Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2000, the Franklin Circuit Court entered a final judgment approving a settlement agreement in “Taff v. Caremark, Inc.,” a class-action lawsuit against the corporate predecessor of the petitioner, Caremark Rx, LLC ("Caremark). Approximately 16 years later, in July 2016, Taff class counsel moved the trial court to enter an order requiring Caremark to produce for them certain information regarding the members of the Taff class so that Taff class counsel could notify those members of a proposed settlement in a separate class-action lawsuit pending against Caremark at the Jefferson Circuit Court, “Johnson v. Caremark Rx, LLC,” in which some of the members of the Taff class might be able to file claims. The trial court ultimately granted Taff class counsel's request and ordered Caremark to produce the requested information. Caremark petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate that order. “The jurisdiction retained by the trial court after it entered its final judgment in Taff is limited to interpreting or enforcing that final judgment; the trial court could not extend its jurisdiction over any matter somehow related to the June 2000 final judgment in perpetuity by simply declaring it so.” The Court therefore granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, Kimberly Bond sued her former attorney, James McLaughlin, alleging legal malpractice. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of McLaughlin. In February 2006, Bond hired McLaughlin to provide legal services involving the estate of her husband, Kenneth Pylant II, who was killed in a motorcycle accident in 2005. McLaughlin allegedly failed to properly contest a copy of Pylant's will that was admitted to probate on November 29, 2005, and, as a proximate result of McLaughlin's breach of duty, Bond was injured and suffered damage. The Supreme Court found that Bond did not contest the will before probate, and, because of McLaughlin's negligence, she did not properly contest the will within six months after probate by filing a complaint with the circuit court. The Supreme Court determined that Bond presented evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment, and accordingly reversed the circuit court’s order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bond v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Sherri Hurst and Brenda Ray had been friends and neighbors for approximately 20 years before the incident that is the basis of the underlying action. One day in 2013, Ray telephoned Hurst and asked her to accompany her to a Wal-Mart. Ray was taking Nona Williams, her elderly aunt, to purchase Williams's medication and other merchandise that day, in preparation for Williams's move to Ohio. Williams testified that Ray asked Hurst to accompany them to the Wal-Mart because "both [Ray] and I had limited mobility, and [Ray] wanted [Hurst] to come along in case either of us needed help moving around." When they arrived at the Wal-Mart, Ray pulled her vehicle along the curb in front of the store to allow Williams to get out of the vehicle at the entrance. After Williams got out of the vehicle, Ray asked Hurst to stand with Williams on the curb while she parked the car. Hurst then began to get out of the vehicle, but, before she had completely exited the vehicle, Ray pulled the vehicle forward, causing Hurst to fall to the ground. Hurst sustained injuries when the back tire of the vehicle ran over her leg. Hurst sued Ray's estate ("the estate"), alleging negligence and seeking to recover damages for her injuries. The estate answered the complaint, raising as a defense, among other things, the Alabama Guest Statute. The estate moved for a summary judgment, arguing that Hurst's negligence claim was barred by the Guest Statute. The trial court entered an order granting the estate’s motion and denying Hurst’s cross-motion for a summary judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the Guest Statute did not apply in this matter, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hurst v. Sneed" on Justia Law

Adam Hilyer appealed a circuit court order denying his request to set aside a default judgment entered against him in a suit brought by Betti Fortier, mother and next friend of minor M.M. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway on Kennedy Avenue. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. The circuit court entered its default judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Hilyer's Rule 55(c) motion to set aside the default judgment. The Court found questions of fact remained about service of the complaint, and miscommunications between insurers, adjusters investigators and lawyers, were not a result of Hilyer's "own culpable conduct." The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law

Petitioners VEL, LLC ("VEL"); Montgomery Drug Co., Inc. ("MDCI"); Robert Stafford; and Erica Greene sought mandamus relief. William Kilgore sought to fill his prescription for ropinirole, a drug used to treat the symptoms of Parkinson's disease, at the Adams Drugs pharmacy in Montgomery. Instead of filling Kilgore's prescription with ropinirole as prescribed, the employees working at the pharmacy filled Kilgore's prescription with risperidone. After having taken risperidone instead of ropinirole for several days, Kilgore began experiencing negative health consequences and sought medical assistance at the emergency room of Baptist Medical Center South. At the time Kilgore's prescription was improperly filled at the Adams Drugs pharmacy, VEL and MDCI each owned and operated at least one Adams Drugs pharmacy in Montgomery. Kilgore and Patricia Kilgore Kyser, as guardian and conservator of Kilgore (collectively, "plaintiffs"), filed the original complaint in the action against "VEL, LLC, d.b.a. Adams Drugs, and/or Adams Drugs Good Neighbor Pharmacy," and several fictitiously named defendants, seeking damages for Kilgore's injuries that plaintiffs alleged were caused by defendants' alleged negligence and wantonness. A month after the statute of limitations expired, VEL moved to dismiss, asserting that it "has no relation or connection with any of the claims stated against it in [the plaintiffs'] complaint." Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to list parties that were previously listed fictitiously. Several months after VEL's motion to dismiss, MDCI moved to dismiss, arguing the statute of limitations had expired, plaintiffs were suing the wrong entity, and that the amended complaint did not relate back to the original. VEL renewed its motion to dismiss, also arguing plaintiffs sued the wrong entity. The trial court ultimately denied the motions, and petitioners filed this mandamus action. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition insofar as they requested a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying MDCI's summary-judgment motion and to enter an order granting MDCI's summary-judgment motion. The Court denied insofar as they requested the circuit court vacate its order denying VEL's, Stafford's, and Greene's summary-judgment motions and to enter an order granting those motions. View "Ex parte VEL, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Todd Hill, Roy Hill, Brian Hill, and Debra Hill Stewart were the children of Leroy Hill, who died testate in 2009. Deborah D. Hill, Leroy’s second wife, offered Leroy's will for probate. The Hill children hired attorneys Vincent Kilborn III and David McDonald to bring a breach-of-contract action against the estate and Deborah, alleging breach of an agreement between Leroy and the Hills' mother at the time Leroy divorced the Hills' mother in 1984 to make a will leaving the Hills a coffee company and a family ranch. The Hills and the attorneys entered into a retainer agreement, which required the Hills to pay the attorneys "40% of any recovery, in the event there is a recovery, with or without suit." According to the agreement, "recovery" included cash, real or personal property, stock in the Leroy Hill Coffee Company, and all or part ownership in the family ranch. After a trial, a judgment was entered for the Hills ordering specific performance of the contract, which required the conveyance of the coffee company and the ranch to the Hills. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. At issue before the Supreme Court involved the attorney fee. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its discretion when it failed to order the payment of the attorney fee in accordance with the retainer agreement. The Hills petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate two order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, they argued that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to determine the 40% contingency fee owed the attorneys was an administrative expense of the estate and, consequently, that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction when any subsequent order at issue in this case. The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court had jurisdiction over the administration of the estate, so the petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1150162) was denied; the orders pertaining to payment of the retainer were reversed (case no. 1150148) and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Kruse" on Justia Law

Genesis Pittman, D.M.D., P.C. ("Pittman, P.C."), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order setting aside a prior summary judgment entered in favor of Pittman, P.C. In August 2014, respondent Debra Blackmon filed a pro se action against Pittman, P.C., alleging negligence and dental malpractice. Blackmon further alleged that she suffered an allergic reaction necessitating emergency medical treatment as well as a related fall resulting in physical injury after treatment from Pittman. Blackmon apparently failed, in accordance with the trial court's scheduling order, to timely disclose the identity of an expert witness she had retained. After the expiration of the disclosure deadline, Pittman, P.C., filed a motion requesting a summary judgment in its favor on the primary ground that, based on the above-described failure to identify an expert, Blackmon could not prove her case. Blackmon, who had, by that time, retained legal counsel, filed a response in opposition that included her own affidavit testimony and medical records. After a hearing, the trial court, entered a summary judgment in favor of Pittman, P.C., as to all counts against it. Blackmon filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment in favor of Pittman, P.C. The trial court scheduled Blackmon's motion for, and ultimately conducted a hearing in May 2016. According to Pittman, P.C., however, by the time of the hearing, Blackmon's motion had been denied by operation of law in April 2016. On May 6, 2016 –- 110 days after the filing of Blackmon's postjudgment motion –- the trial court entered an order purporting to grant Blackmon's postjudgment motion. In response, Pittman, P.C., applied for mandamus relief, contending, in part, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Blackmon's motion. The Supreme Court concluded that Pittman, P.C. demonstrated a clear legal right to the requested relief and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Genesis Pittman, D.M.D., P.C., et al." on Justia Law

LERETA, LLC, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ mandamus to direct the Colbert Circuit Court to vacate its order denying LERETA's motion to set aside a default judgment entered against it in the action brought by Fronia Warhurst, and to enter an order setting aside the default judgment. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Warhurst did not perfect service of process on LERETA, it granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte LERETA, LLC." on Justia Law

Defendants April Steele Benton and John Benton and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its July 18, 2016, order denying the Bentons' and State Farm's motion to transfer this action from the Bibb Circuit Court to the Shelby Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In 2014, April Steele Benton, a resident of Bibb County, and Amir Alan Ebrahimi, a resident of Shelby County, were involved in a two-vehicle collision in Shelby County. Following the collision, Ebrahimi was transported from the scene of the accident by Regional Paramedical Services to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical Center ("UAB"), where he received treatment for his injuries. Ebrahimi filed a complaint in the Bibb Circuit Court against April Steele Benton; John Benton, the owner of the car April was driving; and State Farm, Ebrahimi's underinsured-motorist carrier. The Bentons filed a motion to transfer the action to Shelby County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Bentons argued in their motion that Shelby County had a stronger connection to the case because: (1) the accident occurred in Shelby County; (2) the Pelham Police Department, located in Shelby County, investigated the accident; (3) Ebrahimi resided in Calera, located in Shelby County; (4) the first responders, employees of Regional Paramedical Services, were located in Shelby County; (5) Ebrahimi was treated at UAB, which was closer to Shelby County than to Bibb County; and (6) the only connection this action has with Bibb County was the fact that the Bentons, resided there. The Supreme Court found that the trial court should have granted the Bentons' motion for a change of venue, and accordingly, issued the writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to deny the motion and transfer the action to Shelby County. View "Ex parte Benton et al." on Justia Law

PT Solutions Holdings, LLC ("PT Solutions"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the Barbour Circuit Court to vacate its order denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Laurie White based on an outbound forum selection clause and to grant the motion to dismiss. PT Solutions hired White as the clinic director of its Eufaula location. In September 2014, PT Solutions revised the employment agreements for its clinic directors. The letter agreement described a bonus structure, and included a noncompete clause. The agreement also contained a forum-selection clause, selecting Fulton County, Georgia as proper venue for disputes between the parties. White voluntarily resigned her position as clinic director of PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic and became clinic director for Eufaula Physical Therapy (EPT). She also recruited the office manager and two physical therapists who were working at PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic to come work at EPT. Because of White's actions on behalf of EPT, PT Solutions' counsel sent White a cease-and-desist letter in which he asserted that White had violated the noncompetition agreement. In response, White sued PT Solutions and fictitiously named defendants in the Alabama Circuit Court seeking a judgment declaring that the noncompetition agreement was unenforceable. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found that White failed to clearly establish that enforcement of the forum-selection clause would be either unfair or unreasonable. PT Solutions demonstrated a clear legal right to have the action against it dismissed on the basis that venue in the Barbour Circuit Court was, by virtue of the forum-selection clause, improper. The circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted PT Solutions' petition and granted the writ. View "Ex parte PT Solutions Holdings, LLC." on Justia Law