Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Walter Energy, Inc., appealed a circuit court order that dismissed claims it had asserted against investor Julian Treger, his firm Audley Capital Advisors LLP, and other associated investment entities (collectively, "the Audley defendants") stemming from their alleged involvement in a scheme to improperly manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. Walter Energy sued the Audley defendants alleging various claims stemming from their alleged involvement in a "pump and dump" scheme to manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. After affording Walter Energy three opportunities to amend its complaint, the trial court dismissed all the claims on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. Walter Energy thereafter appealed the dismissal of two of its claims to the Alabama Supreme Court; however, upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the dismissal of those claims was proper, and the judgment of the trial court was accordingly affirmed. View "Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley Capital Advisors, LLP" on Justia Law

The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") petitions for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order granting the motion filed by the Alabama Surface Mining Commission ("ASMC") seeking to transfer the underlying action to Walker County. Shepherd Bend, LLC, joined ASMC's transfer motion. Upon review of the briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; venue was indeed proper in Jefferson County. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order transferring the action to Walker County. View "Ex parte Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham." on Justia Law

Edwin B. Lumpkin, Jr. appealed several Circuit Court orders dismissing three cases he had initiated challenging property-tax assessments made by the Jefferson County Board of Equalization and Adjustments. Lumpkin owned and operated Metro Mini Storage, a chain of self-storage facilities with locations throughout the Birmingham metropolitan area. In 2012, Lumpkin received notice from Jefferson County regarding the assessed value of three of his properties located in that county. Believing the assessed values of these properties to be too high, Lumpkin elected to protest their valuation, and the Board heard his arguments. Acting pro se, Lumpkin filed three appeals in the Jefferson Circuit Court (one for each of the three locations), arguing that the Board's decisions did not reflect the true market value of the properties and that a reduction in assessed value was warranted based on the evidence he had presented. Because Lumpkin's appeals are governed by section 40-3-25 and because he failed to comply with all the requirements of section 40-3-25 for perfecting his appeals, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly dismissed the cases. View "Lumpkin, Jr. v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The City of Florence, the Civil Service Board of the City of Florence ("the CSB") and Keith McDaniel appealed separately a circuit court judgment after a jury rendered its verdict in favor of William T. Ezell. In mid 2011, two positions for promotion to the job of battalion chief became available within the Florence Fire and Rescue Department. Benjamin Cochran, Melvin Brown, Tim Clanton, John T. Muse, McDaniel, and Ezell applied for the positions. The CSB conducted interviews with the candidates on September 1, 2011. Afterward, it promoted Cochran and McDaniel to the two battalion-chief positions. On September 12, 2011, Ezell filed a two-count complaint against the City and the CSB in the Lauderdale Circuit Court. A month later, the City and the CSB filed an answer in which they denied Ezell's allegations. They also asserted that Ezell had failed to join certain indispensable parties. The City and CSB simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss count 1 of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that all six applicants were indispensable parties. They then asked that count 1 of the complaint be dismissed or that Ezell be required to add Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel as defendants. The trial court ordered Ezell to amend his complaint to make Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel parties to the suit. Ezell amended count 1 of his complaint and also added the other applicants as defendants. The City and the CSB filed an answer to the amended complaint in which they denied Ezell's allegations and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The jury returned the following verdict: "We are not reasonably satisfied that the decision of the [CSB] was correct and we find that the following 2 individuals should be promoted to Battalion Chief (pick two) ... Benjamin Cochran ... William Ezell." The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and ordered that the status quo be maintained during the pendency of any appellate proceedings. The City, the CSB, and McDaniel filed posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. McDaniel appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130372). The City and the CSB also appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130373). Because Ezell failed to demonstrate that he had a right to appeal the CSB's decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed these appeals with instructions to the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "City of Florence v. Ezell" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") appealed the trial court's order certifying a class in the action filed by the City of Vernon and a class of similarly situated entities that had purchased uninsured motorist/underinsured-motorist coverage ("UM/UIM coverage") from AMIC. Vernon was the original class representative; however, after AMIC filed its notice of appeal of the class-certification order, Vernon settled its claims against AMIC and withdrew as the class representative. Because there was no longer a representative to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a new class representative to be substituted for Vernon. The City of Fairfield substituted for Vernon as the class representative. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute: the Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Initial jurisdiction over this dispute was with the Alabama Department of Insurance and its commissioner. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's class-certification order, and remanded for dismissal. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order that dismissed a forfeiture action that sought condemnation of certain devices, currency and other property. In 2011, the State executed a search warrant and seized the devices, currency and property from the premises of Greenetrack, Inc. Greentrack moved for the return of the seized property. The State electronically filed its complaint, with the signature lines for the government deputy attorneys general as "/s/ ________." The certificate of service had similar electronic signature lines. A few days later after these pleadings were filed, the State filed amended petitions, and again, the signature blocks lacked any text on each line following the "/s/." The trial court noted that the petitions appeared to lack signatures. After the hearing, the State amended its filings with typewritten names following the "/s/." The certificate of service listed the same counsel as the second amended petition, but no summons accompanied the second amended petition in the trial court record. The trial court ruled for the return of Greenetrack's property, currency and devices. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that though the State's petitions did not strictly conform with the stated rules, it did not require striking the State's petitions. "The failure to properly sign the petitions caused no identified prejudice to Greenetrack. … To conclude otherwise would be contrary to the principles of [the Rule] and would elevate form over substance." View "Alabama v. $93,917.50 & 376 Gambling Devices" on Justia Law

Peter Ferrari was employed by DR Horton, Inc. - Birmingham as a land-acquisition manager for its Gulf Coast division. DR Horton asserted that it gave Ferrari confidential information concerning its business and land-acquisition strategies, including its geographical markets for expansion, and that it empowered Ferrari to arrange land purchases for DR Horton. DR Horton asserted that it received information that Ferrari had supplied third parties with confidential information from DR Horton without DR Horton's permission, including DR Horton's planned land acquisitions, future real estate developments, markets for expansion, and plans for construction. DR Horton also claimed it received information that Ferrari had benefited from DR Horton land acquisitions apart from his employment compensation. DR Horton asked for the tax returns of the Ferrari, his wife, his business Ferrari Capital Partners, LLC, and the entities that allegedly received DR Horton's confidential information: FH Properties, LLC; P6 Holdings, LLC; and Prince 5 Holdings, LLC (collectively, Ferrari defendants) in order to verify his assertions, but Ferrari refused to provide such information. DR Horton subsequently contacted those defendant third parties. Brad Zeitlin agreed to meet with DR Horton representatives to discuss real-property transactions involving DR Horton and Ferrari. According to a witness present during the interview, Zeitlin admitted that he had benefited financially from "tying up" property DR Horton wanted to purchase and then selling it to DR Horton. wanted. DR Horton terminated Ferrari's employment. DR Horton filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from the Ferrari defendants. The trial court granted the petition. The Ferrari defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the trial court to vacate its order and to dismiss DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition before granting the petition. Given that DR Horton expressly sought preaction discovery not for the purpose of perpetuating evidence, but for the purpose of evaluating its claims against the Ferrari defendants, the Court granted the Ferrari defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, and instructed the trial court to dismiss DR Horton's petition for preaction discovery. View "Ex parte Peter Ferrari et al." on Justia Law

One of the defendants in this case, Robert Bosch LLC, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court to vacate or, in the alternative, to amend the provisions of its order granting the request for production of Bosch's "air bag system Electronic Control Unit" ("ECU") filed by plaintiff Dorothy Kilgo, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Ernest Ronald Kilgo, Jr. In 2011, Kilgo and her husband "Ron" were passengers in a 2008 PT Cruiser that Ron's stepson was driving in Etowah County. While they were waiting for an oncoming motor vehicle to pass through an intersection so that they could make a left turn, the Kilgos' vehicle was struck from behind by another motor vehicle. The impact of that collision propelled the Kilgos' vehicle into the intersection, where it was struck head-on by an oncoming motor vehicle. Ron, who was sitting in the front passenger-side seat, suffered severe injuries and died several days later as a result of those injuries. The front passenger-seat air bag failed to deploy during either the rear or the head-on collisions, and the front passenger-side seatbelt "pretensioner," which is supposed to cause the seat belt to "lock" immediately after a collision, did not activate. However, one of the two front driver-side air bags deployed during the collisions, and the front driver-side seat-belt pretensioner was activated as well. Kilgo thereafter filed a wrongful-death lawsuit, naming several defendants, including, among others, Bosch, who designed and manufactured the ECU in the Kilgos' vehicle. Sometime thereafter, Kilgo served a notice of taking the deposition of a corporate representative of Bosch. The trial court entered an order denying Bosch's motion to amend the protective order and, in that order, required Kilgo to "submit a proposed Order including safeguards it will employ to review the requested discovery." In 2014, Kilgo submitted to the trial court a proposed protective order. On the following day, the trial court entered an amended protective order, which required Bosch to produce the entire algorithm for inspection by Kilgo's two experts, subject to 12 confidentiality and disclosure safeguards set forth in the order. After review, the Supreme Court granted Bosh's petition and issued the writ: the trial court was directed to vacate its protective order and to enter a more comprehensive and restrictive protective order with regard to the algorithm. View "Ex parte Robert Bosch LLC." on Justia Law

Progressive Direct Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Progressive's motion to transfer this action from the Wilcox Circuit Court to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The underlying action stemmed from a motor-vehicle accident that occurred in Tuscaloosa County in 2010, between an automobile driven by Ira Robinson and an automobile driven by Amber Clayton. In 2012, Robinson filed a complaint in the Wilcox Circuit Court against Clayton, a resident of Tuscaloosa, and Progressive, a foreign corporation doing business in both Tuscaloosa and Wilcox Counties. In his complaint, Robinson alleged that he was a resident of Wilcox County and that he had suffered injuries as a result of the negligent and/or wanton conduct of Clayton when the vehicle she was driving collided with the vehicle he was driving. Additionally, Robinson alleged that at the time of the accident he had a policy of insurance with Progressive, which included uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage. Progressive filed a motion to transfer the action to Tuscaloosa County, alleging that venue in Wilcox County was improper because, it claimed, the accident occurred in Tuscaloosa County and both Robinson and Clayton resided in Tuscaloosa County at the time of the accident. Alternatively, Progressive claimed that the action was due to be transferred to Tuscaloosa County on the ground of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, based on the evidence before the trial court at the time of its ruling, it should have granted Progressive's motion for a change of venue. View "Ex parte Progressive Direct Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Defendant Linda Manning petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion to transfer this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In early 2014, Shannon Richardson filed a complaint in the Macon Circuit Court against Manning, stating claims of negligence and wantonness as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Montgomery County in October 2012. Richardson sustained injuries and was taken by ambulance to Baptist South Hospital in Montgomery after the accident. Law-enforcement personnel who responded to the accident worked in Montgomery County. At all material times, Richardson was a resident of Montgomery County, and Manning was a resident of Macon County. Manning filed a motion to transfer the action to Montgomery County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Manning's motion for a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted Manning's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter an order transferring the case from the Macon Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Linda Manning" on Justia Law