Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Anthony Ray Hinton petitioned the Jefferson Circuit Court for relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., arguing that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to provide a qualified expert in his defense at his capital-murder trial. The circuit court denied Hinton's Rule 32 petition on the basis that Andrew Payne, the expert retained by defense counsel, was qualified to testify as a firearms-identification expert at Hinton's trial. Hinton appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals; the Court of Criminal Appeals, after remanding twice for the circuit court to address the issue, affirmed the circuit court's denial of Hinton's petition. Hinton then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did indeed base its determination that Payne was qualified to testify as an expert upon the "cold trial record." As a result, it was in no better position than was an appellate court to make the determination it made. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for it to apply a de novo standard of review in reviewing the circuit court's judgment that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms-identification expert. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The Phenix City Board of Education ("the Board") sought mandamus relief from the Russell Circuit Court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment on claims brought against it by The Lisle Company, Inc. ("Lisle"). Because the Board is immune from suit pursuant to § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ. View "Lisle Company, Inc. v. Phenix City Board of Education" on Justia Law

East Alabama Medical Center ("EAMC") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Randolph Circuit Court to transfer the action filed against it by John Tinney to the Lee Circuit Court. Tinney represented Jerry Benefield in a personal-injury action arising out of a motor-vehicle accident. Benefield was treated at EAMC for injuries he sustained in the accident. EAMC filed a hospital lien in Lee County for $3,361 against any recovery Benefield might receive in settlement of his personal-injury action. Tinney recovered a settlement for Benefield. As part of the settlement, Progressive Insurance Company issued a check made payable to EAMC and Tinney in the amount of $3,361. Tinney then filed the underlying lawsuit against EAMC in the Randolph Circuit Court, claiming that he had asked EAMC to allow him to receive 40% of the lien check as an attorney fee but that EAMC "failed and refused to negotiate the check or to agree on a division of the money." EAMC moved to transfer the action to Lee County stating that its principal office is located in Opelika, Lee County; that Lee County is where all actions taken by EAMC, such as telephone calls and letters, occurred; and that EAMC has no facilities and does no business by agent in Randolph County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that EAMC proved that venue was not proper in Randolph County, therefore the trial court erred in denying EAMC's motion to transfer the case to Lee County. View "Tinney v. East Alabama Medical Center" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the bank's motion to strike a jury demand in the complaint filed against it by Plaintiff Thomas L. Busby and to enter an order granting the Bank's motion, thereby enforcing Busby's waiver of a jury trial. The dispute arose from a construction loan to which Plaintiff Busby guaranteed. The loan agreement contained the jury trial waiver in the event of a dispute between the parties. The borrower defaulted on the loan, and the bank sought payment from Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the bank, alleging multiple counts of fraud, misrepresentation and breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank demonstrated that it had a clear legal right to have the jury demand stricken. Accordingly the Court granted the petition, issued the writ, and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the bank's motion. View "Busby v. BancorpSouth Bank" on Justia Law

Christopher Anthony Floyd petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming his capital-murder conviction and his subsequent death sentence. The Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, following its plain-error review, failed to recognize as prejudicial any plain error it found in the proceeding in the trial court. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari review to consider: (1) whether the State used its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner in violation of "Batson v. Kentucky," (476 U.S. 79 (1986)); (2) whether the trial court properly excluded certain statements to police as inadmissible hearsay; and (3) whether the trial court properly denied Floyd's motion for a new trial based on allegedly newly discovered evidence. The Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision based on the Batson issue and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Floyd v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Shirley Spencer and Christy Gee petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Greene Circuit Court to vacate its judgment granting the motion of K & K Excavating, LLC ("K & K"), to enforce a forum-selection clause and transferring the petitioners' action against K & K to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. In 2007, Spencer contracted with K & K for the installation of a septic system at the petitioners' house in Eutaw. The petitioners separately contracted with S. Boyd, Inc. ("Boyd"), to conduct the excavation work necessary to install the septic system. The contract between the parties included a forum-selection clause. When mediation of the case proved unsuccessful, the Greene Circuit Court ordered another pretrial conference to be held. K & K filed a reply brief in support of the transfer motion. The Greene Circuit Court ultimately entered an order granting the transfer motion as to K & K and severing the petitioners' claims against K & K from those asserted against the Boyd defendants; the Greene Circuit Court denied the transfer motion as to the Boyd defendants. The petitioners did not challenge the validity of the forum selection clause. Instead, the petitioners argued only that K & K waived its right to enforce the forum-selection clause "by defending the lawsuit in Greene County for two years, through multiple pretrial conferences and completion of party discovery." The Supreme Court agreed. Under the facts of this case, K & K's substantial invocation of the litigation process in Greene County clearly evinced its intention to abandon its right to enforce the forum-selection clause in favor of the judicial process. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting the transfer motion. View "Spencer v. S. Boyd, Inc." on Justia Law

Carolyn Wilson Floyd petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Thomas ap R. Jones of the Hale Circuit Court to set aside his order denying her motion to dismiss the will contest filed by Carlean Wilson Wakefield on the ground that the action was barred by section 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, which provides that an action to contest a will must be filed within six months after the admission of the will to probate. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded that Floyd properly invoked the jurisdiction of the Court, and showed a clear legal right to the dismissal of the will contest because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the contest. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of mandamus was granted and the circuit court was directed to grant Floyd's motion to dismiss Wakefield's will contest. View "In re: Estate of S.L. Wilson, Sr." on Justia Law

Mark Allen Jenkins was convicted in March 1991 of two counts of capital murder which was committed during the course of a robbery and during the course of a kidnapping. By a vote of 10-2, the jury recommended that Jenkins be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Jenkins to death. In early 2012, the Supreme Court granted Jenkins's petition for a writ of certiorari only as to the ground challenging the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's order dismissing Jenkins's Rule 32 petition on the bases that the trial court adopted verbatim the State's proposed order, and the Court held in abeyance the other grounds raised in Jenkins's petition pending resolution of this issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it upheld the trial court's adoption of the State's proposed order denying Jenkins's Rule 32 petition; as to the remaining grounds the Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. View "Jenkins v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Carson Sweeney petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order of May 26, 2011, insofar as the order granted Timmy Joe Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's demand for a trial by jury in Holland's trespass action against him. In 2010, Holland sued Sweeney, alleging that Sweeney had entered Holland's property and damaged it by, among other things, "remov[ing] trees, timber and other foliage, [and] soil"; "redirect[ing] water flow"; and "install[ing] drainage apparatuses." The complaint stated the following causes of action: "trespass - trespass to chattels," negligence, negligent supervision, and conversion. The circuit court ultimately entered an order that, among other things, granted in part and denied in part Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint. In its order, the circuit court found that Sweeney's failure to file his answer and counter-complaint in a timely manner "was unreasonable and inherently prejudicial" to Holland and that "[g]ood cause has not been shown for said failure." Nonetheless, the circuit court denied Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint because, the circuit court said, "the interest of preserving a litigant's right of trial on the merits is paramount." However, the circuit court granted Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's demand for a jury trial, concluding that Sweeney had "waived his right to demand a trial by jury." Sweeney filed a "motion for reconsideration, modification, new hearing, or in the alternative, motion to alter, amend or vacate" the order striking his jury-trial demand, which the circuit court denied. Sweeney then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus, seeking relief from the circuit court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Sweeney demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought in his petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Holland v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision that denied her second petition for a writ of mandamus in a child-custody matter. The Supreme Court granted Jennifer's petition to examine the rationale applied by the Court of Civil Appeals, which appeared to be premised upon a perceived conflict between Ala. Code 1975, section 6-5-440 and Ala. Code 1975, section 30-3-5. Jennifer argued on appeal that the Court of Civil Appeals' rationale conflicted with the mandate of 6-5-440: it did not follow from the principle that venue in child-custody-modification proceedings could be waived and that a forum-shopping parent could "file a postdivorce proceeding in an improper venue and thereby bar the other former spouse from filing a postdivorce proceeding in the proper venue," because the respondent parent could always object in his or her first responsive pleading in the court in which venue is alleged to be improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded this case for further consideration of 6-5-440 and any other arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis. View "Vest v. Vest " on Justia Law