Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Supreme Court granted Clifford Goodman Wright, the administrator of the estate of Mary Evelyn Wright, permission to appeal a circuit court interlocutory order. In that order, the trial court ruled that the $100,000 cap on damages set out in section 11-93-2, Ala. Code 1975, applied to Wright's claims against three nurses, Dawn Reid, Phyllis Harris, and Tuwanda Worrills, who were employees of the Cleburne County Hospital Board, Inc., d/b/a Cleburne County Nursing Home ("the Hospital Board"), at the times relevant to Wright's action. Section 11-93-2 governed "[t]he recovery of damages under any judgment against a [county or municipal] governmental entity." Because Wright sued the nurses seeking money damages in their individual capacities, the trial court erred in applying section 11-93-2 to Wright's claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wright v. Cleburne County Hospital Board, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, Shaundalyn Elliott, a resident of Montgomery County, was injured in an automobile accident in the City of Hayneville in Lowndes County. On February 23, 2017, Elliott filed this lawsuit at the Lowndes Circuit Court against her automobile insurer, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), seeking uninsured-motorist benefits related to the accident. Elliot alleged that the accident was caused by a "phantom driver," whose location was unknown. Allstate filed a motion to transfer the action from the Lowndes Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court. Elliott petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring this case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Lowndes County and Montgomery County had connections to this action. The accident, injuries, and police investigation occurred in Lowndes County. On the other hand, Elliott resided in Montgomery County, where she sought treatment for her injuries resulting from the accident and where the parties' contractual dealings arose. Under the specific facts of this case, Lowndes County's connection to the accident was not "little" or "weak," and Montgomery County did not have a significantly stronger connection to the case to justify a transfer of this case under the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1. Therefore, the Court held the trial court erred in transferring this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Shaundalyn N. Elliott." on Justia Law

This was the second time this dispute related to benefits provided under the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP") went before the Alabama Supreme Court. In the present case, the remaining defendants below, David Bronner, as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, and the current members of the PEEHIP Board, petitioned for permission to appeal the trial court's denial of their motion seeking a summary judgment. "When a trial court fails to correctly identify the controlling question of law, a Rule 5 permissive appeal is due to be dismissed." After thoroughly reviewing the record and the arguments presented by the parties, the Supreme Court concluded the permission to appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., was improvidently granted, and the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Bronner v. Burks" on Justia Law

Defendants Darlene Slamen ("Darlene"), Charles Martin ("Charles"), Wilhelmina Martin ("Wilhelmina"), and Harris Partnership, LLP ("Harris LLP") (collectively referred to as "defendants"), appealed a circuit court order requiring them to respond to discovery requests propounded upon them by Herbert Slamen ("Herbert"), arguing that all discovery should be stayed while the parties arbitrate their dispute pursuant to an arbitration provision in the partnership agreement that created Harris LLP, and that was executed by Herbert, Darlene, Charles, and Wilhelmina. Finding that the request to the trial court to compel arbitration had not been decided at the time defendants were ordered to respond to the discovery requests, the Alabama Supreme Court found the trial court erred: the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering the defendants to participate in merit-based discovery before the arbitration issue was resolved. Accordingly, treating the appeal as a petition for the writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order requiring defendants to respond to Herbert's discovery requests. View "Slamen v. Slamen" on Justia Law

Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital ("the hospital") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Marengo Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling the hospital to respond to certain discovery requests and to enter a protective discovery order in its favor. T.N., A.V., O.J., and I.P. (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs") brought this action against the hospital, and its radiological technician, Leland Bert Taylor, Jr., who they allege sexually assaulted them while they were patients of the hospital. Along with their complaint, the plaintiffs served the hospital with written discovery requests seeking, among other things, information concerning "other incidents" involving Taylor; its investigation into their allegations of sexual assault by Taylor; and its hiring, training, supervision, and retention of Taylor and the termination of his employment. The hospital objected to the plaintiffs' requests, contending that the requests were protected by certain discovery privileges. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery; after a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and denied a request for a protective order. The Alabama Supreme Court denied relief. The hospital failed to demonstrate that the quality-assurance privilege applied to claims arising out of allegations of sexual acts that are wholly unrelated to medical treatment or that investigations related to allegations of sexual assault are undertaken to improve the quality of patient care. "Given the discretion afforded the trial court with respect to discovery matters, we conclude that the hospital has failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of the privilege afforded by 22-21-8 and the prejudicial effect of disclosing the information the plaintiffs seek." View "Ex parte Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital." on Justia Law

Appellants Tomeka and Marlon McElroy appealed a circuit court judgment denying their will contest. In 2010, Tracy McElroy filed a petition to probate the will of Clifton McElroy, Jr. Tracy was the executrix; the will was self-proving in accordance with the requirements of section 43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975. The probate court admitted the will to probate and issued letters testamentary to Tracy. Later that year, appellants filed a will contest in the probate court, alleging that Clifton's signature on the will was forged and that, therefore, the will was not properly executed. Appellants were both Clifton's heirs and beneficiaries under his will, and demanded that their will contest be transferred to the circuit court pursuant to 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975. Tracy moved to dismiss the will contest, arguing that because the will had already been admitted to probate, the contest could not ben filed pursuant to 43-8-190, Ala. Code 1975. Generally, "[o]nce the administration and settlement of an estate are removed from the probate court, the probate court loses jurisdiction over the estate, and the circuit court obtains and maintains jurisdiction until the final settlement of the case." However, in this case, the administration of Clifton's estate was not properly removed from the probate court; therefore, the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction over the administration of Clifton's estate. Thus, the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the will contest, and the judgment entered by the circuit court on the will contest was void. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "McElroy v. McElroy" on Justia Law

Alan Newell appealed the grant of summary judgment against him on various claims and counterclaims relating to two tracts of real property located in Franklin County. This appeal arises from a dispute between a father, Floyd Newell, and his son, Alan, regarding the ownership of two tracts of land located in Franklin County. The two tracts were farmland, "the Hester farm" and "the DeVaney farm." Floyd was the title owner of the two properties. Alan, however, claimed to be the true owner of the properties and asserts that the properties were deeded to Floyd only as security for loans Floyd made to Alan to purchase the land. Floyd sued Alan, asserting claims of ejectment and detinue. Floyd flatly denied Alan's claim of ownership of the two farms. Floyd contended he purchased both the Hester farm and the DeVaney farm and that he owned the farms outright. He denied lending Alan money to purchase the properties, and that Alan made any payments to him toward the purchase price of the farms. He disputed claims that Alan made improvements to the farms. However, Floyd admitted to allowing Alan to use the properties in varying degrees over the years. The trial court entered a partial summary judgment in favor of Floyd as to the ejectment claim and counterclaim and as to Alan's claim seeking recognition of an equitable mortgage. The trial court specifically held that the basis for Alan's claim of ownership of the two tracts of real property was barred by the Statute of Frauds. The Alabama Supreme Court determined it was clear from Alan's pleadings and from the arguments made at trial that what Alan termed an "equitable mortgage" was what the Supreme Court long recognized as a "resulting trust in the nature of an equitable mortgage." A resulting trust in the nature of a mortgage arises by implication of law and is therefore not subject to the Statute of Frauds. In this case, because the Statute of Frauds was not applicable to a claim seeking a declaration of a trust in the nature of an equitable mortgage, the summary judgment entered on that basis was in error. Furthermore, nearly every fact relevant to Alan's counterclaim seeking an equitable mortgage was disputed, making summary judgment improper. View "Newell v. Newell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lisa Wilson appealed dismissal of her complaint seeking damages against defendants, University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C. ("UAHSF"); Carla Falkson, M.D.; Tina Wood, M.D.; Ravi Kumar Paluri, M.D.; and Mollie DeShazo, M.D., based on the tort of outrage. Wilson's complaint alleged that, in late 2011, her elderly mother, Elizabeth Monk Wilson ("Elizabeth"), was diagnosed with and underwent treatment for colon cancer. According to Wilson, before the onset of Elizabeth's illness, Elizabeth had executed an advanced health-care directive that "instruct[ed] ... caregivers to use all available means to preserve [Elizabeth's] life" and further named Wilson as Elizabeth's health-care proxy "in the event [Elizabeth] became 'too sick to speak for' herself." Elizabeth subsequently suffered a recurrence of her cancer. In August 2015, she was admitted to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital, a facility operated by UAHSF. In her complaint, Wilson alleged that, while Elizabeth was in the hospital, she was treated by the doctors. She further alleged that the doctors made numerous and repeated tactless comments to Elizabeth and Wilson about Elizabeth's condition and her impending death, and to the effect that she was wasting resources by being in the hospital instead of dying at home. Wilson's complaint alleged a single claim for damages "for the tort of outrage, and for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress" and sought compensatory and punitive damages. Wilson sought to hold UAHSF vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of the doctors, which conduct, she alleged, occurred within the line and scope of the doctors' employment with UAHSF. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court's holding that the tort of outrage "is limited to three situations" was an incorrect statement of law: the tort can be viable outside the context of the above-identified circumstances and has previously been held to be so viable. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings where the trial court should, under the standard appropriate for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), determine whether the alleged conduct was "so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." View "Wilson v. University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C." on Justia Law

Mitchell's Contracting Service, LLC ("Mitchell"), appealed a circuit court’s denial of Mitchell's renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial in a wrongful-death action brought by Robert Guy Gleason, Sr., as the administrator of the estate of Lorena Gleason, deceased. Two of Mitchell’s employees were driving dump trucks when one of the trucks caused Lorena’s vehicle to leave the road, where it collided with a tree, resulting in her death. Gleason asserted claims against Mitchell based on vicarious liability for Pettway's or Turner's negligent and wanton acts and omissions. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Gleason for $2.5 million. Based on all the circumstances, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing Mitchell's request for a continuance. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Mitchell's Contracting Service, LLC v. Gleason" on Justia Law

Profit Boost Marketing, Inc., d/b/a Hometown Values Coupon Magazine ("HVCM"), one of the defendants in the underlying case, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Marshall Circuit Court to vacate its order denying HVCM's motion to dismiss the claims filed against it by Mike Zak d/b/a Hometown Magazine ("Zak") and to direct that court to enter an order dismissing Zak's claims against it. HVCM was a Washington state based "print broker ... for direct mail advertising." Hometown Magazine was a coupon distributor; Mike Zak was its sole proprietor. In August 2013, Zak and HVCM entered into a "Print Brokerage Agreement" and related "Licensing Agreement" whereby Zak was to become an exclusive "Area Publisher" of HVCM's coupon magazine in three specified zones within Alabama. Zak obtained from the City of Arab ("the City") a business license to engage in "publishing industries." Zak ultimately published a single issue of a publication entitled Hometown Magazine. According to HVCM, "[i]nstead of publishing as [HVCM], Zak formed Hometown Magazine and used the [HVCM] trademark when he sold advertising to local business," i.e., allegedly, "Zak solicited ... clients as [HVCM], sold them advertising using the [HVCM] trademark ..., and never published a magazine as [HVCM]." This action resulted in a dispute between Zak and HCVM. As a result of a Facebook post, which Zak maintained "was entirely fallacious and possessed absolutely no truth," Zak allegedly began to receive queries from customers regarding the legality of his activities. Ultimately, according to Zak, his reputation was allegedly so "irreparably tarnished and damaged" that Zak was forced to close his business. Zak sued the City and various fictitiously named defendants. Specifically, Zak sought to recover both compensatory and punitive damages on various theories, including defamation, negligence, and "wantonness/gross negligence." After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in denying HVCM's motion requesting dismissal of Zak's claims on statute-of-limitations grounds; therefore the Court granted HVCM's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Marshall Circuit Court to vacate its January 3, 2017, order denying HVCM's motion and to enter an order dismissing HVCM as a defendant in the underlying action. View "Ex parte Profit Boost Marketing, Inc., d/b/a Hometown Values Coupon Magazine." on Justia Law