Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

The Town of Mosses and its chief of police Jimmy Harris, separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. The Court consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all activities." Bryson requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her request. In 2010, Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host a "beer bash" on its premises. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the night of the event, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for showing support for the center." The mayor saw one of the deejay's flyers promoting the event. The mayor, in turn, notified Harris. Harris saw one of the flyers, organized a task force of officers from multiple law-enforcement agencies, and entered "The Spot," observing alcohol being consumed. Bryson was ultimately arrested for selling alcohol without a license. The charges against Bryson were later dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to "The Spot" and drinking alcohol on the premises. Bryson sued the Town and Harris asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. When the trial court denied the Town and Harris' motions to dismiss, they sought mandamus relief. The Alabama Supreme Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary-judgment for Harris on those grounds. To the extent Harris sought mandamus review of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition was denied. The trial court was further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it. View "Ex parte Town of Mosses." on Justia Law

Amanda Holderfield was convicted of second-degree assault. She was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment; that sentence was suspended, and Holderfield was ordered to serve 3 years' supervised probation, to undergo mental-health treatment and substance-abuse treatment, to pay $100 to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund, and to pay restitution of $2,219.99 to the "City of Gardendale Municipal Works Comp Fund." Holderfield filed a "Motion to Set Aside Order of Restitution and Request Hearing," which the circuit court later denied. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Holderfield's appeal, without an opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether a motion to modify or set aside a restitution order in a criminal case should be treated as a motion for a new trial under Rule 24.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., with regard to tolling the time for taking an appeal. After review, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the appeal in this case as untimely, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Amanda Holderfield." on Justia Law

D.W. and J.B. were married on January 25, 2011, and divorced over a year and a half later (June 14, 2012). Testimony at trial indicated that a child was conceived in late September or early October 2012, and born on June 17, 2013. J.B. did not disclose the identity of the child's biological father at delivery. D.W. did not register his intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to the Alabama Putative Father Registry Act ("PFRA"). Immediately after the birth of the child, J.B. placed the child for adoption. On June 19, 2013, the adoptive parents filed a petition in the probate court seeking to adopt the child. Subsequent to the filing of the petition, the adoptive parents informed the probate court that J.B. and D.W. had applied for a marriage license a few months before the child's birth and that "[t]he natural mother's ex-husband [D.W.] will need to be served with a petitioner's notice of hearing because there is concern that [D.W. and J.B.] may have [been] married" when the child was born. D.W. received notice of the impending adoption, and intervened to stop it. The adoptive parents moved to dismiss D.W.'s adoption contest on the ground that he had failed to register pursuant to the PFRA before or within 30 days of the child's birth. Summary judgment was denied, and trial proceeded on whether D.W. and J.B. were common-law married in June 2013 when the child was born. The probate court ultimately found that D.W. and J.B. were not common-law married at the time the child was born. D.W. appealed the probate court's judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. In a two-judge opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the probate court's judgment in part; reversed it in part; and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court determined that D.W. preserved for appellate review his contention that "he had demonstrated the requisite commitment to fatherhood before the birth of the child such that he retained a constitutional right to object to the adoption of the child by [the adoptive parents] regardless of the operation of the PFRA or the AAC [Alabama Adoption Code]," and that remand was required for the probate court to determine "whether [D.W.] had grasped his constitutionally protected 'opportunity interest' by his prebirth conduct toward [J.B.] and the child and his postbirth actions to protect his legal relationship with the child." The Supreme Court rejected that D.W. preserved his constitutional argument, and reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. View "Ex parte J.W.B. and J.J.B." on Justia Law

Kevin Kendrick, as director of compliance at Alabama State University (ASU), appealed the grant of summary judgment ordering him to provide The Advertiser Company d/b/a The Montgomery Advertiser ("the Advertiser") with redacted copies of each "request for reduction/cancellation of athletic financial aid" form submitted to the director involving the ASU football program since December 15, 2014. A reporter for the Advertiser initially sent a written request for the forms to the school's media relations director spoke. The media relations director to the reporter by telephone, advising the reporter that because the forms contained sensitive personal student information, the forms would be heavily redacted. The reporter emailed the media relations director stating that he would "take just the list of names of players whose scholarships have been revoked since December [2014]." Later that day, the media relations director, under advice of university counsel, informed the reporter he could not even provide a list of names, citing privacy concerns under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). Legal counsel for the Advertiser and legal counsel for ASU exchanged correspondence regarding whether the financial aid forms were subject to disclosure. When the parties could not agree, the Advertiser filed a declaratory judgment suit and petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the records' disclosure. The Supreme Court, after review, reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment: "We commend the trial court for its efforts to comply with both FERPA and the Open Records Act by requiring ASU to redact the requested financial-aid forms in the manner it directed. However, the release of the redacted financial-aid forms to the Advertiser would nonetheless disclose information that is protected by FERPA, and the Advertiser did not argue that the release of the redacted financial-aid forms is authorized by any other exception in FERPA. Because FERPA prohibits the very release of the redacted financial-aid forms and because FERPA takes precedence over the Open Records Act, the director is entitled to a summary judgment." View "Kendrick v. The Advertiser Company" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama appealed circuit court orders dismissing the State's petition for forfeiture of certain electronic-gambling devices and related records and currency located at VictoryLand casino (appeal no. 1141044). In 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Circuit Judge Tom Young, Jr. to issue a search warrant "as to certain allegedly illegal gambling devices and related items" at the VictoryLand casino in Shorter. During the search, the State seized 1,615 gambling machines, $263,105.81 in currency, and related servers, terminals, and other equipment. Shortly thereafter, the State filed the forfeiture petitions at issue here. The Supreme Court, in response to a petition by the State, issued a writ of mandamus disqualifying Judge Young from presiding over the forfeiture proceeding. All the other eligible judges in the Fifth Judicial Circuit voluntarily recused themselves. Montgomery Circuit Judge William Shashy was appointed to preside over the case. Judge Shashy conducted a four-day bench trial. The State argued the machines seized were illegal gambling devices. Witnesses for KC Economic Development, LLC (KCED) testified that the intent of the voters who in 2003 ratified Macon County's "bingo amendment" was to legalize the very types of devices that had been seized. Nine months later, Judge Shashy entered an order dismissing the forfeiture action on equal-protection grounds, on the basis that the State tolerated at other locations in Alabama the operation of casinos that used the same type machines at issue in this forfeiture case. The order did not address the issue of the legality of the machines. KCED filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the trial court specifically find that the intent of the voters in approving Amendment No. 744 was to authorize the use in Macon County of electronic-gambling machines like those allegedly available at other locations in the State. KCED additionally requested that the trial court order that all the seized property be returned. The State disagreed that it had selectively enforced Alabama's gambling laws and contended that the equal-protection rationale was legally untenable. After a hearing, Judge Shashy issued an order that provided the findings of fact sought by KCED, and repeated his finding from his earlier order that the State was "cherry picking which facilities should remain open or closed" and thus was "not enforcing the law equally." Judge Shashy then entered a conditional order for return of the seized property. The State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the devices at issue here were not "bingo" machines, and therefore the "bingo amendment" as grounds for return of the machines was invalid. The Court reversed both circuit court orders and rendered a judgment for the State in appeal no. 1141044. The Court dismissed KCED's cross-appeal in appeal no. 1150027. View "KC Economic Development, LLC v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether there was a "fatal variance" between the indictment, which charged James Hall with theft of "currency," and the evidence produced at trial, which established theft of the funds by means of depositing a check. Hall was the "commander" of the Houston County chapter (Chapter 87) of the Disabled American Veterans ("the DAV"). In 2013, Hall had issued to himself a check from the DAV's bank account in the amount of $1,500, purportedly to reimburse Hall for expenses incurred in the performance of his duties as commander. He deposited the check into his personal bank account. The expenditure, however, had not been approved by the DAV chapter and, therefore, violated the provisions of the DAV's constitution and bylaws. The DAV requested that Hall reimburse the funds to the DAV and provide the DAV with documentation supporting the alleged expenses. Hall failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no material variance in the indictment and the evidence, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Ex parte James R. Hall." on Justia Law

Petitioners-inmates Curtis Cook and Joe Hold, Jr. filed "petition[s] for release order" pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (APLRA). Petitioners also filed requests for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status. Both requests for IPF status would ultimately be denied. Then both filed for writs of mandamus relief, seeking that the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the IFP orders. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction over the cases and remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the petitions to the Supreme Court. Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arose from actions seeking relief based on the conditions of their incarceration, rather than from actions giving rise to their incarceration. Therefore, the proceedings underlying the petitions are civil, not criminal, in nature. However, the mere fact that the Department of Corrections was the agency charged with overseeing Cook's and Holt's incarceration did not bring their mandamus petitions within the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive appellate jurisdiction either. Having determined that only the Supreme Court could review the cases, the Court then turned to the merits of petitioners' claims. The Court then found neither petitioner met his burden proving he was entitled to mandamus relief, and denied both requests. View "Ex parte Curtis J. Cook, Jr." on Justia Law

On February 11, 2015, the State of Alabama on relation of the Alabama Policy Institute and the Alabama Citizens Action Program initiated this case by filing an "Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus." The petition sought a writ of mandamus "directed to each Respondent judge of probate, commanding each judge not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and not to recognize any marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples." By this order, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed all pending motions and petitions with regard to this matter. View "Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute" on Justia Law

Devonte Acosta was convicted of first-degree burglary and was sentenced to 156 months in prison. Acosta argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court improperly prevented him from presenting his defense that he was not present during the burglary at trial by refusing to admit certain statements into evidence. After concluding that Acosta's argument was properly preserved for appellate review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the statements in question. The Court reasoned that the trial court's strict application of the hearsay rule deprived Acosta of the ability to present a complete defense. Upon review of the record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Acosta's fundamental rights to a fair trial and to due process were not violated by the trial court's refusal to admit the statements into evidence. The court of Criminal Appeals was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law