Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC"), the defendant in an action pending at the Lamar Circuit Court filed by the City of Vernon on behalf of itself and other similarly situated entities, appealed the court's order that certified a class in that action. Vernon stated that it had reached an agreement with AMIC regarding individual claims and therefore no longer wished to pursue them. AMIC filed a response to Vernon's motion in which it argued that the Supreme Court should remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss it because now the case was missing its named representative, and therefore the requirements for a class action could not be met. Vernon argued it had the right to withdraw from the pending litigation, but because the trial court certified the class, the litigation remains viable. Vernon requested time in which to allow the class to name a new representative. The Supreme Court agreed with Vernon that the trial court should have the opportunity to determine whether a new named plaintiff should be certified. "The trial court is the proper entity to decide whether to allow the class members to amend their complaint to substitute a new named plaintiff and to determine whether that plaintiff meets the adequacy requirements in Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., so as to represent the class." As such, AMIC's appeal was dismissed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Vernon et al. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pavilion Development, L.L.C., sought to redeem certain foreclosed real property. In this appeal, it challenged the trial court's judgment assessing the "lawful charges" due the various parties holding a legal interest in the property. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and thus proper for immediate appeal. As such, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. View "Pavilion Development, L.L.C. v. JBJ Partnership et al. " on Justia Law

Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc. petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to grant its Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Richard Kimbrough alleged that a deer ran across the road causing a truck traveling in the opposite direction to swerve into the Kimbrough's lane. According to Kimbrough, the truck struck his vehicle and ran him off the road and into a creek bed. The driver of the truck allegedly fled. Kimbrough broke his right femur, right hand, and nose. Kimbrough sued Safeway, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith, alleging that Safeway, without justification, had intentionally refused to pay Kimbrough's claim. Safeway moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claim for uninsured-motorist benefits was not ripe for adjudication until liability and damages were established. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as Safeway's subsequent motion to reconsider. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded Safeway did not clearly demonstrate this case was not ripe or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Safeway did not have a clear legal right to mandamus relief. View "Kimbrough v. Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

Carolyn Christopher petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the a Court of Appeals judgment that affirmed an order requiring her to pay postminority educational support on behalf of her child, C.C. In "Ex parte Bayliss," (550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989)), the Court interpreted 30-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, as authorizing a trial court to require a noncustodial parent to pay college expenses for children past the age of majority. The Court granted Carolyn's petition to consider whether Bayliss was correctly decided, and reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded the Bayliss Court failed to recognize the ordinary and common-law definitions of "child" as a minor, did not defer to the legislature's designation of the age of majority, and failed to observe the canon of construction that courts cannot supply what a statute omits. Accordingly, the Court expressly overruled Bayliss. Because the child-custody statute did not authorize a court in a divorce action to require a noncustodial parent to pay educational support for children over the age of 19, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals n this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Christopher v. Christopher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it affirmed Derek Baker's conviction for trafficking in marijuana. Baker was entitled to production of the seized substance in his case for the purpose of having it independently tested. The denial of the motion for production resulted in prejudice to Baker and violated his right to due process. Additionally, because the record did not indicate that Baker ever requested funds for an expert to conduct the independent testing, he was not required to demonstrate that there was a particularized need for such testing. Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied Baker's motions seeking independent testing and evaluation of the substance purported to be marijuana. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Baker v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to reverse Curtis Maurice Sanders's conviction for third-degree burglary. Sanders entered a guilty plea. As a matter of first impression, the issue in this case before the Court was whether an unoccupied house that was scheduled for demolition constituted a "building" as defined in 13A-7-1(2), Ala. Code 1975, for purposes of 13A-7-7(a), Ala. Code 1975. "If the legislature had intended to exclude an abandoned building awaiting demolition from the purview of the statute, it could have included express language to that effect in the statute. However, it did not do so, and this Court will not read such language into the statute." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanders v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling discovery of a post-accident investigation report related to an accident that occurred at the Birmingham facility of Schnitzer Southeast, LLC (a subsidiary). In 2008, Jason Jackson had part of his leg amputated as a result of a workplace accident that occurred at Schnitzer Southeast's metal-recycling facility in Birmingham. After the accident, Schnitzer Steel instigated a post-accident investigation. Josephine Cetta, who was a safety director at Schnitzer Steel at the time of Jackson's accident, conducted the investigation. Cetta testified in her deposition that in-house counsel at Schnitzer Steel reviewed and edited the report. She also testified that in-house counsel marked the report as privileged. Sometime after the accident but before Cetta's report was created, Jackson filed a worker's compensation claim with Schnitzer Southeast. In September 2010, Jackson and his wife, Latonya Jackson, filed a separate action against Schnitzer Steel and certain of its employees, seeking additional recovery for the injuries Jackson suffered. The trial court ordered Schnitzer Steel to produce, among other things, "reports of safety inspections." Here, the evidence before the Supreme Court indicated that, although anticipation of litigation may not have been the sole factor for preparing the report, it was "a significant factor" in the company's decision to have the report prepared. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion by ordering Schnitzer Steel to produce the report, which was prepared in reasonable anticipation of litigation. Therefore, the Court granted Schnitzer Steel's petition and issued the writ. View "Jackson v. Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Alabama Educational Television Commission and Ferris W. Stephens, Rodney D. Herring, Les Barnett, J. Holland, Dannetta K. Thornton Owens, Bebe Williams, and Gregory O. Griffin, Sr. (collectively, "the Commissioners"), petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss claims brought against them by Allan Pizzato and Pauline Howland and to strike Pizzato and Howland's second amended complaint. In 2012, Pizzato requested certain materials from the Commission pursuant to the Open Records Act. Pizzato sued the Commission and the Commissioners alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Pizzato also requested a judgment declaring that Stephens improperly held the office of assistant attorney general while he was serving as a commissioner. The Commissioners moved the circuit court to dismiss Pizzato's claims against them, arguing that Pizzato did not have standing to bring an Open Meetings Act claim, that the Open Meetings Act did not provide for the recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, and that the complaint failed to state a claim. Furthermore, the Commissioners argued that Pizzato's Open Records Act claim was moot because the requested documents had been produced. Because Pizzato and Howland did not establish standing to bring their action against the Commission and the Commissioners under the Open Meetings Act, the claims asserted in both the first amended and second amended complaints should have been dismissed. The Court therefore granted mandamus relief and issued the writ. View "Pizzato v. Alabama Educational Television Commission" on Justia Law

F.V.O., respondent in a dependency action, appealed a trial court's orders after a dispositional review hearing in a dependency case. A majority of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the orders; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Both arguments presented by the motherÐ-regarding the finding by the trial court as to the efforts made by DHR to reunite the mother and the children and the announcement of a new permanency plan--failed to adjudicate any rights of the mother from which an appeal would lie. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to dismiss the mother's appeal and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "F.V.O. v. Coffee County Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. Defendants sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. Pettway sued the defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. In a second complaint, Pettway alleged that because defendants constituted a majority of the conference committee, the private meeting at which HB 84 was revised was a de facto meeting of the conference committee. Therefore, alleged Pettway, that meeting was an "unannounced executive session" and violated both the Open Meetings Act and Rule 21. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to quash service. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion but issued a stay of the proceedings and certified the matter for the Supreme Court's review. Defendants responded with a petition for permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. Civ. P., or in the alternative, a writ of mandamus. After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus to order the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's second complaint on related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the scope of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involved nonjusticiable claims. View "Pettway v. Marsh et al." on Justia Law