Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Willie Hughes, Sr. ("Willie"), and Marjahn Marley were involved in an automobile accident. Approximately six months later, Willie died from enterococcal sepsis. Dottie Hughes ("Hughes"), as the personal representative of Willie's estate, filed a wrongful-death action against Marley, asserting that Marley's negligence and wantonness had caused the accident and the accident had led to Willie's eventual death from sepsis. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Marley, which Hughes appealed. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded Hughes failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Marley's conduct proximately caused Willie's sepsis and subsequent death, and affirmed the trial court judgment. View "Hughes v. Marley" on Justia Law

Brenda Terrell argued a circuit court erred by denying her motion for new trial following the entry of a judgment on a jury verdict against her and in favor of Alfonza Joshua that awarded Joshua $675,000 in compensatory damages. In 2005, Joshua was run off the road by a sleeping driver; Joshua injured his neck and back. In November 2013, Joshua was rear-ended in which he again sustained injuries "to his neck and low back." On November 2014, Joshua was a passenger in a vehicle that was T-boned by another vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed that ran a red light and hit Joshua's side of the vehicle. Joshua was not wearing a seat belt at that time, and he landed in the driver's lap after hitting his head on the ceiling of the vehicle. Joshua reported sustaining neck and back injuries after the 2014 accident, and he received treatment from a chiropractor and from physical therapists following that accident. In November 2015, Joshua was again hit, this time by a vehicle driven by Terrell. Terrell's vehicle sustained the most damage in the accident, which was caused by the front of her car hitting the trailer hitch on Joshua's truck. Joshua was able to drive away from the accident and to continue using his trailer hitch after the accident. Joshua did not seek medical attention immediately after the 2015, accident. However, a few days later, Joshua complained about having neck pain and back pain to his chiropractor. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by excluding from trial all evidence of and any references to Joshua's previous automobile accidents and the medical treatment he received following the November 2014 accident. Furthermore, the Court concluded that error injuriously affected Terrell's substantial rights during the jury trial in this case. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Terrell v. Joshua" on Justia Law

Arthur Smith, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Sammie Wells Smith, appealed a judgment entered in favor of Michael Smith. Sammie's remaining living children were Michael, Arthur, Larry Smith, Charles Smith, Brenda Smith Watson, Sarah Smith, and Elizabeth Smith. During her lifetime, Sammie owned two tracts of land; her house was located on one of those tracts of land. On September 13, 2013, Sammie executed a general warranty deed in which she conveyed the property to Michael and Watson but reserved a life estate for herself. On October 12, 2015, Michael and Watson executed a "Corrective Deed Jointly for Life with Remainder to Survivor," in which they created a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, subject to Sammie's life estate. On October 21, 2015, Sammie executed another deed in which she conveyed her life estate to Michael. On that same date, Watson executed a "Life Estate Deed," in which she conveyed a life estate in the property to Michael. Sammie died on February 15, 2018. Arthur was living in Sammie's house at the time of her death, and he remained in her house after her death. Michael and Watson commenced an ejectment seeking to remove Arthur from the property. During a bench trial, Michael and Watson presented evidence indicating that Sammie had executed deeds conveying the property to them and relinquishing her life estate; and that they were the exclusive owners of the property. However, Larry, Elizabeth, Charles, and Sarah testified that the signatures on the deeds were not Sammie's. Testimony was also presented indicating that Sammie had repeatedly stated that she wanted the property to be divided equally among her seven living children; that Sammie had wanted the property to be available if any of those children needed somewhere to stay. Ultimately, the trial court held that Michael and Watson were not entitled to relief and denied their ejectment petition. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions that the trial court "join [the remaining heirs] as [parties] to this action... If the trial court determined that any of the remaining heirs could not be made a party to the action, it "should consider the reasons [why any such heir] cannot be joined and decide whether the action should proceed in [any such heir's] absence." View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

Douglas Martinson II and Caleb Ballew ("the lawyers") represented Lesley Hatch in probate court in a dispute over the guardianship of her aunt, Brenda Cummings. During the proceedings, the lawyers withdrew from representing Hatch and filed a claim for attorney fees to be paid from Cummings's estate. The probate court entered a judgment on the merits of the underlying case and denied the lawyers' claim for fees. Over 30 days later, the lawyers moved the probate court to reconsider their claim. After a hearing, the probate court reversed course and entered an order awarding them their fees. Elizabeth Cummings Hill, acting on behalf of Cummings under a power of attorney, appealed. She argued the probate court did not have jurisdiction to grant the lawyers' motion because it was untimely. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal, with instructions to vacate the order awarding attorney fees. View "Hill v. Martinson, et al." on Justia Law

In appeal no. SC-2023-0198, Louie Smith, Emily Smith, and Joshua Smith appealed a circuit court judgment declaring that Katherine Stowe had a prescriptive easement over the Smiths' property to allow her to access her property for agricultural and recreational purposes. In appeal no. SC-2023-0200, the Smiths appealed a judgment granting Stowe a right-of-way over both their property and a railroad crossing owned by Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk"). Finding no reversible error in either case, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgments. View "Smith v. Stowe" on Justia Law

These consolidated appellate proceedings consisted of an appeal filed by Regina Daily ("Regina") and The Daily Catch, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Shores Seafood ("The Daily Catch") (case number SC-2022-0672); a cross-appeal by Greg Esser ("Greg") (case number SC-2022-0673); and a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Patrick Daily ("Patrick"), Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, Inc., d/b/a Remax of Orange Beach ("White Sands"), and Blue Palms, LLC (case number SC-2022-0992). The appeal, the cross-appeal, and the mandamus petition all involved the same underlying action filed by Greg -- in his individual capacity, in his capacity as the trustee of the Wallene R. Esser Living Trust ("the trust"), and in his capacity as an administrator ad litem of the estate of Wallene R. Esser ("the estate") -- against Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms. Following a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment awarding damages in favor of Greg and against Regina and The Daily Catch; the circuit court denied Greg's claims as to all the other defendants. Regina and The Daily Catch filed their appeal, and Greg filed his cross-appeal. Later, Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms petitioned for mandamus relief. Greg and Regina were Wallene's children and were beneficiaries to Wallene's estate. Generally, Greg alleged that "[t]he trust has been harmed and depleted by the acts and omissions of the defendants." Greg asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, requesting money damages and declaratory relief. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in case numbers SC-2022-0672 and SC-2022-0673, and granted the mandamus petition filed in case number SC-2022-0992. View "Daily, et al. v. Esser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Janice Morrison appealed a circuit court's judgment entered in favor of defendants-counterclaim plaintiffs Torry May, Sr., and Angela May. This case involved two parcels of property in Mobile, Lots 24 and 25. In 2008, the Morrison's parents, the Reddicks, executed a mortgage on Lot 25 in favor of GMAC Mortgage, LLC, f/k/a GMAC Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC"). Yolanda Reddick died in 2009. Shortly after Yolanda's death, Joseph Reddick moved out of state and died shortly later. Lot 24 was sold at a tax sale; GMAC foreclosed on Lot 25, and Fannie Mae purchased Lot 25 at the foreclosure sale in 2012. In early 2013, the Mays purchased Lot 25 from Fannie Mae, and Morrison purchased Lot 24 from the State. The Mays testified they waited until the redemption period ended before they started making improvements to the house. Torry testified he had not expanded the part of the house that sat on Lot 24. Morrison testified that, at the time she purchased Lot 24, she did not know that parts of the house, the driveway, and the storage shed were located on Lot 24 and that she did not discover that information until sometime later. At some point in 2018, Morrison walked up the driveway on Lot 24, and Torry told her to get off his property. She told Torry that it was not his property, the police were called, ultimately leading to this litigation. In its judgment, the trial court found that the Mays were entitled to redeem Lot 24 pursuant to § 40-10-82 because they were in possession of that property Morrison had not adversely possessed Lot 24 for a period of three years. The Alabama Supreme Court found the undisputed evidence established the Mays had never been owners of Lot 24 and never ever held title that property. Thus, the exception in § 40-10-82 did not apply. Because the Mays filed their counterclaim to redeem Lot 24 after the expiration of the time to redeem, the trial court erred when entered its August 11, 2022 judgment determining that the Mays had properly exercised the right to redeem Lot 24, and when it subsequently entered its November 3, 2022, order quieting title to Lot 24 in favor of the Mays. View "Morrison v. May" on Justia Law

Dr. William Morgan, Dr. Carol Zippert, Morris Hardy, Leo Branch, Sr., and Carrie Dancy, each of whom is or was a member of the Greene County Board of Education ("the Board"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Greene Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the individual-capacity claims asserted against them by Dr. Rhinnie B. Scott. Scott had been an employee of the Board for over two decades. For most of that time, she served as "Vocational Director." During the 2007-2008 school year, Scott was asked by the president of the Board at that time, Elzora Fluker, to serve as "Acting Principal" at Greene County High School ("GCHS"). During a search for a school principal in the 2010-2011 school year, Scott was tapped to serve as "Instructional Leader" for GCHS in addition to her regular function of Vocational Director. The purpose of such designation was for Dr. Scott to serve as the leader of the school until a principal was selected. At the time of that decision, the period of time of the designation was thought to be only a few weeks at most. Problems arose, however, with the selection, and Dr. Scott ended up having to serve in the position for the entire 2010-2011 school year. Scott filed a grievance with the Board in 2014 concerning her claim that she had not been compensated for her service as "Instructional Leader," which she deemed to be service as the de facto acting principal, at GCHS during the 2010-2011 school year. Additionally, Scott presented a claim that she had been "underpaid by approximately $1,664.00" each year since 2007 because, she asserted, the Board had "inadvertently reduc[ed] the annual pay for the Vocational Director." The Board denied Scott's grievance claims. Because Scott conceded that no genuine issues of material fact remained to be decided with respect to her individual-capacity claims against the Board members, the Board members were entitled to summary judgment concerning those remaining claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the Board members' petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Morgan, et al." on Justia Law

In a defamation action, M.E.J. filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied M.E.J.'s motion. She then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct that court to vacate its order and to enter an order dismissing the action. Because M.E.J. lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Alabama and maintenance of this action would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte M.E.J." on Justia Law

MSE Building Company, Inc. ("MSE") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of The Stewart/Perry Company ("Stewart/Perry"); Buc-ee's, Ltd., and Buc-ee's Alabama II, LLC (referred to collectively as "Buc-ee's"); and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company ("Philadelphia"). Among other things, the trial court found MSE's claims against the defendants were unenforceable because MSE had violated § 34-8-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which regulated contractors, by utilizing unlicensed sub-subcontractors in connection with a construction project. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment insofar as it determined that MSE's claims were barred as a matter of law under § 34-8-1 because there were material issues of disputed fact regarding whether the labor brokers utilized by MSE were required to obtain a general contractor's license under § 34-8-1. Accordingly, the summary judgment on MSE's lien claim and prompt-payment claim was also reversed. The summary judgment on MSE's negligence claim against Buc-ee's was affirmed. In addition, the summary judgment was affirmed insofar as it was entered in favor of Stewart/Perry on MSE's claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, because MSE did not challenge the judgment on those claims in its appellate brief. View "MSE Building Company, Inc v. The Stewart/Perry Company, et al." on Justia Law