Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Town & Country Property, L.L.C., and Town & Country Ford, L.L.C. (collectively referred to as "T&C") appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment Amerisure Insurance Company and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company (collectively referred to as "Amerisure"), holding that Amerisure was not obligated to pay a $650,100 judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of T&C and against Amerisure's insured, Jones-Williams Construction Company, because, the trial court reasoned, the faulty construction of the T&C facility upon which the judgment was based was not an "occurrence" covered under the commercial general-liability ("CGL") insurance policy Amerisure had issued Jones-Williams. On October 21, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed in part the judgment entered by the trial court, agreeing that faulty construction did not in and of itself constitute an occurrence for CGL-policy purposes and that, accordingly, "Amerisure was not required to indemnify Jones-Williams for the judgment entered against it insofar as the damages represented the costs of repairing or replacing the faulty work." On remand, the parties filed briefs with the trial court: T&C argued that the vast majority of the $650,100 judgment should be attributed to covered damage, while Amerisure argued that the damages T&C sought for the repair and/or replacement of defective construction exceeded the amount of the verdict and thus none of the judgment should be attributed to covered damage to personal property or nondefective portions of the T&C property. In its order resolving the issue on remand, the trial court identified $257,500 in damages claimed by T&C at trial as representing the repair or replacement of faulty construction. It therefore subtracted that amount from the $650,100 awarded by the jury and awarded T&C $392,600 plus interest and costs. Upon a review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the $392,600 judgment entered by the trial court was not supported by the evidence. The judgment entered by the trial court on remand was accordingly reversed, and the case was again remanded for the trial court to enter a final judgment in favor of T&C for the amount of damages the Supreme Court deemed T&C was entitled to: $600. View "Town & Country Property, L.L.C. v. Amerisure Insurance Co. " on Justia Law

White-Spunner Construction, Inc., and Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford") appealed the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney fees in favor of Construction Completion Company, LLC ("CCC"), in CCC's action alleging that White-Spunner failed to pay it for labor and materials it provided as a subcontractor to White-Spunner in the fall of 2008 in conjunction with White-Spunner's work as the general contractor on a public-works project at Auburn University CCC cross-appealed, arguing that the Mobile Circuit Court erred in dismissing its bad-faith and fraud claims against Hartford, which had issued payment bonds to White-Spunner for the project. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment based on the fact that CCC's claims against White-Spunner and Hartford stemmed from an illegal contract CCC entered into with an unlicensed contractor that provided that contractor's employees would complete the work CCC was contracted to perform. As a result of this reversal, the Court dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "White-Spunner Construction, Inc. v. Construction Completion Company, LLC" on Justia Law

David Bennett and Bennett & Bennett Construction, Inc. ("Bennett") appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of the claims alleging fraud in the inducement and the tort of outrage brought against them by Barbara and Leotes Skinner. The Skinners entered into a construction-services contract with Bennett, pursuant to which Bennett was to renovate and remodel their residence located in Oxford. After disagreements developed between the parties, the Skinners sued Bennett, alleging claims of breach of contract; breach of warranty; fraud in the inducement; assault and battery; the tort of outrage; and negligence, wantonness and recklessness. Bennett moved to compel arbitration of all claims, arguing that, because each of the claims alleged by the Skinners arose from the construction-services contract or were related to the construction-services contract, the claims were subject to arbitration. Furthermore, Bennett argued that the tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and that the Skinners should not be allowed to avoid arbitration because they cast their claim as a tort. The Skinners responded, arguing that their agreement to the arbitration clause in the contract was obtained fraudulently. The trial court denied Bennett's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Skinners' tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and thus was a proper claim for arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Skinner " on Justia Law

Northstar Battery Company, LLC ("Northstar"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Cullman Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Northstar's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Apel Steel Corporation ("Apel") and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The case stemmed from a contract in which Apel Steel was working as a subcontractor for a battery manufacturing plant in Springfield, Missouri. Northstar Battery, owner of the plant, contracted with Walton Construction to serve as general contractor. Apel had further subcontracted a portion of its work to JS Nationwide, who erected structural steel at the plant. Sparks from welding started a fire which resulted in the destruction of property/equipment, and caused heat and smoke damage in the affected area of the plant. The contract between Apel and Walton contained a provision by which Apel allegedly waived all rights against JS Nationwide. Counts against Northstar alleged negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, misrepresentation and conspiracy. Northstar moved to dismiss citing lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that Apel failed to carry its jurisdictional burden, the Supreme Court held that the trial court "clearly" erred in denying Northstar's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court granted Northstar's petition and issued the writ. View "Apel Steel Corporation v. JS Nationwide Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law

Employers Mutual Casualty Company (Employers Mutual) appealed a circuit court's denial of its motion to intervene in a pending case. Holman Building Company was sued by multiple homeowners who claimed their homes were poorly built from inferior building materials with poor quality workmanship. In 2010, Employers Mutual moved to intervene in the action, asserting that it had issued Holman commercial general-liability and umbrella policies that covered some if not all of the allegations made by the homeowners. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employers Mutual's permissive intervention: "given the complexity of this case, the trial court was clearly within ints discretion to deny Employers Mutual's request to intervene for the purpose of obtaining a bifurcated trial of insurance-coverage issues or a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories ... this case provides a prime example of the need for discretion in a trial court's ruling on an insurer's motion for permissive intervention." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the insurance company's intervention. View "Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Holman Building Co., LLC et al. " on Justia Law

Town & Country Property, L.L.C., and Town & Country Ford, L.L.C. (T&C), sued Amerisure Insurance Company and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company (Amerisure) and its insured, Jones-Williams Construction Company, Inc., alleging that Amerisure was obligated to pay a $650,100 judgment entered in favor of T&C and against Jones-Williams in a separate action pursuant to a commercial general-liability insurance policy Amerisure had issued Jones-Williams. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Amerisure, and T&C appealed. Specifically, the trial court held that Amerisure was not required to indemnify Jones-Williams because there had been no occurrence invoking coverage under the policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment to the extent the awarded damages represented the costs of repairing or replacing faulty work covered under the liability policy. The Court remanded the case to the trial court so that it could consider arguments from the parties to determine if any of the damages awarded represented compensation for damaged property. View "Town & Country Property, L.L.C.v. Amerisure Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. (Turquoise) appealed a circuit court judgment that denied its motion to alter, amend or vacate an arbitration award in an action filed by Clark A. Cooper, David L. Faulkner, Jr., and Hugh and Adrienne Overmyer (collectively, Claimants). Claimants signed purchase and escrow agreements to purchase condominiums to be built as part of "phase I" of a complex Turquoise was developing in Orange Beach. In conjunction with the purchase, they each posted a letter of credit for 20% of the purchase price. When construction neared substantial completion, the Claimants declined to "close" on the purchases on their respective units, allegedly because Turquoise had failed to build an outdoor pool and sundeck area or to provide individual storage units and private cabanas which it had agreed to build and to provide. The purchase and escrow agreements contained an arbitration provision. Claimants' initial demands contained claims of breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The arbitrator entered a lengthy arbitration award containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately in favor of the Claimants. Turquoise filed a motion to modify the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had made a computational error in his calculation of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator did mistakenly calculate damages owed to the claimants. The Court vacated the arbitrator's award and remanded the case for recalculation of damages. View "Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. v. Overmyer" on Justia Law

Sammy Thomas and Pam Thomas appealed the Blount Circuit Court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Sloan Homes, LLC ("Sloan Homes"), David Sloan, and Teresa Sloan in the Thomases' action alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct in relation to the construction of a house by Sloan Homes, the grantor under the residential sales agreement. The question presented by this appeal was whether, under the doctrine of merger, the execution and delivery of the deed in this case nullified an arbitration clause included in the antecedent residential sales agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause was still valid, thereby affirming the circuit court's order granting Sloan Homes and the Sloans' motion to compel arbitration of the Thomases' claims. View "Thomas v. Sloan Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, Massachusetts Defendant No. 1 Steel Products, Inc. (No. 1 Steel) was a subcontractor on a construction project at a health rehabilitation center in Massachusetts (Cape Regency project). While working on the project, No. 1 Steel determined that it needed to hire out some of the steel fabrication for which it was responsible. No. 1 Steel found Alabama Plaintiff Garrison Steel Fabricators, Inc. (Garrison). No. 1 Steel was dissatisfied with Garrison's work and refused to pay Garrison anything beyond what it had previously paid. In an attempt to collect the remaining amount owed, Garrison sent No. 1 Steel notice that it intended to file mechanic's liens on the project unless it was paid. Upon receiving the notice, No. 1 Steel filed a motion in Massachusetts court to discharge and release the not-yet-filed-lien, arguing that Garrison was not registered to do business in Massachusetts and that no written contract of the parties' agreement existed. The Massachusetts court granted the motion without stating a rationale. In 2009 Garrison sued No. 1 Steel in Alabama court, asserting claims of open account, implied contract and labor and work performed. No. 1 Steel moved to dismiss, arguing a lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the "specific contacts" No. 1 Steel had were not sufficient enough that it should have anticipated being haled into court in Alabama; No. 1 Steel's relationship with Garrison was limited to a one-time purchase of customized goods. The Court directed the trial court to dismiss Garrison's case because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over No. 1 Steel. View "Garrison Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. No. 1 Steel Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Willard Ryals appealed a trial court's order enforcing a creditor's judgment against him in favor of Respondent Lathan Company, Inc. (Lathan). In 2004, Lathan sued Ryals Construction Company for breach of a construction sub-contract. The contract called for Ryals to obtain workers' compensation insurance for the project. Lathan claimed it made an advance payment for the insurance. When Ryals failed to get the insurance, Lathan sued. No one appeared on behalf of Ryals on the trial date. A default judgment was entered on behalf of Lathan. Two years later, Lathan tried to collect on its default judgment by serving a post-judgment discovery request on Ryals Construction. The request went unanswered. Lathan filed a motion for sanctions, naming "Ryals Real Estate," Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction Company. Through counsel, Willard Ryals moved to strike the motion for sanctions which the trial court granted. Lathan then amended its complaint to substitute Willard Ryals with fictitious parties. Rather than re-allege the allegations of its first complaint, Lathan sought to hold Ryals Real Estate and Willard Ryals liable as alter egos for the judgment it held against Ryals Construction Company. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that Lathan's amended complaint did not technically substitute Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate for fictitiously named parties in the original complaint; it added them and asserted a new cause of action. The court found that Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction were liable for the creditor judgment. Willard Ryals appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lathan's amended complaint. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as void: "The trial court's attempt to treat Lathan's amended complaint as a new action was in words only and was not sufficient to commence a new action." Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter its judgment against Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate. View "Ryals v. Lathan Company, Inc." on Justia Law