Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Circuit Court dismissed claims asserted by St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. ("the corporation"), against Reverend James M. Howard, Sr., and the counterclaims asserted by Howard against the corporation and its directors after concluding that their dispute was ecclesiastical in nature and outside the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the corporation's claims because they were indeed ecclesiastical in nature and outside the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. But the Court reversed dismissal of Howard's claims because the issues underlying that appeal involved only the financial affairs and property rights of the church. Howard's case was remanded for further proceedings. View "St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. v. Howard" on Justia Law

Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. ("Jim Bishop"), appealed judgment entered on jury verdicts in favor of Michael and Tina Burden ("Burden"). In 2012, the Burdens sued General Motors, LLC, Jim Bishop, and Lynn Layton Chevrolet, Inc. ("Lynn Layton"), to recover damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as the result of a fire that occurred in a truck they had purchased from an automobile dealership owned and operated by Jim Bishop. When Jim Bishop filed its answer, also generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses, Jim Bishop further asserted a cross-claim against General Motors alleging it had refused to indemnify Jim Bishop. The Burdens eventually entered into pro tanto settlements with General Motors, which agreed to pay them $20,000, and Lynn Layton, which agreed to pay them $32,000, as to the respective claims asserted by the Burdens against those defendants. The settlement with General Motors resolved the breach-of-warranty claims and the "Magnuson-Moss" claim. The trial court dismissed the Burdens' claims against both General Motors and Lynn Layton pursuant to joint stipulations of dismissal filed by those parties. Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a summary judgment on the Burdens' remaining claims against it, moved at the close of evidence for a judgment as a matter of law, and renewed its JML motion post-verdict. All three were denied, and the jury returned its verdict against Jim Bishop. Based on its review of the facts entered into the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to grant Jim Bishop's motion for a JML and in submitting the case to the jury. Therefore, it reversed the judgment entered in favor of the Burdens on the jury's verdicts and rendered a judgment for Jim Bishop. View "Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Burden" on Justia Law

Synovus Bank appealed a circuit court order denying Synovus's motion to set aside a joint stipulation of dismissal. Synovus sued Tom James Mitchell d/b/a Mitchell Motors ("Mitchell") seeking damages for Mitchell's alleged default on a promissory note. Mitchell moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to another circuit court. Mitchell argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that, should the case nevertheless be allowed to proceed, venue was proper only in Jefferson County. The Walker Circuit Court entered an order denying Mitchell's motion to dismiss and transferring the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to determine whether, in denying the motion, the trial court exceeded its discretion. However, in this case, the trial court based its denial of Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion not on the merits of the motion but, rather, on the trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. Because the trial court did not consider the merits of Synovus's motion, the Supreme Court could not address Synovus's argument that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the motion; "indeed, there was no exercise of discretion for this Court to review." Thus, the Court reversed the order denying Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the merits of Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion and to enter a judgment in accordance with its consideration of the merits of that motion. View "Synovus Bank v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

North American Adjusters, Inc. ("North American"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate certain orders denying a jury trial in this case because the written jury demand endorsed on the plaintiff's complaint was not signed. In 2013, Jeffery Saulsberry, acting pro se, filed a verified complaint against Green Tree Financial, LLC, Daniel Hood, and fictitiously named defendants on claims of trespass; invasion of privacy; conversion; negligence; and theft of property. Saulsberry included at the end of his complaint a demand for "A Trial By A Struck Jury," and for each of his asserted claims he sought compensatory and punitive damages "in an amount to be determined by the Jury." Additionally, a notation of a requested jury demand appears on the civil cover sheet, which Saulsberry served simultaneously with the summons and complaint. Saulsberry added as defendants North American and American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida ("American Bankers"). According to North American, American Bankers has yet to be properly served. In 2015, after North American learned that the trial court would be removing the case from its jury docket and placing it on a nonjury docket, it filed a motion to certify that the case would be tried by a jury. Saulsberry then filed an amended complaint seeking to, among other things, withdraw the jury demand on the ground that it was "without proper attestation." The trial court entered an order denying North American's motion to certify that the case would be tried by a jury; the trial court noted in its order that a "Jury Demand may be endorsed upon a pleading; none has been done in this case." North American unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that North American had shown it had a "(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon [the trial court] to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Accordingly, the Court granted North American's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to vacate its orders finding that there had been no "indorsement upon a pleading" because the endorsement was not signed. View "Ex parte North American Adjusters, Inc." on Justia Law

Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered against her and in favor of the City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers, Joseph Wordell, in her action for damages based on personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. Wordell had been dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile. Wordell testified that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the domestic disturbance. Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother. Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11. The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle. The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick unconscious. The impact of the collision caused Wordell's vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on with a third vehicle. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there remained disputed facts in the record, for which granting summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kendrick v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law

Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered against her and in favor of the City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers, Joseph Wordell, in her action for damages based on personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. Wordell had been dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile. Wordell testified that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the domestic disturbance. Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother. Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11. The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle. The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick unconscious. The impact of the collision caused Wordell's vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on with a third vehicle. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there remained disputed facts in the record, for which granting summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kendrick v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law

Clatus Junkin, a resident of Fayette County, owned and operated Johnco Materials, Inc., a sand and gravel pit located in Lowndes County. At some point in time, Junkin purchased diesel fuel from Southeastern Energy and had it delivered to Johnco Materials. When Southeastern Energy did not receive payment for the fuel, Southeastern Energy sued Johnco Materials and Junkin, individually, in Lowndes County. With regard to Junkin, Southeastern Energy alleged that "Junkin was personally liable to Southeastern Energy for diesel fuel that was sold and delivered to Johnco Materials." At the request of the parties, the Lowndes Circuit Court entered a consent judgment against Johnco Materials and in favor of Southeastern Energy for an agreed-upon amount and dismissed Junkin from the action with prejudice. Junkin then sued Southeastern Energy in Fayette County alleging malicious prosecution by Southeastern Energy in the Lowndes County case. Southeastern Energy moved to dismiss the malicious prosecution action or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to "Montgomery County, Alabama, or any other proper venue, pursuant to Rule 82(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., and governing law." Southeastern Energy Corp. petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Southeastern Energy's motion for a change of venue for the underlying action and directing the Fayette Circuit Court to grant the motion and transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court (case no. 1150033). Southeastern Energy filed a second petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Supreme Court to direct the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate an order transferring the underlying action to the Lowndes Circuit Court, and to direct the Fayette Circuit Court to enter an order transferring the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court (case no. 1150294). Finding no errors in the transfer orders, the Supreme Court dismissed Southeastern Energy's petition in case no. 1150033, and denied its petition in case no. 1150294. View "Ex parte Southeastern Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners-inmates Curtis Cook and Joe Hold, Jr. filed "petition[s] for release order" pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (APLRA). Petitioners also filed requests for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status. Both requests for IPF status would ultimately be denied. Then both filed for writs of mandamus relief, seeking that the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the IFP orders. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction over the cases and remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the petitions to the Supreme Court. Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arose from actions seeking relief based on the conditions of their incarceration, rather than from actions giving rise to their incarceration. Therefore, the proceedings underlying the petitions are civil, not criminal, in nature. However, the mere fact that the Department of Corrections was the agency charged with overseeing Cook's and Holt's incarceration did not bring their mandamus petitions within the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive appellate jurisdiction either. Having determined that only the Supreme Court could review the cases, the Court then turned to the merits of petitioners' claims. The Court then found neither petitioner met his burden proving he was entitled to mandamus relief, and denied both requests. View "Ex parte Curtis J. Cook, Jr." on Justia Law

On February 11, 2015, the State of Alabama on relation of the Alabama Policy Institute and the Alabama Citizens Action Program initiated this case by filing an "Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus." The petition sought a writ of mandamus "directed to each Respondent judge of probate, commanding each judge not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and not to recognize any marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples." By this order, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed all pending motions and petitions with regard to this matter. View "Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute" on Justia Law

Defendants Hubbard Properties, Inc., and Warrior Gardens, LLC filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the Alabama Supreme Court direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the action filed against them was a nullity. Louis Chatman was married to Carolyn Chatman and was a resident of the Warrior Gardens Apartments, which defendants owned and operated. In 2011, there was a fire in the apartment where Louis resided. He was not able to escape and ultimately died in the fire. Louis' estate sued defendants, alleging that as a proximate result of the defendants' negligence and/or wantonness, Louis suffered injuries that resulted in his death. The estate filed a motion to substitute parties, seeking to substitute herself for the administratrix of the estate. The trial court granted the motion, then subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the administratrix had been appointed 15 days before Carolyn filed the wrongful death action. Therefore, Carolyn was without authority to file suit. Because she lacked authority, she could not substitute herself with the administratrix and proceed with the case. The Supreme Court granted the writ. View "Ex parte Hubbard Properties, Inc. and Warrior Gardens, LLC." on Justia Law