Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clay Merches petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. The underlying case concerned a missing flatbed trailer owned by Builders Transportation, a Tennessee company. The plaintiffs were Alabama residents. The complaint alleged that the parties had entered into a contract in which Builders Transportation and Dwight Bassett (employee of Builders Transportation) had agreed to pay the plaintiffs $10,000 in return for information about the location of the missing trailer. The plaintiffs further alleged that Builders Transportation and Bassett had breached that contract by failing to pay the plaintiffs $10,000 for the information given about the trailer, which was located in a field in Hale County. Instead of receiving $10,000, the plaintiffs were arrested in Hale County and charged with receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit theft of property. Those charges were later dismissed. In July 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Merches, an employee of Builder Transportation as a defendant. The claims and factual allegations made against Merches in the amended complaint were the same as those made against Builders Transportation and Bassett. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Merches lacked sufficient contact with Alabama to support the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Accordingly, the Court issued the writ.View "Brantley v. Bassett" on Justia Law

Petitioners B2K Systems, LLC, a Delaware limited-liability company; Ingenuity International, LLC, a foreign corporation; and Robert A. Przybysz, sought a writ of mandamus seeking enforcement of an outbound forum-selection clause and the reversal of a preliminary injunction entered by an Alabama Circuit Court. This matter arose out of a business dispute. Respondent Nannette Smith, was the founder and president of, and the sole shareholder in, B2K Systems, Inc., a Birmingham-based Alabama corporation that developed specialized software for point-of-sale retailers. In 2012, B2K, Inc. sold its assets to B2K Systems, LLC (a corporation set up for the purpose of acquiring B2K Inc's assets). Przybysz, the managing member and CEO of B2K LLC and Ingenuity, executed the promissory note on behalf of B2K LLC and the guaranty agreement on behalf of Ingenuity. That same day, B2K LLC and Smith entered into the employment agreement, pursuant to which Smith became president of B2K LLC. Each agreement (an asset-purchase agreement, employment agreement, promissory note, and guaranty agreement) contained a forum-selection clause. All the agreements provided that the law of the State of Delaware would govern (the forum selection clauses in each lie at the heart of this appeal). Following the purchase, relations between Smith and B2K LLC deteriorated. In 2014, Przybysz acted to terminate Smith's employment with B2K LLC, "for cause." The same day, B2K LLC filed for and received a temporary restraining order ("TRO") from a Kent, Michigan Circuit Court. Along with its request for the TRO, B2K LLC filed a lawsuit against Smith alleging breach of Smith's employment agreement with B2K LLC, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the asset-purchase agreement. The day after the Michigan TRO was issued, Smith filed a complaint and a petition for a TRO in Alabama ("the trial court"), seeking her own TRO against the petitioners and also seeking monetary damages for breach of the employment contract and the promissory note. The Alabama court issued the TRO. Petitioners then moved to dissolve the TRO and to dismiss Smith's lawsuit, arguing, in part, that under the various forum-selection clauses contained in the parties' agreements, either the Kent, Michigan Circuit Court or the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan were the exclusive forums for Smith's lawsuit. Smith argued that venue in the Alabama court was proper, that the forum-selection clauses were permissive rather than mandatory, and that Michigan was a seriously inconvenient forum. The trial court noted that the forum-selection clauses were "inartful" and concluded that venue was proper in both Alabama and Michigan. The petitioners filed this petition for a writ of mandamus 13 days after the entry of the preliminary injunction. Because the Alabama Supreme Court was presented "with no viable argument or citation of authority regarding the proper standards for interpreting or enforcing the forum-selection clauses at issue," it declined "to disturb the trial court's determination that its exercise of authority in this case was not prohibited by those clauses." As such, petitioners failed to establish a clear legal right to the dismissal of Smith's action based on the forum-selection clauses. As to the venue issue, the petition for the writ of mandamus was also denied: Smith failed to convince the Court that, without the injunction, she would suffer irreparable injury. View "Smith v. B2K Systems, LLC et al" on Justia Law

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Clarke Circuit Court to vacate its order denying State Farm's motion to transfer this case to the Mobile Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The underlying action arose from an automobile accident that occurred in Mobile County in 2010. Sandra Banks, a resident of both Clarke and Mobile Counties, sued Robert Spray, a resident of Baldwin County, and State Farm. Banks alleged that she suffered injuries as a result of the wrongful, negligent, and/or wanton conduct of Spray when the vehicle he was driving and owned struck her vehicle. Additionally, Banks alleged that at the time of the accident she had a policy of insurance with State Farm, which included uninsured-/underinsured-motorist coverage, and that she was due proceeds under her coverage. Because both the "convenience of parties and witnesses" and the "interest of justice" prongs of the doctrine of forum non conveniens compelled the transfer of this case from Clarke County to Mobile County, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer the action. Therefore, the Court granted State Farm's petition and issued a writ directing the Clarke Circuit Court to vacate its order and to enter an order granting the motion.View "Banks v. Spray" on Justia Law

Paul Kennamer and Dorothy Kennamer appeal an order entered by the Marshall Circuit Court compelling them to arbitrate their claims against Ford Motor Credit Company LLC and Ray Pearman Lincoln, Inc. (the dealership). The Kennamers had problems with the used car they purchased and stopped making payments on the loan they obtained through Ford Credit and the dealership. After review of the retail-installment contract at the center of this controversy, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision insofar as it granted the dealership's motion to compel arbitration and reversed insofar as it granted Ford Credit's motion to compel arbitration. View "Kennamer v. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC" on Justia Law

In late 2005 or early 2006, Corey Culverhouse began constructing a house for himself on a five-acre lot in Hartford. He obtained a policy from Alfa Mutual Insurance Company to insure the house during the remainder of the construction process and after construction was completed. In 2009, a minor fire damaged the kitchen of the house. Culverhouse submitted a claim to Alfa, which paid for a remediation company to clean and repair the smoke damage caused by the fire. During this process, Culverhouse moved out of the house and into a barn on his property. After about two weeks of living in the barn, Culverhouse moved into a house he was constructing for eventual sale across the road from his house. Later that year, another fire damaged the house. This time, the fire could not be extinguished, and the house, its contents, and an adjacent swimming pool were completely destroyed. Culverhouse promptly informed Alfa. Alfa immediately questioned the Culverhouse's claim because he had not submitted with his claim an inventory of the contents of the house and supporting documentation, and he had not submitted any evidence supporting the large claim he had submitted for loss of use in the two-month period prior to the second fire. Culverhouse ultimately sued Alfa for payment of the claim. A hearing on the summary-judgment motion was held on in 2013, and the trial court granted Alfa's motion and dismissed each of Culverhouse's claims; the trial court also dismissed an Alfa counterclaim as moot. Culverhouse thereafter retained a new attorney and, on moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its order. The trial court granted Culverhouse's motion in part and amended its summary-judgment order so as to exclude Culverhouse's breach-of-contract claim from the judgment, leaving it as the only remaining claim in the case. Alfa's argument on appeal did not relate to the merits of Culverhouse's breach-of-contract claim. Rather, it concerned only whether the trial court acted properly by amending its summary-judgment order to resurrect that claim in response to Culverhouse's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "ALFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Culverhouse " on Justia Law

Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. sued Edgetech I.G.,Inc., n/k/a Quanex I.G. Systems, Inc.; Quanex Building Products Corporation; Thompson I.G., LLC, and RDM Consulting, LLC; and Wynne Enterprises, Inc. Edgetech filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction; the trial court denied the motion. Edgetech then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the Supreme Court direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting the motion and dismissing the case against it. Finding that the trial court erred in denying Edgetech's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court granted Edgetech's petition and issued the writ. View "Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. v. Thompson I.G., LLC et al. " on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association and U.S. Bancorp sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss the malicious-prosecution case filed against them by Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. that arose out of a lawsuit prosecuted by U.S. Bank entirely in the State of Washington. The principle of "lex loci delicti" requires that the law of the state in which the antecedent lawsuit was terminated in favor of the complaining party governs a malicious-prosecution claim. Thus, Washington law governed Sterne Agee's claim of malicious prosecution. Accordingly, U.S. Bank's petition for writ for mandamus was granted, and the circuit court was ordered to dismiss Sterne Agee's malicious-prosecution case.View "Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

AutoSource Motors, LLC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court: (1) to vacate its order denying AutoSource's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Stephanie Chamberlain for lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) to enter an order granting AutoSource's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The controversy arose when Chamberlain purchased a vehicle from AutoSource via the Internet. Chamberlain's affidavit did not rebut the prima facie showing made by AutoSource in that her affidavit failed to establish that AutoSource was subject to suit in Alabama pursuant to either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction; consequently, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in denying AutoSource's motion to dismiss Chamberlain's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. AutoSource demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; the Supreme Court granted its petition and issued the writ. View "Chamberlain v. AutoSource Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Merchants Bank appealed a Circuit Court judgment in favor of Elizabeth Head on Merchants Bank's claim against her alleging breach of a promissory note. After the 2008 promissory note at issue was executed, Merchants Bank wired the $400,000 to Elizabeth's husband, David Head's, personal account. David testified that he then wrote a check distributing the funds to his real-estate-development company, Head Companies, LLC. The Heads renewed the 2008 promissory note in March 2009 and again in March 2010, in August 2010, in February 2011, and, finally, in July 2011. With the exception of the July 2011 renewal, each renewal was signed on page three by both David and Elizabeth. A box on page two was left blank. On the initial version of the July 2011 renewal of the note, however, Elizabeth signed in both the box on page two, indicating that she intended to "give [Merchants Bank] a security interest" in the Heads' personal residence, and at the end of the document on page three. signature on page two of the initial July 2011 note was "a mistake in the nature of a scrivener's error and [Merchants] Bank subsequently had the Heads execute a corrected note, which they did knowingly and voluntarily." Elizabeth presented no evidence to the contrary. The "corrected note" bore the same date as the initial July 2011 note and, like all the previous renewals, was signed by both David and Elizabeth on page three of the document only. The box on page two of the corrected July 2011 note was left blank. The Heads defaulted on the promissory note in April 2012. In September 2012, Merchants Bank sued the Heads, alleging breach of the promissory note and attaching to the complaint the initial July 2011 note as evidence of the debt. David did not answer the complaint, and Merchants Bank obtained a default judgment against him in the amount of $415,142.57 plus interest on the judgment. Elizabeth did answer the complaint, arguing that the note was unenforceable against her because she had signed the initial July 2011 note only to give a security interest in her and David's residence not "for the purpose of agreeing to pay the debt evidenced thereby" and because she had not received consideration for her signature on the note. Merchants Bank moved for a summary judgment against Elizabeth. That motion was denied. After a bench trial in March 2013, the circuit court entered a final judgment in favor of Elizabeth. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Elizabeth renewed her obligations under the 2008 promissory note in the capacity of a maker in July 2011, and that her obligations under the 2008 promissory note were supported by valid consideration. It was undisputed that she and David defaulted on their obligations under the corrected July 2011 note. Thus, Elizabeth was liable to Merchants Bank on its claim of breach of promissory note, and the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in her favor. View "Merchants Bank v. Head " on Justia Law

Bryant Bank appealed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants Talmage Kirkland & Company, Inc., d/b/a Kirkland & Company ("TKC"), and Quentin Ball and Jason Stoutamire, appraisers for TKC. This case arose out of an appraisal of real property conducted by TKC for Bryant Bank in the course of Bryant Bank's consideration of a loan application submitted by Wallace Seafood Traders, Inc. ("WST"), in September 2007 for the purchase of the property, which WST was renting and out of which it was operating its business. The Bryant Bank employees responsible for approving WST's loan application suspected that the value of the property might have been overstated in TKC's appraisal. However, Bryant Bank approved WST's loan application and issued the loan to WST. Ultimately, WST defaulted on the loan. Bryant Bank obtained another appraisal of the property from a different appraisal firm; this new appraisal indicated that the property had a value that differed drastically from that which TKC had appraised. Bryant Bank sued the defendants, alleging breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation arising from its reliance on TKC's appraisal report in issuing the loan to WST. In their partial-summary-judgment motion, the defendants argued that Ball and Stoutamire were entitled to a summary judgment as to the breach-of-contract claim because they were acting as agents of a disclosed principal, Bryant Bank. As to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the defendants argued that they were entitled to a summary judgment in their favor because: (1) the opinion of value expressed in TKC's appraisal report could not serve as the basis of a negligent-misrepresentation claim; (2) Bryant Bank had not relied upon TKC's valuation; and (3) the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court concluded the Bank presented substantial evidence that it relied on TKC's appraisal of the property, and that each of the arguments defendants raised in their partial-summary-judgment motion did not warrant the entry of a summary judgment in their favor with respect to the Bank's negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bryant Bank v. Talmage Kirkland & Company, Inc." on Justia Law