Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Engineering Design Group, LLC, and David Stovall, the principal of Engineering Design Group, LLC (collectively, "EDG"), and Building & Earth Sciences, Inc. ("BES"), filed separate petitions to the Alabama Supreme Court, each seeking a writ of mandamus to direct the St. Clair Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter an order transferring the action filed in the trial court by plaintiffs Delaney Exchange, LLC, and Springdale Stores Exchange, LLC, to the Shelby Circuit Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded EDG and BES carried their burden of showing that Shelby County's connection to the action was strong, and St. Clair County's connection to the action was considerably weak. Thus, the trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing to transfer the case to the Shelby Circuit Court, and the interest of justice required the transfer. View "Ex parte Engineering Design Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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Michael Kelley petitioned for certiorari review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to affirm the trial court's judgment sentencing Kelley to death for his convictions for two counts of capital murder, and for sentencing him to life for his conviction on one count of sexual torture. The Alabama Supreme Court granted Kelley's petition solely to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review Kelley's sexual-torture conviction. After that review, the Court reversed in part and remand. Kelley alleged that the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to affirm his sexual-torture conviction because, he argues, his sexual-torture conviction was not ripe for appeal, and on this ground, the Supreme Court agreed. View "Ex parte Michael Brandon Kelley." on Justia Law

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Petitioners R.J.J., W.L.C., and W.F. were convicted of hunting after dark, hunting from a public road, and hunting with the aid of an automobile. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed their convictions by an unpublished memorandum. The petitioners challenged the sufficiency of the State's evidence, arguing: (1) the State produced no evidence indicating that the petitioners had in their possession an artificial light suitable for night hunting and that the State produced tenuous evidence indicating that the petitioners were in an area frequented by protected wildlife; (2) the State's circumstantial evidence failed to link the petitioners to the shots allegedly fired and that evidence of two shots fired could not support three hunting convictions; and (3) the State failed to prove that the petitioners had the intent to hunt. The Supreme Court reversed petitioners' convictions and instructed the trial court to enter a judgment acquitting petitioners of all charges. View "Ex parte W. F., W.L.C., and R. J. J." on Justia Law

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In 2009, Christopher Dalton pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder, one count of breaking and entering an automobile, and one count of misdemeanor theft. Dalton was sentenced to 2 terms of 30 years' imprisonment for his attempted-murder convictions, a 5-year prison sentence for his unlawful-breaking-and-entering conviction, and a 1-year prison sentence for his theft-of-property conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently. In November 2009, Dalton filed his first Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, alleging that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he erroneously told Dalton that, on the 30-year sentence for attempted murder, he would be eligible for parole in 6 years. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court, finding that Dalton's counsel did not promise parole or that he would be eligible for parole in six years. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, "a promise of parole and a representation as to when a defendant will be eligible for parole are two different things." The case was remanded for the circuit court to determine whether Dalton's trial counsel misrepresented his eligibility for parole. View "Ex parte Christopher Eric Dalton." on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review centered on the propriety of a probation revocation hearing. The State moved to revoke the probation of Carless Wagner based on allegations that he violated two conditions of his probation. At the end of the hearing in question, the trial court revoked Wagner's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence with the Department of Corrections. Wagner appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's order, finding that Wagner had not received a probation-revocation hearing in compliance with Rule 27.6(c), ALa. R. Crim. P. The State appealed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment. After review, and finding that Wagner received a hearing that "substantially conformed" with the Rule , the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law

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The Alabama Supreme Court granted review of this case filed by E.L. seeking review of a Court of Civil Appeals decision to affirm a family court order insofar as that judgment recognized and gave effect to an adoption decree entered by the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia approving the adoption by V.L., E.L.'s former same-sex partner, of E.L.'s biological children, S.L., N.L., and H.L. E.L. and V.L. were involved in a relationship from approximately 1995 through 2011. During the course of that relationship, they maintained a residence in Hoover. In December 2002 E.L. gave birth to S.L., and in November 2004 E.L. gave birth to twins, N.L. and H.L. All births were achieved through the use of assisted-reproductive technology. The parties eventually made the joint decision to take legal action to formalize and to protect the parental role V.L. had undertaken. In 2007, V.L. filed a petition with the Georgia court to adopt the children. The Georgia granted the petition, and subsequently new birth certificates were issued. In approximately November 2011, E.L. and V.L. ended their relationship, and, in January 2012, V.L. moved out of the house E.L. and V.L. had previously shared. 2013, V.L. filed a petition in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that E.L. had denied her access to the children and had interfered with her ability to exercise her traditional and constitutional parental rights. She asked the Alabama court to register the Georgia judgment, to declare her legal rights pursuant to the Georgia judgment, and to award her some measure of custody of or visitation with the children. The matter was transferred to the Jefferson Family Court, and E.L. moved that court to dismiss V.L.'s petition on multiple grounds. The Jefferson Family Court ultimately denied E.L.'s motion to dismiss, without a hearing, and simultaneously awarded V.L. scheduled visitation with the children. E.L. filed her notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. After reviewing the record and analyzing the relevant law of both Alabama and Georgia, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals and the Jefferson Family Court erred in giving full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment because the Georgia court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the Georgia judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte E.L." on Justia Law

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Jason Tulley was convicted of carrying a pistol on premises not his own in violation of a Jacksonville city ordinance. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether by charging him under Ordinance No. O-514-10, which incorporated by general reference section 13A-11-52 Ala. Code 1975, the City violated Tulley's due-process rights. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Tulley's conviction. At the time of Tulley's alleged offense, 13A-11-52 was unconstitutional on its face, and the City's purported adoption of that offense as an offense against the City by general reference in Ordinance No. O-514-10 was a nullity. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict Tulley. View "Ex parte Jason Dean Tulley." on Justia Law

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Christopher Floyd was convicted of capital murder in 2005 for the death of Waylon Crawford, for which he was sentenced to death. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review of Floyd's appeal to determine whether the following holdings of the Court of Criminal Appeals were proper: (1) that the trial court did not err in holding that the State provided valid race- and gender-neutral reasons for its exercise of its peremptory strikes during jury selection; (2) that the trial court did not err by refusing to admit into evidence all of Floyd's statements made to law-enforcement officers; and (3) that the trial court did not err in denying Floyd's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ex parte Christopher Anthony Floyd." on Justia Law

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The Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to address the State's request that it overrule "Ex parte J.A.P.," (853 So. 2d 280 (Ala. 2002)), the controlling precedent applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in reversing Eric Higdon's conviction for first-degree sodomy by forcible compulsion. "In overruling 'Ex parte J.A.P.,' this Court returns to an approach more consonant with the statutory definition of forcible compulsion and the principles set forth in a 'Powe [v. Alabama, (597 So.2d 721 (Ala. 1991))]' in conducting a forcible-compulsion analysis when a defendant, regardless of his or her age, exercises a position of domination and control over a child." The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed, and this case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law

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In August 2011, Teddy Knox was driving along Interstate 59 in Fort Payne. Officer Matt Wilson of the Fort Payne Police Department stopped Knox's vehicle for improper lane use. During the stop, Officer Wilson became suspicious that Knox might be transporting drugs, and he requested backup from Officer Tony Blackwell, who was a member of the county drug task force and who had his drug-detection dog with him. Lt. Randy Garrison, another member of the drug task force, was also en route to the scene. Officer Wilson eventually issued a warning citation to Knox and told him that he was free to go, but he continued to question Knox about his travel plans. Lt. Garrison and Officer Blackwell arrived at some point during the questioning of Knox. After Officer Blackwell arrived with his dog, Officer Wilson asked Knox if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Knox refused to consent, and Officer Blackwell then deployed his dog to perform a free-air sniff. The dog "indicated" for the odor of marijuana, and the police eventually searched the vehicle and discovered marijuana. The police seized in excess of 2.2 pounds of marijuana and arrested Knox for trafficking in marijuana, unlawful possession of marijuana, and first-degree unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Knox filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the marijuana seized during the traffic stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered a written order granting the motion to suppress. The State appealed; the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment on a ground not raised in the circuit court: that Knox was no longer being detained at the time the search was executed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, surmising that it was likely that the State's failure to raise the absence-of-detention argument before the circuit court may have deprived Knox of an opportunity to present evidence in opposition to that theory. "The primary focus of the suppression hearing was the existence of reasonable suspicion, which was based largely on the police officers' observations. Had the State raised the absence-of-detention argument in the circuit court, it is possible that Knox might have chosen to present evidence as to (1) whether he felt free to leave the scene after he was given his warning citation and (2) whether there was a showing of authority sufficient to constitute a detention. By failing to raise this new issue at trial, the State deprived Knox of an opportunity to present evidence and to make arguments. The State's failure to raise the issue also deprived the circuit court of the opportunity to make factual findings and credibility determinations on this issue." View "Ex parte Knox." on Justia Law