Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The president of the University of South Alabama and several hospital administrators petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order that denied their motion for summary judgment, and to enter an order granting their motion. The underlying suit arose from a contract dispute between the University and the former dean of the College of Medicine, Dr. Richard Teplick. Changes in duties to University Hospital administration lead to the elimination of certain positions and a reassignment of Dr. Teplick's duties. Dr. Teplick was unhappy with the reassignment and the University's substitution. Dr. Teplick sued the University and administration in their official and individual capacities alleging among other things, a violation of his due process rights, bad faith, emotional distress, punitive damages, backpay and reinstatement (or "front pay" in lieu of reinstatement). The University answered Dr. Teplick's complaint, raising among other defenses, immunity under Article I of the Alabama Constitution. The University moved for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order denying the University's motion without making any findings of fact or conclusions of law. In a lengthy review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded the University demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief they requested. The Court granted the petition for the writ and directed the circuit court to enter summary judgment in the University's favor. View "In re: Teplick v. Moulton" on Justia Law

Petitioners James Waltman and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their respective motions to transfer the underlying action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The underlying case arose from a truck accident in which a utility trailer Waltman was towing disconnected from his vehicle and struck Respondent John Owens' truck. Owens was injured from the accident. Owens filed suit against Waltman, Progressive and GEICO Indemnity Company, including a workers' compensation claim against his employer Griffin Wood, alleging that he was working within the scope of his employment when the accident took place. Owens filed the action in Perry County because Griffin Wood's principal place of business was in Perry County. Waltman filed a motion to transfer venue, contending that a more appropriate forum would be Tuscaloosa since the accident took place in Tuscaloosa County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Waltman's and Progressive's motions for change of venue, and granted their petitions for the writ of mandamus. The Court directed the Perry Circuit Court to transfer the case. View "Owens v. Griffin Wood Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough each petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decisions in their respective cases. The Court granted their petitions and consolidated the cases because both presented the same issue of first impression for the Court's consideration: whether the term "child" as used in section 26-15-3.2, Ala. Code 1975 (the chemical endangerment statute), included an unborn child. The appellate court concluded that it did, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court of Criminal Appeals judgments was affirmed in both cases. View "Ankrom v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Carl Weaver appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint filed against him by Roger D. Firestone. In May 1995, Firestone, Charles T. Amberson, Jr., and Darrell Thomas were assaulted, battered, and burned. Amberson and Thomas died from their injuries; Firestone suffered extensive physical injuries and incurred over $1,000,000 in medical expenses. In August 2012, Charles Richard Tooley, L.C. Collins, Jr., and Mickie Wayne Collins pled guilty to attempted murder as to Firestone. On August 20, 2012, Firestone sued Weaver; Tooley; Collins, Jr.; Collins; and fictitiously named parties A-M. Recognizing that his causes of action were filed outside their respective limitations periods, Firestone noted in his complaint that the defendants then-recently led guilty, and it was not until recently that Firestone discovered the identity of the [individuals] who had attacked him "because of the fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy and the identity of the conspirators." After conducting a hearing on Weaver's motion to dismiss, the trial court denied Weaver's motion, concluding that the statutes of limitations had been tolled. The Supreme Court reversed: because Firestone did not satisfy the "reasonable-diligence" standard for equitable tolling and Firestone's causes of action were filed undisputedly after the expirations of the applicable limitations periods, his claims against Weaver were barred by the limitations periods. View "Weaver v. Firestone " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is a 'Potentially Responsible Party' ('PRP') letter from the Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA'), in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ('CERCLA') provisions, sufficient to satisfy the 'suit' requirement under a liability policy of insurance?" The plaintiff in the underlying action is Alabama Gas Corporation ("Alagasco"). Defendants St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company are all direct and indirect subsidiaries of defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al. v. Alabama Gas Corporation " on Justia Law

Anne Bates Gibbons appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Vincent ("the Town"), the town's planning commission, and White Rock Quarries, LLC ("White Rock") (collectively, "appellees"). This matter stemmed from a zoning change impacting 86 acres of undeveloped land owned by White Rock that were annexed into the Town. Gibbons's complaint challenged the Town's rezoning of the land based on a rezoning application submitted by White Rock and its annexation of the 86 acres. White Rock sought the rezoning and annexation so that it could construct and operate a rock quarry on the property. Gibbons alleged that the Town did not satisfy the notice requirements of the applicable statutes that give municipal corporations in Alabama the power to enact zoning ordinances and that set out the requirements for enacting such ordinances in adopting a 2009 amendment. In the alternative, assuming that the 2009 amendment was validly adopted, Gibbons sought a declaration that White Rock's proposed use of the land was covered under section 5.5, not section 5.14.5, of the Town's zoning code. The circuit court ultimately granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, and Gibbons appealed. Finding that the Town complied with the applicable statutes in its annexation of the 86 acres, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees. View "Gibbons v. Town of Vincent" on Justia Law

In case no. 1110439, the Town of Gurley ("the Town") appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N Materials, Inc. ("M & N"), on M & N's inverse-condemnation claim against the Town. In case no. 1110507, M & N cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Town and Stan Simpson on other claims. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the matter, the Court found that the applicable statute upon which M&N maintained did not support its claim of a regulatory taking. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N on its inverse-condemnation claim and rendered a judgment in favor of the Town. The Court's conclusion pretermitted the other issues raised by the Town in case no. 1110439. In case no. 1110507, the Court found no error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed its decision. View "Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Housing Authority of the Birmingham District ("HABD") appealed the judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court which awarded Logan Properties, Inc., $350,000 on its inverse condemnation claim against HABD, as well as an additional $100,000 for litigation expenses, and awarding the intervening plaintiff Alamerica Bank $10,000 for litigation expenses. Logan Properties is a real-estate and property-management company that purchases, renovates, rents, and maintains single-family and multi-family residences. In January 2002, Logan Properties purchased "Patio Court," a 30-unit apartment complex for approximately $101,000. Logan Properties began renovating the vacant units in the complex with the plan of transferring current tenants into the newly renovated units until the entire complex was eventually renovated and leased. Logan Properties financed the purchase and rehabilitation of Patio Court by obtaining a construction loan from Alamerica Bank. In February 2003, Logan Properties obtained an adjacent parcel of property including a triplex unit with the same goal of renovating and leasing the units. Sometime in 2004, Logan Properties learned that HABD had obtained a federal grant to redevelop "Tuxedo Court," a multi- block public-housing complex located across the street from Patio Court. That project entailed the demolition of the existing Tuxedo Court housing complex and the construction of new housing in its place. After the plans for the Tuxedo Court project were made public, tenants started leaving Patio Court, telling Logan Properties that HABD was going to condemn Patio Court as part of the project. As residents in Tuxedo Court left as well, the general area deteriorated, and the vacant Patio Court apartments became the subject of theft and vandalism. Though Logan Properties had completely renovated 18 of the units, it eventually stopped renovation work, and, at trial conceded that the entire property had become unlivable. The parties tried to negotiate salvaging the area, but Patio continued to deteriorate. HABD subsequently initiated condemnation proceedings, and simultaneously filed a lis pendens notice on the properties. The probate court granted HABD's application for condemnation and appointed three disinterested commissioners to determine the compensation due Logan Properties for the condemnation of its property. The probate court failed to enter an order adopting the commissioners' report within a seven-day period required by statute and Logan Properties moved for a dismissal of the condemnation action. The probate court granted that motion and dismissed the action. Logan Properties then initiated an inverse-condemnation action against HABD, alleging that HABD had taken or injured property owned by Logan Properties. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that because no evidence was presented at trial indicating that HABD was responsible for a direct physical injury upon Logan Properties' property, that judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to enter a judgment as a matter of law in favor of HABD. View "Housing Authority of the Birmingham District v. Logan Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

Jeff Snider ("Jeff"), as administrator of the estate of Thelma June Smith Snider, appealed the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against Marquita S. Morgan ("Morgan"), both as executrix of the estate of Troy Ray Snider and on behalf of the estate of Harold Snider and First Bank of Boaz for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The matter stemmed from accusations over the execution of a power of attorney, the "seizure" of the decedents' estates and the repayment of loans from the estates. Upon review of the lower court's record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Jeff's claim against Troy's estate for money had and received (count IV) and the portion of count III representing Jeff's unjust-enrichment claim against Harold's estate. The trial court's judgment of dismissal of the remaining counts, however, were reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Snider v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Southeast Construction, L.L.C. ("SEC") appealed a circuit court's judgment and WAR Construction, Inc. ("WAR") filed a cross-appeal (which was treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus). The matter came before the Supreme Court following the appeal of the entry of the arbitration panel's ruling on the parties' respective construction contract claims. The decision resulted in a net award to WAR of $373,929. SEC filed a motion for modification of the award. WAR responded with a "Motion for Clerk's Entry of Arbitration Award as Final Judgment" pursuant to Rule 71C, Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court entered an order in which it declined to have the award entered as a judgment at that time. Eventually the court did enter an order based upon the arbitration award, and the parties appealed. "Given the nature of the award made by the arbitrators in this case and the nature of the resulting judgment the circuit court properly ordered the clerk to enter, it is apparent that the circuit court must take some additional responsibility for enforcing that award and the resulting judgment. To the extent WAR complain[ed] in its petition of the circuit court's reluctance to do so, [the Supreme Court agreed] with WAR" and, accordingly, ordered the circuit court to take appropriate action to enforce the judgment it has entered based upon the arbitrators' award. View "Southeast Construction, L.L.C. v. WAR Construction, Inc. " on Justia Law