Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Ray appealed a circuit court judgment in a will contest transferred to the circuit court from the Tallapoosa Probate Court. The will contest in this case was transferred to the circuit court pursuant to 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975. The Alabama Supreme Court held previously that the jurisdiction conferred on the circuit court by this section was statutory and limited. A circuit court, however, was not limited to the issues presented to the probate court prior to the transfer, and a circuit court could, in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, allow additional issues in the will contest, "provided those issues can properly be raised in a will contest." In this case, it appeared that the only issues raised by the contestants were those issues set forth in their complaint contesting Huett's will, and the only ones properly before the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded after Ray's arguments on appeal, that the circuit court should have decided the case on the issues actually raised in the contest -- i.e., testamentary capacity, valid execution, and undue influence. Because it did not stick to the issues raised, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for the circuit court to decide the specific will contest issues before it, and to enter a judgment either upholding or denying the contest. View "Ray v. Huett" on Justia Law

Alabama resident Joan McCullough Scott petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Probate Court to vacate its order requiring all Alabama resident-beneficiaries of the estate of Kathryn Marie Lange to pay the probate court distributions they received from a concurrent administration of the estate in London, England. Lange was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1930. In 1953 she married a Danish citizen and moved to Copenhagen. She divorced her husband in 1961, and in 1962 she became a resident of London, where she resided until her death in 2010. Despite living overseas for the majority of her adult life, Lange retained her United States citizenship, and she never became a British citizen. At her death, Lange owned the several parcels of real property in England, a small sum of money in an English bank account, some personal property located in England, and approximately $350,000 in personal property located in Alabama. The probate court granted Lange's nephew, Charles Lange Clark's petition on the day it was filed and issued him letters of administration. Clark hired legal counsel in London to assist in the administration of the estate overseas. At some point in the relationship, Clark terminated the London firm, and the firm invoiced Clark for work done to the point of termination. Clark did not pay the invoice, and the firm sued him in England. Clark sought indemnification as to costs incurred in defending against the London law firm, and asked the Alabama Probate Court for relief. At the time of Clark's motion, he had already distributed all but approximately $70 of the assets under his control. Scott did not object to the motion for indemnification, nor the probate court's order granting the motion. An "Order of Escrow" was entered, requiring all beneficiaries of the estate in Alabama to pay the probate all monies that had been previously paid out so that a determination could be made about Clark's indemnification claim. The monies asked for included money any Alabama beneficiary received from the English administration of the estate. In her writ application, Scott argued that the probate had no jurisdiction as to the estate assets she received from the English administration. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, granted Scott's petition, issued the writ, and directed the probate court to vacate the escrow order. View "Ex parte Joan McCullough Scott." on Justia Law

Charles Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation (collectively, "Breland") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Fairhope in Breland's declaratory action based on alleged negligent conduct by Fairhope in relation to real property owned by Breland. In 2000, Breland filed applications for permits and certifications from the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") in order to fill approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands on the property. Fairhope opposed the fill project. Breland purchased the mitigation credits required by the Corps permit, and hired engineers and consultants for the project sometime before he began actual filling activity. Eight years later, actual work on the fill project began, but the City issued a stop-work order that halted operations. Because his Corps permit would expire in late 2008, Breland sued Fairhope for declaratory relief and an injunction against the effects of multiple City ordinances passed in attempts to stop Breland's work. Fairhope moved to dismiss the complaint. Charles Breland testified that he dismissed his lawsuit against Fairhope when both his Corps permit had been extended (to 2013), and that "there [were] conversations that the city [initiated] about buying the property." According to Breland, by late 2011, he got the impression that Fairhope had been negotiating with him to buy the remainder of the property under false pretenses and that Fairhope actually was trying to delay Breland from resuming the fill project until the Corps permit expired. In early 2013, Breland sued again seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Fairhope's attempts to stop the fill project. The trial court dismissed Breland's case on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that each time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity on his property, Fairhope committed a new act that served as a basis for a new claim. Fairhope's last stop-work order was issued in November 2011; Breland filed this action on August 7, 2013. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar a claim for damages stemming from the 2011 stop-work order. View "Breland v. City of Fairhope" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2007, Florian Hinrichs was riding in the front passenger seat of a 2004 GMC Sierra 1500 pickup truck owned and operated by his friend Daniel Vinson when they were involved in a motor-vehicle accident. It was undisputed that Hinrichs was wearing his seat belt. A vehicle operated by Kenneth Smith, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, ran a stop sign and collided with the passenger-side door of the Sierra. The Sierra rolled over twice, but landed on its wheels. Hinrichs suffered a spinal cord injury in the accident that left him a quadriplegic. The accident occurred in Geneva County, Alabama. Hinrichs alleged that his injuries were caused by the defective design of the roof of the Sierra that allowed the roof over the passenger compartment to collapse during the rollover and by the defective design of the seat belt in the Sierra, which failed to restrain him. At the time of the accident, Hinrichs, a German citizen, was a member of the German military; he had been assigned to Fort Rucker for flight training. He and Vinson were in the same training program. Vinson had purchased the Sierra at Hill Buick, Inc., d/b/a O'Reilly Pontiac-Buick-GMC and/or Hill Pontiac-Buick-GMC ("the O'Reilly dealership"), in Pennsylvania in 2003. He drove it to Alabama in 2006 when he was assigned to Fort Rucker. General Motors Corporation, known as Motors Liquidation Company after July 9, 2009 ("GM"), designed the Sierra. GM Canada, whose principal place of business was in Ontario, Canada, manufactured certain parts of the Sierra, assembled the vehicle, and sold it to GM in Canada, where title transferred. GM then distributed the Sierra for sale in the United States through a GM dealer. The Sierra ultimately was delivered to the O'Reilly dealership for sale. Hinrichs, appealed the trial court's decision to dismiss General Motors of Canada, Ltd. ("GM Canada"), from the case. Finding that the trial court correctly concluded that it had neither general nor specific jurisdiction over GM Canada, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd." on Justia Law

Margie Wylie appealed the circuit court's affirmance of the Montgomery Probate Court's decision removing her as personal representative of the estate of Derrell Cockrell, appointing a successor personal representative for the estate, and assessing over $19,000 in costs against Wylie. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the circuit court did not exceed its discretion in affirming the probate court's decision to remove Wylie as personal representative. The record lacked supporting documentation of the probate court's fee award to the guardian ad litem, however, and orders from neither the probate court nor the circuit court provided sufficient information to perform a meaningful review of that decision. The Court therefore reversed that portion of circuit court's judgment affirming that award and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wylie v. Estate of Derrell Cockrell" on Justia Law

Dolgencorp, LLC appealed the judgment entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $100,000 in favor of Michelle Spence in her action arising from her arrest for shoplifting. The charges against Spence were dismissed after two court appearances because no witnesses appeared to testify against her. Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Spence and against Dolgencorp in the amount of $100,000 in compensatory damages. Dolgencorp appealed the denial of its renewed motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JML) and motion for a new trial. After review, the Supreme Court determined that the malicious-prosecution and defamation claims were improperly submitted to the jury. Dolgencorp submitted a motion for a JML specifically directed to the various claims; that motion was denied. "We cannot assume that the verdict was based only on those of Spence's claims that were properly submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the judgment based on the jury verdict for Spence must be reversed." The case was remanded for a new trial on Spence's claims that were properly submitted to the jury, i.e., negligent training, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The Court reversed the judgment for Spence and remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of a JML in favor of Dolgencorp on Spence's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation and for a new trial on Spence's remaining claims of negligent training, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence" on Justia Law

In late 2015, Jimmy Lee and Jackie Mixon sued defendants Tier 1 Trucking, LLC and James Gray, Jr. in the Wilcox Circuit Court, alleging negligence and/or wantonness in connection with an automobile accident that occurred on November 3, 2014. Jimmy was driving his vehicle on a highway in Conecuh County when his vehicle collided with a tractor-trailer owned by Tier 1 and operated by Gray, who was an employee of Tier 1. Gray lived in Conecuh County. The accident was investigated by the Castleberry Police Department, also in Conecuh County. The Mixons lived in Wilcox County, and Tier 1 had done some business in Wilcox County. Tier 1's principal office is in Jay, Florida. Defendants filed a "motion to dismiss/transfer for improper venue." In that motion, defendants argued that Wilcox County was not a proper venue for this action because, they said, Tier 1 had not conducted business in Wilcox County and, thus, this civil action could not be brought in Wilcox County. When this motion was denied, they applied for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Court to vacate its order and transfer the case to Conecuh County. Finding that defendants demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief, the Supreme Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Tier 1 Trucking, LLC" on Justia Law

Arvest Bank petitioned for mandamus relief, seeking to have the Autauga Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Arvest's motion to quash a writ of execution obtained by Iberiabank f/k/a Capitalsouth Bank ("Iberia") against real property owned by Evelyn Niland ("Evelyn"). Thomas Karrh, II transferred the property Iberia wanted to sell to Evelyn and her husband Raymond Niland as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The Nilands quitclaimed the property to Evelyn, removing Raymond from the title. Raymond stopped paying an existing debt to Iberia. Iberia obtained a judgment against Raymond for close to $125,000. Iberia filed a lien against all of Raymond's property. Evelyn transferred the property back to herself and Raymond, attempting to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. At the same time Evelyn tried this transfer, she and her husband executed a mortgage to Arvest Bank. Iberia secured a writ of execution against the property; Arvest intervened to try to quash a sheriff's sale of the property. Raymond died shortly thereafter. The trial court granted the intervention and stayed the sale proceedings, but after Iberia opposed these actions, the sheriff's sale was permitted to proceed. Finding that Evelyn indeed did create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, the Supreme Court found that Iberia's interest was extinguished with Raymond's death, and that Iberia could not attach its writ to the property. The order denying Arvest's motion to quash the writ of execution was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to grant Arvest's request. View "Ex parte Arvest Bank." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

John Boman appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Gadsden. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. Following his retirement, Boman elected to pay for retiree health coverage through a group plan offered by Gadsden to retired employees. This retired-employee-benefit plan was also administered by Blue Cross and provided substantially similar benefits to those Boman received as an active employee. In 2000, however, Gadsden elected to join an employee-health-insurance-benefit plan ("the plan") administered by the State Employees' Insurance Board ("the SEIB"). When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and severe osteoarthritis of the spine. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a "record of the Medicare payment." However, Boman had no Medicare credits. Boman was hired before March 31, 1986, and, although Gadsden did begin participation in the Medicare program in 2006, Boman's employee group had not opted to obtain Medicare coverage before Boman retired. Consequently, Boman never paid Medicare taxes and did not claim to have Medicare coverage. The SEIB ultimately determined that the plan was the secondary payer to Medicare. Boman sued Gadsden, asserting that it had broken an agreement, made upon his employment, to provide him with lifetime health benefits upon his retirement. Boman also sued the members of the SEIB charged with administering the plan, challenging the SEIB's interpretation of the plan. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment to Gadsden, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boman v. City of Gadsden" on Justia Law