Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Alabama petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order that granted a mandamus petition filed by Jeremy B. Jones, and that directed Mobile Circuit Judge Charles Graddick to recuse himself from presiding over Jones's postconviction proceedings. In October 2005, Judge Graddick presided over a trial in which Jones was convicted on four counts of capital murder and was sentenced to death. The jury was sequestered throughout the trial, which lasted several days. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Jones filed a petition for postconviction relief. In that petition Jones alleged that juror "T.E." was unfit to serve on the jury on account of alcohol dependence and that T.E. had failed to answer truthfully certain questions on voir dire regarding his alcohol dependence. According to Jones, posttrial interviews revealed: (1) that T.E. had told Judge Graddick during Jones's trial that he was an alcoholic; (2) that T.E. had received permission from Judge Graddick to drink alcohol during sequestration; and (3) that Judge Graddick did not inform Jones's counsel that T.E. had requested such permission and that Judge Graddick had granted it. Jones's petition alleged juror misconduct, as well as juror incompetence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Judge Graddick would not be a material witness in Jones's postconviction proceedings, no "reasonable person knowing everything that the judge knows would have a 'reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality.'" Thus, the Court held Judge Graddick did not exceed his discretion in denying Jones's motion for his recusal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that he did. The Court granted the State's petition for mandamus. View "Alabama vs. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the admissibility into evidence a child witness's prior inconsistent out-of-court statements. The Court granted certiorari to address this as an issue of first impression: whether a part of the Child Physical and Sexual Abuse Victim Protection Act conflicted with the Alabama Rules of Evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an "inherent tension" existed between the Act and the Rules of Evidence insofar as it permitted a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement of a child witness to be considered substantive evidence of asserted facts when the rules considered those statements as hearsay. "M.L.H." was adjudicated a youthful offender based on the trial court's finding that he was guilty of first-degree sodomy, and he was sentenced accordingly. M.L.H. appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that M.L.H.'s prior out-of-court statements, although admissible as substantive evidence under the Act, were inadmissible as substantive evidence under the rules of evidence. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, finding no conflict between the Act and the rules of evidence. The case was remanded for reassessment of the substantive admissibility of M.L.H.'s prior inconsistent out-of-court statements. View "M. L. H. v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Mitchell was convicted on four counts of capital murder for killing three people during the course of a robbery at a hotel. The jury recommended that Defendant be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parol on each conviction. After considering Defendant's presentence report and holding a sentencing hearing, the trial court overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Defendant to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Defendant petitioned the Supreme COurt for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the appellate court, asserting seventeen separate grounds for review. The Court granted the writ in May 2011, and issued the writ to examine the sole question on whether the trial court complied with Ala. Code 1975 section 13A-5-47(d) and (e). Upon receiving the record, the Court determined the writ was "improvidently issued" and quashed it. The Court found that the trial court fully complied with Alabama Code. View "Mitchell v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Defendant James Beauford Lamb, Jr. appealed the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of his 2004 conviction for first-degree sexual abuse. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in entering a judgment based on an amended written jury verdict that differed from one taken from a direct poll of the jury after it had been discharged from its duty. Alabama case law held that once a jury had been discharged and "left the court's control, the jury could not properly be resummoned to correct or amend an insufficient verdict, and that the judgment entered on the amended verdict of that recalled jury must be reversed." Following precedent, the Supreme Court concluded that the amended verdict would constitute double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's affirmance of the amended verdict and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lamb v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Defendant T.D.M. was convicted on one count of first degree sexual abuse and one count of first degree sodomy. At the end of Defendant's trial, the jury first returned verdicts of guilty and not guilty, respectively. The jury was then discharged. The clerk of the court informed the trial judge that due to a clerical error, the 'not-guilty' verdict was entered incorrectly. The jury was recalled, and each juror polled stated that he/she had voted Defendant guilty on the sodomy charge. Ultimately the trial court entered a corrected judgment finding Defendant guilty on the sodomy charge, and passed sentence accordingly. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed the convictions. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant's constitutional rights against double jeopardy had been violated by the poll of the jury and change in Defendant's sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, Defendant's constitutional rights were violated. The Court reversed the sodomy conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "T. D. M. v. Alabama " on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to reverse Sean Travis Howard's criminal conviction based on the trial court's failure to charge the jury on manslaughter as a lesser offense to capital murder, the offense with which Howard was charged. The Court granted review to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicted with its decision in "Fox v. State." The Court concluded that it did, and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment: "Reckless murder and reckless manslaughter do not involve the same degree of recklessness. … [t]he difference between the circumstances which will support a murder conviction and the degree of risk contemplated by the manslaughter statute is one of degree, not kind. ... [T]he degree of recklessness which will support a manslaughter conviction involves a circumstance which is a 'gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation,' but is not so high that it cannot be 'fairly distinguished from' the mental state required in intentional homicides." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Melvin Jarrett petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum affirming the circuit court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Jarrett challenged his 2006 guilty-plea conviction for one count of failing to comply with the requirement of the Community Notification Act (CNA) that he provide notice of his intent to move his legal residence. Jarrett alleged, as he did before the Court of Criminal Appeals, that his 15-year sentence imposed following his conviction for violating the CNA was illegal. Specifically, Jarrett contended that his offense was complete before October 1, 2005, the effective date of the amendment to the CNA which changed the violation from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C felony. Jarrett argued that the offense to which he pleaded guilty was, at the time he committed it was only a misdemeanor, not a Class C felony, thus, his 15-year sentence was not authorized by law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Jarrett and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' sentence. View "Jarrett v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Defendant Melvin Gene Hodges petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted for the limited purpose of determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court's summary denial of Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief (alleging juror misconduct during the voir dire examination) conflicted with the Court's decision in "Ex parte Burgess." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it did: "The rule of 'Burgess' is that a petitioner seeking relief under Rule 32 for the alleged failure of jurors to respond accurately or truthfully to voir dire questioning is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim, unless it appears on the face of the record that he knew or reasonably should have known of the inaccuracy in time to raise it on appeal." When the State sought a summary dismissal of the claim, Defendant replied that his counsel could not have known about the alleged juror misconduct in time to raise the issue at trial or on appeal. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hodges v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address whether an indigent defendant, who has no right to initially choose a particular court-appointed attorney, had a right to continued representation by a particular court-appointed counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an indigent defendant had such a right. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ because the trial court, when it considered the State's motion, did not evaluate the evidence regarding the question of disqualification and did not weigh the constitutional rights at issue. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the record of Defendant Thomas Lane's case, the Supreme Court concluded "an indigent defendant is not entitled to legal counsel of his choice, when counsel is to be paid by public funds, but rather is entitled to competent legal representation." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lane v. Alabama" on Justia Law