Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Howard Ross petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming summary judgments in favor of West Wind Condominium Association, Inc. and Joseph London III. Ross owned four condominium units within the West Wind community. Ross and West Wind agreed that West Wind would accept maintenance and repair work from Ross in lieu of his paying the condominium association's monthly dues. West Wind informed Ross in September 2006 that further work would not be necessary and that he should start paying the dues. Ross paid his dues monthly starting in December 2006. When Ross made his payments for April and May 2007, West Wind rejected those payments and sent Ross a letter through its attorney disputing Ross's charges for the maintenance and repair work that Ross had performed. Through his own attorney, Ross submitted an itemized list of charges for his work done for West Wind, but Ross never received any further correspondence from West Wind. In 2007, West Wind recorded instruments in the office of the Probate Judge of Madison County claiming liens on Ross's four condominium units. In early 2008, West Wind published notice of a foreclosure sale on Ross's units in a local newspaper and continued publishing the notice for four weeks. A month later, West Wind conducted foreclosure sales on Ross's four condominium units and was the highest bidder on all of them. That same day, the auctioneer executed foreclosure deeds conveying the four units to West Wind. West Wind then conveyed two of the units to Jimmy Spruill and Cynthia Spruill, one unit to Joseph London III (who was president of West Wind), and one unit to Delvin Sullivan. Ross sued West Wind, London, Sullivan, and the Spruills alleging claims of wrongful foreclosure and seeking redemption of the properties. Ross sought an order setting aside the foreclosure sales, as well as redemption of the four condominium units. Ross claimed that West Wind had foreclosed on his units without giving him proper notice and that he had not learned of the foreclosures until after they had occurred. The trial court entered a default judgment against Sullivan, but it entered summary judgments in favor of London and the Spruills. West Wind also moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that it had the right to foreclose based on Ross's unpaid dues. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for West Wind and London, and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that Ross had waived the argument that he had presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had received proper notice. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ross v. West Wind Condominium Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Jennifer Leigh Clayton and Justin Andrew Bailey filed separate motions requesting that the trial court suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of their apartment by law-enforcement officers in early 2011. A grand jury issued an indictment charging Clayton and Bailey with first-degree unlawful manufacturing of methamphetamine. After a hearing, the trial court granted their motions to suppress the evidence. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's order as to the search. The State appealed that decision. The Supreme Court did "not find persuasive Clayton and Bailey's argument that the behavior of the officers indicated that there was no need for immediate action. A fair reading of the record establishes that, in light of the odor the law enforcement officers recognized to be consistent with the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, the law-enforcement officers were concerned about their safety and the safety of the occupants of the apartment and the public." Because law-enforcement had probable cause to believe that methamphetamine was being manufactured inside the apartment and because the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, in light of its explosive nature, created an exigent circumstance, the law-enforcement officers' warrantless entry into and search of Bailey and Clayton's apartment was proper. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals holding otherwise was reversed, and this case was remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Alabama v. Clayton " on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court focused on two appeals (case no. 1101384 and case no. 1110310) and two petitions for writs of mandamus (case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158) filed by the State of Alabama, all challenging orders entered by a circuit judge in Greene County requiring State officials to return to items seized by the State as contraband pursuant to search warrants previously issued by the Greene Court. In addition, the Supreme Court reviewed a petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1130598) filed by the State seeking relief from the refusal of a district judge in Greene County to issue warrants similar to the warrants involved in the first four cases based on evidentiary submissions similar to those provided by the State in those same four cases. The latter case involved the same potential defendants and gaming establishments as the first four cases, as well as similar gambling devices alleged by the State to be illegal. Moreover, the district judge in case no. 1130598 relied upon the judgment of the trial judge in the former cases in refusing to issue the warrants in that case. Upon review of the trial record of all parties' cases involved, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was asked to preemptively adjudicate (within the confines of a motion filed under Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P.) the lawfulness of property seized as contraband. The Court concluded the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore the Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court in case no. 1101384 and 1110310 and dismissed those actions. The Court dismissed the appeals in those cases, and the related petitions for writ of mandamus then pending in case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158. As to case no. 1130598, the Court, by separate order, granted the State's petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded this case for the immediate issuance of the warrants for which the State applied. View "Alabama v. Greenetrack, Inc. " on Justia Law

J&W Enterprises, LLC ("J&W"), and Ezell Coates were defendants brought by plaintiff Angel Luis Cruz. J&W and Coates petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Clarke Circuit Court to transfer the action to the Mobile Circuit Court. This action arose from a truck accident that occurred in 2011 in Mobile County. At the time of the accident, Coates was driving a tractor-trailer rig owned by J&W, his employer. According to the complaint, Coates negligently and/or wantonly operated the tractor-trailer rig, causing it to collide with a tractor-trailer rig operated by Cruz. Cruz claimed injury as a result of the accident, but he did not seek any medical treatment in Mobile County as a result of the accident. Given the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court could not say that Mobile County had a significantly stronger connection to this case than did Clarke County so that the interest of justice would be offended by trial in Clarke County. Accordingly, the Court could not conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing to transfer this action to Mobile County. As such, the Court denied the writ. View "Cruz v. J&W Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Alabama Educational Television Commission petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss claims brought against them by Allan Pizzato and Pauline Howland and to strike Pizzato and Howland's second amended complaint. From 2000 until June 2012, Pizzato served as the executive director of Alabama Public Television ("APT") and Howland served as the deputy director and chief financial officer of APT. Sometime before June 2012, tension arose between Pizzato and the Commissioners. At its regular quarterly meeting in June 2012, the Commission voted to go into executive session to discuss Pizzato's "general reputation, character, and job performance." After the Commission returned to its regular meeting from the executive session, the Commissioners moved to terminate Pizzato's and Howland's employment, stating that "the Commission had decided to move APT in a new direction." Thereafter, Pizzato requested certain materials from the Commission pursuant to the Open Records Act. A month later, Pizzato sued the Commission and the Commissioners in their individual and official capacities, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The Commissioners moved the circuit court to dismiss Pizzato's claims against them, arguing that Pizzato did not have standing to bring an Open Meetings Act claim, that the Open Meetings Act did not provide for the recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, and that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Open Meetings Act. Further, the Commissioners argued that Pizzato's claim was moot because the requested documents had been produced and that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the request for a declaratory judgment because the allegations supporting that count failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the Commission and the Commissioners' motions, including the motion for a permissive appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P. The Commission and the Commissioners then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. After review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in its decisions denying the Commissioners' motions. Because Pizzato and Howland had not established standing to bring their action against the Commission and the Commissioners under the Open Meetings Act, the claims asserted in both the first amended and second amended complaints should have been dismissed. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for mandamus relief and issued the writ. View "Pizzato v. Alabama Educational Television Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain Earnest Walker's appeal from the new sentence imposed for his 2006 guilty-plea conviction for second-degree receiving stolen property. The new sentence was imposed after it was determined, following Walker's filing a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, that Walker's original sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Walker's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the trial court's exercise of discretion created a significant difference between the facts in the controlling case law and those in this case. "[D]ue process mandates that Walker have an opportunity to appeal his new sentence." View "Walker v. Alabama " on Justia Law

In 2008, James Ware was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree burglary, and first-degree robbery, for which he was sentenced as an habitual felony offender to three sentences of life imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Ware appealed his convictions to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Ware argued: (1) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him when it admitted a DNA-profile report that was based on the work of laboratory technicians who did not testify at trial; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the robbery and burglary charges because there was not sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the first issue and reversed as to the second. View "Ware v. Alabama " on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Bessemer Water Service (BWS) and Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. (LCDC) over a contract referred to as the "1998 water agreement." In "Bessemer I," the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had exceeded its discretion in holding that the 1998 water agreement was a valid binding contract and in awarding LCDC $224,979.83 because the agreement was entered into violation of section 39-2-2 and was therefore void. On appeal, the Attorney General intervened and filed a complain seeking to recover payments BWS made to LCDC under the 1988 water agreement. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment in favor of the Attorney General (for the benefit of BWS). LCDC thereafter filed a postjudgment motion requesting the trial court alter, amend or vacate its judgment, or in the alternative, order a new trial. The trial court denied LCDC's motion; that denial was brought before the Supreme Court in this case. After review, the Supreme Court held the trial court's denial of LCDC's motion should have been reversed. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. v. Bessemer Water Service " on Justia Law

Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company filed suit against Roger D. Allen, Homeland Vinyl Products, Inc., and Deric Miner, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Jane Miner, seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty of defense or indemnity to Allen for claims arising out of a fatal automobile accident that occurred in New Jersey. Allen was a New Jersey resident, and moved to dismiss the claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. In response, the trial court dismissed the case in its entirety. The insurance company appealed that decision. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Allen " on Justia Law

John and Oretha Meeks appealed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Roderick Morrow and Merchants & Farmers Bank. Because it appeared that the judgment from which the Meekses purported to appeal was not a final judgment, the Supreme Court's clerk’s office remanded the cause to the trial court, which then certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. After review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s certification was not proper and the judgment was not made final. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Meeks v. Morrow " on Justia Law