Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bay Area Physicians for Women ("BAPW") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate an order entered by that court on November 8, 2012, which reinstated a medical-malpractice case filed against BAPW and transferred the case to the Mobile Circuit Court. The Supreme Court concluded BAPW did not include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the Supreme Court to consider vacating the November 8, 2012 order, notwithstanding that it was filed more than seven months after the Baldwin Circuit Court entered it. Accordingly, insofar as BAPW's petition for a writ of mandamus sought vacatur of the Baldwin Circuit Court's order, the Court dismissed the petition as untimely. View "White v. Bay Area Physicians for Women" on Justia Law

Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc. petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to grant its Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Richard Kimbrough submitted a claim to Safeway for uninsured-motorist coverage when he was injured in an accident. A deer ran across the road, causing a truck in the southbound lane to swerve into the northbound lane, where Kimbrough was driving. According to Kimbrough, the truck struck his vehicle and ran him off the road and into a creek bed. The driver of the truck allegedly fled and was unknown. Kimbrough contended the driver of a "phantom vehicle" was an uninsured motorist. He sought the full policy limit of $50,000 because his expenses exceeded his coverage. The parties disputed whether Safeway denied the claim. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with Safeway's argument that the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. As such, Safeway did not demonstrate a clear legal right to the writ of mandamus. The Court therefore denied the petition. View "Kimbrough v. Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patricia Working, Rick Erdemir, and Floyd McGinnis appealed a circuit court judgment that held that the Jefferson County Election Commission ("the JCEC"), Probate Judge Alan King, Circuit Clerk Anne-Marie Adams, and Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale were immune from liability as to the plaintiffs' attorney fees. In "Working I," the Supreme Court held that a February special election was invalid on state-law grounds, and that the Governor's appointment of George Bowman to fill a vacancy on the Election Commission was lawful. On remand to the circuit court, as the "prevailing parties," plaintiffs moved for attorney fees. The trial court denied their motion, and plaintiffs appealed. In "Working II," the Supreme Court addressed plaintiffs' that the trial court erred in denying their motion for mediation, and vacated the trial court's order denying the motion for an award of attorney fees and remanded the case. On remand, the trial court concluded that the JCEC defendants had not waived their immunity defense and that plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees against defendants was precluded by the Alabama Constitution as to plaintiffs' state-law claims. Plaintiffs then filed this third, appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded the case once again to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the issue of immunity and state-law claims, but remanded remand the case with instructions on the issue concerning section 6–6–20 and the federal-law claims. View "Working v. Jefferson County Election Commission" on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") and its director, John Cooper, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss all claims filed against them by Asphalt Contractors, Inc. ("ACI"). Trichloroethylene ('TCE') and other chemicals were used by ALDOT since the early 1970s. TCE was used extensively by ALDOT as a degreaser and/or cleaning agent and/or as a solvent. TCE is now contained in shallow groundwater in North Montgomery. Since at least April 2009, ALDOT has pumped groundwater into a Dewatering Pond and from there onto a Transfer Pond and then to the South Pond. A portion of the South Pond and wetland area used in ALDOT's remedial efforts is being discharged onto ACI's property. In 2010, ACI demanded that ALDOT immediately cease all dumping of contaminated water on ACI's property. However, the dumping of TCE-laden water onto ACI's property continued to the date of ACI filing its lawsuit. The complaint asserted trespass to realty and inverse condemnation and made claims for injunctive relief. ACI requested damages for the full fair-market value of its property, consequential and incidental damages, compensatory damages, punitive and exemplary damages, expenses, costs, interest, and attorney fees. ALDOT and Cooper filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss ALDOT as a party to this action. Conversely, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss as to ACI's inverse-condemnation claim against Cooper in his official capacity. Further, the trial court properly refused to dismiss ACI's claim for injunctive relief against Cooper. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in part and denied it in part. View "Asphalt Contractors, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Transportation " on Justia Law

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. They sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. The Alabama House of Representatives approved House Bill 84 ("HB 84"), and the bill was sent to the Senate, where the Senate Education Committee gave it a favorable report. During the third reading of HB 84 on the floor of the Senate, an amendment was proposed and approved, and HB 84 was passed by the Senate. The amended version of HB 84 was then sent to the House, but the House voted to "non concur," and HB 84 was sent to a conference committee. Pettway sued the defendants in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") prohibiting the clerk of the House of Representatives from sending HB 84 to the governor for his signature, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court issued an order vacating the TRO, dismissing the underlying action, and dismissing the appeal on the ground that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication because HB 84 had not been signed into law or even taken on the color of law. The Supreme Court found that the defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's new complaint on the related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involves nonjusticiable claims that would lead to "judicial second-guessing" of the legislature's internal actions, motivations, and procedural decisions regarding its actions. View "Pettway v. Del Marsh" on Justia Law

Afassco, Inc., a Nevada-based corporation, appealed a circuit court judgment that held a judgment Afassco obtained in a Nevada state court against former Afassco employee and Alabama resident Comer Ladon Sanders was void because the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sanders. Afassco sued Sanders in a Nevada court. After Afassco domesticated the judgment in Alabama in an attempt to collect on it, Sanders moved an Alabama court for relief from the judgment, arguing that the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Alabama court agreed and entered a judgment granting Sanders's motion. However, because Sanders filed a motion in the Nevada court asking it to dismiss Afassco's action based on the alleged lack of personal jurisdiction, he consented to the court's determination of that issue. He waived any right to subsequently litigate that issue in another forum. Because of that waiver, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded it was unnecessary to consider the substance of Sanders's argument that the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and we accordingly pretermitted all consideration of that issue. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Afassco, Inc. v. Sanders " on Justia Law

The Bessemer City Board of Education and Davis Middle School petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the claim filed against them by John Doe, a minor, by and through his next friend, W.A. ("Doe"), and to enter an order dismissing with prejudice the claim against petitioners. The matter stemmed from a claim of negligence Doe raised against the school; Doe claimed he had been sexually abused by an unidentified person as a result of the negligence of petitioners. The Circuit Court denied petitioners motion based on qualified immunity grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found that petitioners demonstrated they were entitled to absolute immunity from Doe's action against them. Therefore the Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Bessemer City Board of Education" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions pertaining to Alabama law to the Alabama Supreme Court. The certified questions in this matter required the Court to determine the scope of certain provisions of the Act No. 2010-761, Ala. Acts 2010. The Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative: (1) the "or otherwise" language in the Act is limited to the use of State mechanisms to make payments to organizations that use at least some portion of those payments for political activity; (2) the term "political activity" is not limited to electioneering activities, i.e., activities undertaken in support of candidates for elected offices. View "Alabama Superintendent of Education et al. v. Alabama Education Association" on Justia Law

Bruce L. Johnson, Michael L. King, and William Harrison sued Luke Edwards, the Apostolic Advancement Association, Heritage Real Investment, Inc., Alabama-Mississippi Farm, Inc., and several officers and board members of those organizations. Plaintiffs filed an application for the entry of a default judgment against Edwards pursuant to Rule 55, Ala. R. Civ. P., for his failure to plead or otherwise to defend the allegations in the complaint. The trial court held a hearing on plaintiffs' second application for a default judgment. The trial court thereafter entered a default judgment against the defendants and awarded damages. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendants' notice of appeal was untimely. Therefore the Court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "Edwards v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The City of Bessemer and Bessemer City Councillors Jimmy Stephens, Dorothy Davidson, Sarah W. Belcher, and Albert Soles sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former City Councillor Louise Alexander and the law firm of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C. ("WAD"). The City councillors also sought to have a racial-discrimination claim dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2006 and 2007 Alexander received three donations from a Tuscaloosa real-estate developer, which were properly used for charitable projects in her district. In this same period (according to the complaint), Davidson and Belcher, received similar donations from the same individual for charitable projects in their respective districts. According to the complaint, beginning in the early spring of 2007, plaintiff Alexander opposed several projects the donor had proposed to the City and, the donor "vowed to retaliate." The complaint alleged that because of the donor's complaint to the Attorney General, a five-count indictment against Alexander was filed in August 2008 alleging violations of the Alabama Ethics Law. The complaint asserted that similar charges were not brought against Davidson and Belcher. WAD represented Alexander during her criminal proceedings. Alexander was ultimately acquitted. Alexander and WAD alleged that the City had a "policy and practice" of paying legal fees for city officials charged with crimes relating to their official duties if and when they were found not guilty. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief as it related to the bad-faith claim against the City. The Court denied the petition with regard to plaintiffs' claim against the City councillors regarding the racial discrimination claim: the councilors did not demonstrate entitlement to legislative immunity, and whether they were entitled to qualified immunity was a question requiring further consideration of facts outside of the pleadings. View "Alexander v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law