Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Marathon Construction and Demolition, LLC, and OAX, LLC, appealed a circuit court order granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff King Metal Recycling and Processing Corporation. King Metal sued Marathon and OAX, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, interference with contractual relations, and breach of fiduciary duty/duty of loyalty. King Metal alleged that it had entered into an agreement with Marathon to purchase, demolish, and redevelop the former Delphi Industrial Complex in Limestone County ("the Delphi Project"). King Metal also alleged that OAX was formed by it and Marathon as the entity through which they would complete the Delphi Project. King Metal alleged that it filed the complaint after becoming concerned that it was being "frozen out" of the Delphi Project. It also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court entered an order for a writ of seizure in which it ordered that the net proceeds of the Delphi Project be seized. Defendants filed a motion to quash the order for a writ of seizure, arguing, in part, that the writ was the incorrect procedure for the remedy sought and asserting that King Metal should have instead requested a temporary restraining order. King Metal filed a motion in opposition to the defendants' motion to quash the order for a writ of seizure, and after a hearing, the writ of seizure was set aside, and a temporary restraining order issued instead. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to enjoin sale portion of the Delphi site because it did not conform with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. "This decision should not be interpreted as precluding King Metal, should it deem it necessary, from asking the trial court to again issue a preliminary injunction, provided that any such injunction complies with Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P." View "Marathon Construction & Demolition, LLC v. King Metal Recycling & Processing Corp. " on Justia Law

Transportation Leasing Corp. ("TLC") and Aquilex Hydrochem, LLC, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order denying TLC and Aquilex's motion to dismiss the action without prejudice to refile in Mississippi in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens and to enter an order dismissing the action without prejudice. Ronald Weir, a resident of Mississippi, was severely injured in an automobile accident in Meridian, Mississippi. Weir filed a complaint in the Perry Circuit Court naming as defendants TLC, Aquilex, Floyd Hershey, and Gordon Booker and alleging negligence, wantonness, and negligent entrustment. In his complaint, Weir alleged that TLC was a corporate entity whose principal office is located in Illinois and that Booker, an Alabama resident, was operating a vehicle owned by TLC when the accident occurred. Weir alleged that Aquilex was a corporate entity whose principal office is located in Ohio and that Hershey, a resident of Ohio, was operating a vehicle owned by Aquilex when the accident occurred. Weir sued TLC, Aquilex, Booker, and Hershey. The petitioners argued that Mississippi was a more convenient forum because Booker was the only connection the action had to Alabama and the majority of witnesses and accident-related documents were in Mississippi. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for a dismissal based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Transportation Leasing Corp., and Aquilex Hydrochem, LLC" on Justia Law

Brooks Insurance Agency, Sidney Brooks (its agent), and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (collectively "Nationwide") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss an action filed by Guster Law Firm, LLC, and Guster Properties, LLP (collectively "Guster"), against them. Guster made a claim for a fire loss under commercial property policies issued to it by Nationwide. In April 2011, Nationwide filed a declaratory-judgment action requesting that the federal court determine the rights and obligations under the insurance policies it had issued to Guster. Guster answered and asserted compulsory counterclaims against Nationwide, including bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim and breach of contract, among others. Months later, Guster filed a lawsuit in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging against the agency, Brooks, and Nationwide: negligent/wanton failure to provide insurance coverage; misrepresentation; suppression and concealment; and negligent/wanton failure to train. The agency, Brooks, and Nationwide moved to dismiss the state court action on the ground that the action violated the state abatement statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule. The trial court summarily denied the motion to dismiss. The agency, Brooks, and Nationwide then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and issued the writ. Although the causes of action in the federal court and the state court arose out of the same transaction or occurrence and were thus related, Guster's claims against the agency and Brooks were not compulsory counterclaims in the federal declaratory-judgment action because the agency and Brooks were not "opposing part[ies]" in the federal action. Accordingly, the Alabama abatement statute mandated that the claims against Nationwide in Guster's complaint filed in state court be dismissed. The Court concluded that the agency and Brooks did not show a clear legal right to the dismissal of Guster's claims against them in the state-court action. However, Nationwide did show a clear legal right to the dismissal of Guster's claims against it in the state-court action, therefore the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss as to Nationwide. View "Guster Law Firm, LLC v. Brooks Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

Roosevelt Upshaw appealed a circuit court's decision to deny his petition for habeas relief. In his petition, Upshaw alleged that the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") had erred in calculating the term of his sentence after he was arrested while on parole in that ADOC unlawfully denied him credit under 15-22-32(a), Ala. Code 1975, for the time he was incarcerated in Georgia. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Upshaw v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Lowell and Deborah Fuller, and Ronald Sheila Turner, appealed a circuit court judgment that found that although the Town of Magnolia Springs held no riparian rights in or to the Magnolia River, the Town was entitled to construct improvements on the shores and to construct a boat launch, dock and/or pier to be used in connection with "Rock Landing," a public landing on the River, and that Rock Street (a public street adjoining land owned by the Fullers and Turners) could be used as temporary parking for the purpose of launching a boat or other float at Rock Landing. The Town cross-appealed that portion of the judgment which declared that the Town held no authority to convert a portion of Rock Street from a public street to a parking facility and recreational area. The Supreme Court, after its review, concluded that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were contradictory to the remedy it ultimately fashioned. Because of this contradiction, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for revision of either the conclusion of law or the relief ordered. With regard to the Town's cross appeal, the Court found that because the issue of parking along Rock Street directly related to the issues on appeal, it too should have been reconsidered. View "Fuller v. Town of Magnolia Springs " on Justia Law

Immediately following the release of the Supreme Court's previous decision in this case, the Alabama Legislature passed Act No. 2012-198, Ala. Acts 2012, which repealed the statutory provision that underpinned the decision in "Perdue I." In the prior case, the Court vacated the circuit court's judgment that approved a settlement agreement that ended class-action litigation involving the Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition (PACT) program. Class member Carol Perdue objected to the trial court's approval of the settlement; the Supreme Court originally rejected plaintiffs' argument that Ala. Code 16-33C-19 did not prohibit the PACT Board from entering into the settlement, and that the agreement was "clearly contrary to state law." The Legislature specifically repealed 16-33C-19 and caused the Court to revise its previous decision. The Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in finding the settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable, found the retroactive application of the 2012 Act constitutional, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perdue v. Green" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Mobile Gas Service Corporation, pipeline operators and several other companies over the release of an odorant containing mercaptan. Mobile Gas, stated that, in fall 2011, Mobile Gas started receiving complaints about natural-gas leaks in the Eight Mile area; that the complaints centered around the facilities of Gulf South and Mobile Gas. plaintiffs, who resided in the Eight Mile area, filed their complaint, alleging nuisance, aggravated nuisance, negligence, and wantonness against the defendants arising from the release of mercaptan. A dispute arose over the issuance of a subpoena to the engineering firm that did the initial survey of the leak for Mobile Gas in response to an investigation by State Department of Environmental Management (ADEM). Mobile Gas objected to plaintiffs' attempt to subpoena the engineer; Mobile asserted that the engineer's report was privileged and therefore protected by the work-product privilege. The trial court denied Mobile Gas' objection. Mobile then filed its mandamus petition with the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mobile Gas has established that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it disregarded the work-product privilege and entered an order compelling Mobile Gas to produce the documents included in the privilege log and when it denied Mobile Gas's motion for a protective order. Thus, Mobile Gas has established a clear legal right to a protective order regarding the production of the documents listed on the privilege log it submitted to the trial court. Accordingly, the Court granted Mobile Gas's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to set aside its order compelling the production of documents included in the privilege log and to order those documents protected (including the engineer's report) from discovery. View "Parker et al. v. Mobile Gas Service Corporation et al." on Justia Law

Daniel Ernest Hegarty, M.D., and the Monroeville Medical Clinic appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Dixie Hudson in her medical-malpractice action. Dr. Hegarty delivered Hudson's baby via cesarian-section ("C-section") in 2004. During the operation, but after the baby had been delivered, the placenta became detached from the baby's umbilical cord. Dr. Hegarty searched within and beyond Hudson's uterus but was unable to locate the placenta. Dr. Hegarty requested assistance from his partner at the time, who also tried to locate the placenta but was unsuccessful. Following the operation, Hudson experienced severe pain in her abdomen and dramatic weight loss. Dr. Hegarty eventually ordered a CT scan to be performed and at that time, a mass was located in Hudson's abdomen. Dr. Hegarty then referred Hudson to Dr. Fahy, who subsequently referred her to a doctor in Mobile, who identified and surgically removed the retained placenta from Hudson's abdomen. Hudson sued in 2006 alleging medical negligence. The defendants contended on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing Hudson's expert witness to testify as an expert regarding the applicable standard of care and Dr. Hegarty's alleged breach of it. Defendants also argued that the trial court's charge to the jury was improper and that the judgment against Dr. Hegarty violated public policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing Hudson's expert to testify, and as such, erred in denying the doctor's motions for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of Dr. Hegarty. View "Hegarty v. Hudson " on Justia Law

Jermaine Parker was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime (the unlawful distribution of cocaine), and of obstructing governmental operations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the convictions in an unpublished memorandum, conflicted with "Ex parte Williams," (468 So. 2d 99, 101 (Ala. 1985)) regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support Parker's conviction for conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime. The Court denied certiorari review with regard to Parker's conviction for obstructing governmental operations. After review of the trial court record and the unpublished appellate court opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented in this matter "speculative" in nature: "Such proof is always insufficient, unless it excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis, but that of the guilt of the accused. No matter how strong the circumstances, if they can be reconciled with the theory that some other person may have done the act, then the defendant is not shown to be guilty, by that full measure of proof which the law requires...." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Parker" on Justia Law

On rehearing, Clay C. Slagle moved the Supreme Court to "disqualify" Robert Bernard Harwood, Jr., from sitting as a Special Justice on this case on the ground, among others, that he was then-currently engaged in the private practice of law. Slagle based this argument solely on the text of Art. VI, section 147(a), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). "In effect, Slagle [was] contending that, notwithstanding the provision in 12-2-14, Ala. Code 1975, for the appointment of 'member[s] of the bar' to sit as Special Justices in certain circumstances, the Constitution prevents such an appointee from engaging in the private practice of law." The Supreme Court rejected Slagle's contention and overruled his application. View "Slagle v. Ross" on Justia Law