Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company ("Alfa") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to grant its motion seeking to realign the parties to the underlying litigation so that Alfa may "opt out" of participation in the trial. In October 2012, respondent Mark Trotter was injured when a "road sweeper" he was operating was struck by a vehicle being operated by Daniel Elijah Davis, an uninsured motorist. In October 2014, Trotter sued Alfa seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits pursuant to a policy of insurance issued by Alfa to Trotter, which was in place at the time of the 2012 accident. Trotter did not include Davis as a codefendant in his action against Alfa. Alfa subsequently filed a third-party complaint adding Davis as a third-party defendant. Specifically, Alfa's third-party complaint alleged that, to the extent it was determined to be liable to Trotter for UIM benefits, then Alfa was subrogated to and entitled to recover the amount of that liability from Davis. Thereafter, Alfa filed a "Motion to Realign Parties" in which it asked to "opt out" of the litigation. Without explaining the findings on which its decision was based, the trial court denied Alfa's motion. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded after a review of the record, that Alfa has demonstrated a clear legal right to have its motion to realign the parties granted and to allow it to opt out of the underlying litigation. No authority is cited requiring that, in order to make the permitted election, Alfa must first release the right of subrogation to which it was also clearly entitled. View "Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Defendants Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. (collectively, "Citiflats"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff Coretta Arrington as untimely filed. On July 18, 2014, Arrington filed, both individually and in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of her deceased minor child, a complaint against Citiflats. Arrington's complaint alleged tort-based claims in connection with the death of Arrington's child as the result of injuries allegedly sustained in 2012, on premises owned and managed by Citiflats. Arrington's complaint was accompanied by an "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship," alleging that Arrington was unable to pay the corresponding filing fee. At the time it was filed, the hardship statement had not been approved by the trial court as required by statute. Arrington's complaint was also accompanied by the summonses necessary for service on the named defendants, which were stamped "filed" by the clerk of the trial court on the filing date. On August 18, 2014, after the July 24, 2014 expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations, the trial court entered an order approving the hardship statement. On August 19, 2014, the clerk of the trial court issued the previously filed summonses for service. Citiflats filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeking to dismiss Arrington's complaint on the ground that the statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of a filing fee or the approval of a hardship statement. The Circuit Court denied Citiflats' motion. Because the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss Arrington's complaint as untimely, it concluded that Citiflats made the requisite showing of a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "Ex parte Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management LLC." on Justia Law

Tanya Butts petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Clarke Circuit Court to stay the proceedings in the underlying civil case until a criminal case pending against her was completed. Gaines McCorquodale and Butts each owned a one-half interest in Hometown Hospice, Inc. In July 2014, McCorquodale sued Butts, asserting claims based on allegations that Butts had misappropriated funds belonging to Hometown. The trial court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting Butts from any involvement in the operation of Hometown. Butts contended that a stay in the civil case was necessary to protect her constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court denied the petition: Butts was not entitled to a stay of that part of the civil case determining the value of Hometown in accordance with 10A-2-14.34. Because the trial court had not yet ruled on whether the remaining parts of the civil case should be stayed pending the resolution of the criminal case against her, mandamus relief was not appropriate on that issue. View "Ex parte Tanya Butts." on Justia Law

Defendants Quality Carriers, Inc. and Bennie Hugh Orcutt filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the Dallas Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to transfer the underlying action to the Autauga Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. Desmond Woods was driving northbound on Interstate 65 in Autauga County; Kimberly Livingston, Tory Cooper, Marquita Speer ("Marquita"), and Aaron Jones were passengers in the automobile. The automobile Woods was driving had a mechanical problem and stalled in the right travel lane; it was nighttime, and the lights on the automobile were not on. Woods, Cooper, and Jones got out of the automobile and started looking under the hood. Livingston and Marquita remained in the automobile. Orcutt, who was employed by Quality Carriers, was also traveling northbound on Interstate 65 in a tractor-trailer rig that was owned by Quality Carriers. The tractor-trailer rig Orcutt was driving collided with the back of the automobile. Both vehicles caught fire. Livingston and Marquita, who were in the automobile when it caught fire, were pronounced dead at the scene by the Autauga County coroner. Woods and Cooper were transported to Prattville Hospital. According to the accident report, marijuana was found on Woods's person at the hospital. At the time the accident report was filed, toxicology results were pending to determine whether Woods was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the crash. Upon review of defendants' argment on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Quality Carriers and Orcutt's motion for a transfer based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court, in the interest of justice, to enter an order transferring the case from the Dallas Circuit Court to the Autauga Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Quality Carriers, Inc." on Justia Law

Nicholson Manufacturing Limited petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor on the ground that Gerald Templeton's substitution of Nicholson for a fictitiously named defendant was made after the expiration of the applicable statutory limitations period and did not "relate back" to the filing of the original complaint. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Nicholson established it had a clear legal right to the relief requested. The Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Nicholson Manufacturing Ltd." on Justia Law

Gudel AG, one of several defendants to this case, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Crenshaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Gudel's motion to dismiss the personal-injury claims filed against it by Robert and Cindy Rutledge, and to enter an order dismissing the Rutledges' claims on the basis of a lack of in personam jurisdiction. In February 2013, Robert sued Smart Alabama, LLC ("SAL"), an automotive-parts manufacturer located in Crenshaw County, seeking to recover worker's compensation benefits in connection with an alleged work-related injury Robert suffered in November 2011 while in SAL's employ. In November 2013, Robert amended his original complaint to add a count pursuant to Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine as well as negligence and wantonness claims. In addition, the amended complaint added both Hyundai WIA ("Hyundai") and Gudel, as well as several fictitiously named entities, as defendants. The amended complaint alleged that Gudel, a foreign corporation headquartered in Switzerland, "designed, built, manufactured, tested and sold [the] subject machine/equipment that is the subject matter of [the Rutledges'] lawsuit." After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court exceeded its discretion in determining that it possessed personal jurisdiction over Gudel. Accordingly, Gudel has established a clear legal right to the dismissal of the claims against it; therefore, the Alabama Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Gudel's motion to dismiss and to dismiss the Rutledges' claims against Gudel. View "Ex parte Gudel AG." on Justia Law

On or about August 1, 2006, the University of Southern Alabama (USA) hired Azin Agah, a cell biologist, as a tenure-track employee, to teach biochemistry and to research the abnormalities in the extracellular matrix and angiogenesis associated with the pathogenesis of scleroderma. In 2010, USA did not reappoint Agah based on alleged research misconduct. In 2011, Agah sued several department members at the College of Allied Health Professions at USA and chairman of the two ad hoc committees that evaluated Agah, and other fictitiously named parties, alleging theft of electronic computer data and her research logbook and intentional and malicious interference with her contractual relationship with USA and seeking recovery of chattels in specie for the electronic data and her research logbook. On March 21, 2013, Agah amended her complaint adding USA and others as defendants and adding various claims. The only claim in her amended complaint that specifically named USA as a defendant "[sought] a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary damages against USA for the breach by USA of [her] tenure track employment contract with USA." As a state school, USA argued it was immune from civil actions and petitions the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss it from Agah's suit. Additionally, Amber Bartlett, a student who worked under Agah's supervision in USA's research laboratory and a defendant in the same underlying action, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to issue an order quashing the subpoena issued to Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. ("APS"), ordering production of her mental-health records. The Court granted the petitions and issued the writs. USA and Bartlett have established that they had a clear, legal right to the relief they have requested. USA was entitled to absolute sovereign immunity from Agah's civil action, and the trial court was directed to enter a judgment of dismissal for USA. Bartlett was entitled to confidentiality of her mental-health records, and the trial court was directed to enter an order quashing Agah's subpoena for Bartlett's mental-health records from APS. View "Ex parte University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

In April 2010, Officer Brandon Brown, a police officer with the City of Fultondale, received a be-on-the-lookout ("BOLO") from dispatch for a blue Mitsubishi automobile, the occupants of which were suspected of having committed a theft, engaged in the pursuit of a blue Mitsubishi that he saw leaving the area of the offense. Moments after Officer Brown ceased pursuit of the blue Mitsubishi, the driver, Christopher Mitchell, ran a red light at an intersection and struck a vehicle being driven by Pamela Cupps in which David Cupps was a passenger. Pamela Cupps was killed and David Cupps was injured. David Cupps, on behalf of himself and as administrator of Pamela Cupps' estate, sued Mitchell, Officer Brown, and others. With regard to Officer Brown, David Cupps alleged that Officer Brown negligently and/or wantonly pursued Mitchell's vehicle by driving recklessly, that he negligently and/or wantonly pursued Mitchell's vehicle in violation of the City of Fultondale Police Department's pursuit policy and procedure, and that he violated section 32-5A-7(c), Ala. Code 1975, by operating his patrol vehicle in pursuit of another vehicle without the use of an audible signal. After the complaint was filed, David Cupps died; Allison Cupps, the administrator of the estates of David Cupps and Pamela Cupps, was substituted as the plaintiff. Officer Brown petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment in his favor based on State-agent immunity and statutory immunity on claims filed against him by Allison Cupps. Finding that Officer Brown established, as a matter of law, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity from Cupps' action, the Supreme Court granted his petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Brandon Brown." on Justia Law

James H. Goldthwaite lived in his Birmingham house for approximately 45 years. The house was adjacent to or near property on which were actively used railroad tracks owned by Norfolk Southern. The record reflected that Norfolk Southern used one of the railroad tracks located near Goldthwaite's house as a staging or temporary storage area for coal trains, which consist of empty rail cars and cars loaded with coal. In October 2013, Goldthwaite filed a complaint against Norfolk Southern alleging that his "life, health, liberty and possessions" have been harmed by noise and "noxious fumes" from the diesel locomotives that were left running in coal trains that are temporarily stored near his house. Norfolk Southern had the case removed to the United States District Court on the ground that Goldthwaite's claims were completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, and that the federal district court had federal question jurisdiction for the limited purpose of dismissing the action. In April 2014, the federal district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action because Goldthwaite's state-law claims were not completely preempted by the ICCTA. Holding that removal of the action from state court was not proper, the federal district court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. On remand, Norfolk Southern moved the circuit court to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted under the ICCTA because, it maintained, the nuisance action was an attempt to regulate transportation by rail carrier and actions related to the regulation and operation of rail carriers, pursuant to the ICCTA, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted by the ICCTA, the circuit court erred in denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment for Norfolk Southern, dismissing Goldthwaite's state court action. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Goldthwaite" on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Dan Hilyer appealed the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him and in favor of plaintiff Betti Fortier. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. B.D., M.M.'s brother; R.W., M.M.'s fiancé; and B.H., a friend of B.D.'s, were also in the vehicle. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. In early 2014, the trial court entered a judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000 and found "that the proposed settlement of the claim of the minor, M.M. is just, fair, reasonable, in keeping with the evidence, and is in the minor's best interest." A month later, Hilyer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, finding that Hilyer, in his motion to set aside the default judgment, met the threshold showing of each of the three "Kirtland" factors. Additionally, Hilyer supported his motion with affidavits and copies of correspondence. Fortier submitted evidence in support of her opposition to the motion to set aside that controverted the facts and evidence submitted by Hilyer. However, after conducting a hearing and taking the matter under advisement, the trial court allowed the motion to set aside to be denied by operation of law without any indication that the denial of the motion was the product of due deliberation and without any indication that the denial was based upon a consideration of the Kirtland factors. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the denial by operation of law of Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment and remanded this case for the trial court to consider the Kirtland factors in determining whether to set aside the default judgment. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law