Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. (Turquoise) appealed a circuit court judgment that denied its motion to alter, amend or vacate an arbitration award in an action filed by Clark A. Cooper, David L. Faulkner, Jr., and Hugh and Adrienne Overmyer (collectively, Claimants). Claimants signed purchase and escrow agreements to purchase condominiums to be built as part of "phase I" of a complex Turquoise was developing in Orange Beach. In conjunction with the purchase, they each posted a letter of credit for 20% of the purchase price. When construction neared substantial completion, the Claimants declined to "close" on the purchases on their respective units, allegedly because Turquoise had failed to build an outdoor pool and sundeck area or to provide individual storage units and private cabanas which it had agreed to build and to provide. The purchase and escrow agreements contained an arbitration provision. Claimants' initial demands contained claims of breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The arbitrator entered a lengthy arbitration award containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately in favor of the Claimants. Turquoise filed a motion to modify the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had made a computational error in his calculation of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator did mistakenly calculate damages owed to the claimants. The Court vacated the arbitrator's award and remanded the case for recalculation of damages. View "Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. v. Overmyer" on Justia Law

Capmark Bank appealed a preliminary injunction entered in favor of RGR, LLC; MB Park, LLC; TTM MB Park, LLC; Robert G. Randall; and T. Todd Martin III (referred to collectively as "RGR") which enjoined Capmark from foreclosing on certain real property that served as the primary collateral for a loan from Capmark to RGR, LCC, MB Park, LLC, and TTM MB Park, LLC. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded RGR failed to establish the requisite elements entitling it to a preliminary injunction. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment issuing the injunction. View "Capmark Bank v. RGR, LLC " on Justia Law

Timothy C. Allsopp appealed a trial court's denial of his motion for relief from a judgment entered in favor of James and Kisha Bolding. The Boldings sued Naysa Realty and Investments, LLC, Deleana Davis, Keller-Williams Realty Co., and Allsopp. The Boldings alleged breach of fiduciary duty, and three counts of fraud arising out of real-estate transactions in Madison County. Davis was a principal in Naysa Realty and was employed by Keller-Williams as a real-estate agent. Davis advised the Boldings, who were purchasing property, to give Allsopp power of attorney to sign certain closing documents on their behalf. A default judgment was entered against Allsopp, with leave for the Boldings to prove damages against him later. Allsopp argued on appeal that the evidence against him was insufficient to support the judgment against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's decision and affirmed the judgment in the Boldings' favor. View "Allsopp v. Bolding" on Justia Law

Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. (APS) appealed a grant of summary judgment by the circuit court in favor of 412 South Court Street, LLC (Court Street). SRS Group, LLC, owned by Eugene Sak, began substantial renovations to the Court Street building, including gutting and rebuilding the interior of the structure. Sak entered into negotiations with Make Believe, LLC, to lease space in the building for use as a gym and exercise facility. While he was negotiating with Make Believe, Sak entered into discussions with APS about leasing office space. During the negotiations, APS voiced concerns about having a discreet entrance for APS's clients and about potential noise from a gym facility in the building and that there would not be sufficient parking for APS patients and staff because of the use of the parking lot by members of the gym. Sak assured APS that the noise problem would be solved, that parking would be sufficient for both the gym members and APS, and that when construction of the addition was complete, the gym would have its own separate entrance. Sak sold the building before construction was complete. The new ownership assumed AFS' lease but the discreet entrance was not built. On appeal, APS argued that it was fraudulently induced to sign a lease agreement for space in the building. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record contained substantial evidence to support APS's claim that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, through misrepresentation and the suppression of material facts, Sak fraudulently induced APS to enter into the lease agreement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. v. 412 South Court Street, LLC. " on Justia Law

American Suzuki Motor Corporation petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion to dismiss the claims filed against it by John Burns and Jill S. Hearn. Plaintiffs sued Defendants American Suzuki, several local dealerships and the dealerships' owner, alleging breach of contract based on Suzuki vehicle warranties, diminution in value of their vehicles, fraudulent misrepresentations, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs purported to bring the action on behalf of themselves and all members of a class composed of individuals who had purchased Suzuki vehicles from Defendants and had active warranties or service contracts on those vehicles. According to the complaint, new Suzuki vehicles carried a manufacturer's warranty, and that Defendants also sold purchasers of Suzuki vehicles extended warranties and maintenance agreements. In early March 2009, "the defendants closed dealerships … and [that] there are no other Suzuki dealerships closer than Nashville, Tennessee, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, or Birmingham, Alabama, to perform service work on the warranted vehicles." As a result of the dealerships being closed, Plaintiffs alleged they were "constructively barred from obtaining warranty work on their vehicles." The complaint did not allege that Plaintiffs needed or sought service under the warranties on their vehicles or that any of the Defendants refused to honor the warranties on vehicles. American Suzuki filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of American Suzuki's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting American Suzuki's motion. View "American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Burns" on Justia Law

Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. (the corporation), Robert S. Grant (RSG), and Pam E. Grant (PEG) (collectively referred to as "the Grants") appealed an order striking their jury demands in an action commenced by Frontier Bank (the bank) against the Grants and others alleging breach of contract, fraud, and the fraudulent conveyance of real estate. This case arose out of a loan from the bank to the corporation. The loan ultimately involved a number of related agreements, including a construction-loan agreement between the corporation and the bank and a series of "continuing guaranties," whereby RSG personally guaranteed repayment of the loan. The Supreme Court was unable to reach the merits of the Grants' contentions, and dismissed the appeal because, despite the invocation of Rule 54(b), the trial court's order was not final and appealable. View "Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. v. Frontier Bank " on Justia Law

Sammy Thomas and Pam Thomas appealed the Blount Circuit Court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Sloan Homes, LLC ("Sloan Homes"), David Sloan, and Teresa Sloan in the Thomases' action alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct in relation to the construction of a house by Sloan Homes, the grantor under the residential sales agreement. The question presented by this appeal was whether, under the doctrine of merger, the execution and delivery of the deed in this case nullified an arbitration clause included in the antecedent residential sales agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause was still valid, thereby affirming the circuit court's order granting Sloan Homes and the Sloans' motion to compel arbitration of the Thomases' claims. View "Thomas v. Sloan Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Faye Gilmer sued Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. ("Crestview"), Garland Jones, Barry Taul, and Mary Caldwell, alleging claims related to services Crestview had provided with regard to the funeral of Mrs. Gilmer's husband. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all the claims against them. Mrs. Gilmer appealed, and the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the claims against Jones, (2) affirmed the negligent-supervision claim against Jones and Crestview, and (3) affirmed the negligent- or wanton-conduct claim against all the defendants. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the tort-of-outrage, suppression, and breach-of-contract claims against Crestview, Taul, and Caldwell. The case was then remanded the case for further proceedings. Taul and Caldwell were eventually dismissed from the action. The trial court granted Mrs. Gilmer's motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on the breach-of-contract claim. The suppression and tort-of-outrage claims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in Crestview's favor on the tort-of-outrage claim and in Gilmer's favor on the suppression claim. Crestview appealed the trial court's judgment as to the breach-of-contract and suppression claims, as well as the compensatory-damages and punitive-damages awards. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the breach-of-contract and suppression claims: "Crestview presented substantial evidence creating a question of fact requiring resolution by the jury as to the materiality of the alleged breach of the contract, the trial court erred in entering a JML in favor of Gilmer with regard to that claim." Moreover, the Court was unable to determine from the lump-sum award of compensatory damages what damages were assessed with regard to the suppression claim and the breach-of-contract claim, respectively: "[t]herefore, we must reverse the trial court's judgment as to both claims and remand the case for a new trial on the suppression and breach-of-contract claims." View "Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. v. Gilmer" on Justia Law

Branson Machinery, LLC appealed a circuit court's decision that set aside a default judgment granted in its favor against Hilltop Tractor, LLC and Jeffrey Williams. According to Branson, Hilltop owed it money for equipment it had purchased. Because it had not received payment, Branson filed a breach-of-contract action against Hilltop and Mr. Williams. The Blount Circuit Court entered a default judgment in favor of Branson. Following the entry of the default judgment, Branson's counsel engaged Hilltop and Mr. Williams (acting without counsel) in settlement negotiations. The parties negotiated a "workout" agreement, and at some point, Hilltop became unable to meet the payment terms. Branson filed garnishment paperwork with the trial court seeking to enforce the original default judgment. Hilltop and Mr. Williams hired counsel and successfully moved the court to set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Hilltop and Mr. Williams' motion to set aside the default judgment. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case to reinstate the original default judgment. View "Branson Machinery, LLC v. Hilltop Tractor, LLC" on Justia Law

The Industrial Development Board of the City of Montgomery (IDB) appealed a circuit court's interlocutory order that denied its motion for summary judgment as to a breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by George and Thomas Russell as co-executors and co-trustees of the wills and testamentary trusts of Earnest and Myrtis Russell, Price and Mary McLemore and several others. In 2001, various officials of the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, the Montgomery County Commission, Montgomery Chamber of Commerce and the local water works board began making preparations to secure options to purchase property in the Montgomery area in an attempt to persuade Hyundai Motor Company to build an automobile plant in the area. All the trusts owned acres of land in the targeted area. The IDB signed separate options with the Russells, the McLemores and other trusts to purchase the respective properties. Hyundai's plans for its manufacturing plant changed, and subsequently, not all of the options were exercised. The Russells and the McLemores each filed breach-of-contract actions against the IDB and Hyundai alleging that neither adhered to the terms of their respective options. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the IDB's motion for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Indust. Develop. Bd. of the City of Montgomery v. Russell" on Justia Law