Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shirley R. Hulsey and her husband purchased a residence in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, which was adjacent to a vacant lot owned by Yellow Hammer Capital Management, LLC. In 2017, Build Art, LLC was retained by Yellow Hammer to construct a residence on the adjacent lot, which was at a higher elevation and sloped toward Hulsey’s property. After construction began, Hulsey observed water and debris flooding her property, which she attributed to changes in the grading and runoff from the construction. She alleged that the construction caused damage to her home’s foundation and sought damages and injunctive relief against Build Art, Yellow Hammer, and unnamed defendants, claiming trespass, nuisance, negligence, wantonness, emotional distress, and violation of her common-law rights concerning surface water flow.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Build Art on all claims against it, while the claims against Yellow Hammer and other defendants remained pending. Hulsey moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The court subsequently certified the summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing Hulsey to file an appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the trial court’s order was a final judgment suitable for appeal. The Supreme Court determined that the claims against Build Art and Yellow Hammer were so closely intertwined, arising from the same operative facts, that certifying the summary judgment as final was improper. The Supreme Court held that such certification posed risks of inconsistent results and wasted judicial resources. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the order was not a final judgment capable of supporting appellate review. View "Hulsey v. Build Art, LLC" on Justia Law

A mother and father, previously divorced, shared joint custody of their minor son. While visiting his father’s home, the child wandered into a neighbor’s property, accessed a swimming pool, and drowned. Following the child’s death, the mother—on behalf of her son—filed a wrongful death suit against both the father and the neighbor. The father cross-claimed against the neighbor for wrongful death as well. The neighbor settled with both parents, and the settlement funds were interpleaded with the Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, which then dismissed all claims against the neighbor.After the neighbor’s dismissal, the mother received half of the settlement funds. The father’s portion was held by the court pending resolution of a related criminal case, in which the father later pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide. The mother then requested that the court award her the remainder of the funds, arguing that Alabama law and public policy prohibited the father from benefitting financially from his son’s death. The father argued that because his conviction did not involve a felonious and intentional killing, he was not barred from recovery. The trial court agreed with the father and ordered the remaining funds to be disbursed to him, while reserving all other issues for trial or further hearing.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the order appealed from was not a final judgment. The trial court had expressly reserved remaining claims—specifically, the wrongful death claim against the father—so not all issues between all parties had been conclusively resolved. The Supreme Court of Alabama therefore dismissed the appeal. View "B.S.H. v. Humphryes" on Justia Law

In this matter, a member of the University of Alabama’s men’s basketball team, Kai Spears, brought suit against The New York Times Company after it published articles erroneously identifying him as the unidentified passenger in a car at the scene of a high-profile shooting. The Times based its reporting on information from two confidential sources. Spears, who was not in the car, alleges that The Times failed to use reasonable care in publishing false and damaging statements about him. During litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Spears sought discovery to uncover the identities of the sources and related information. The Times resisted, invoking Alabama’s “shield statute,” which protects journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama concerning the scope of the state’s shield statute. The first question asked whether the statute protects the identity of a source when information is published online. However, as Spears conceded that the print publication of the article triggered the statute’s application, the Supreme Court of Alabama declined to answer this question, finding it irrelevant to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the second certified question, which asked whether the shield statute protects any and all information that could reasonably lead to the identification of a protected source. The Court held that Alabama’s shield statute does not extend so broadly. Instead, it protects only information that would inevitably reveal the identity of a confidential source. Thus, information that could merely “reasonably lead” to the identification of a source is not covered. The Court declined to expand the statute’s protections beyond its plain language and expressly limited the privilege to “source-identifying” information whose disclosure would make identifying the source unavoidable. View "The New York Times Company v. Spears" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a contract signed on May 12, 2021, under which Kindra Cooper agreed to purchase a house from Highland Rim Investments, LLC. Delays in closing led the parties to enter into three extensions, but the sale never concluded. Cooper then sued for specific performance, declaratory judgment, and damages, later amending her complaint to add additional defendants and claims, including various forms of misrepresentation and a request to pierce Highland Rim’s corporate veil. During litigation, certain claims were dismissed, and after a jury trial, the jury awarded Cooper compensatory and punitive damages against Highland Rim and Monique Dollone, but found for other defendants on the misrepresentation claims.The Madison Circuit Court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded Cooper attorney fees, granted her motion to pierce the corporate veil as to one defendant, and later appointed a receiver over Highland Rim to preserve its fiscal health until the judgment was satisfied. The defendants moved for post-judgment relief, which was denied, and then appealed both the judgment and the receivership order.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the appeals. It found that the trial court erred by requiring the parties to strike the jury from a list of only 21 prospective jurors, rather than the 24 required by Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 47(b). This procedural error mandated reversal. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court’s judgment in favor of Cooper and its order appointing a receiver over Highland Rim must be reversed. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Highland Rim Investments, LLC v. Cooper" on Justia Law

A woman sought to challenge the probate of a will and asserted claims seeking recognition as an heir, either as a biological child or by equitable adoption, following the death of a decedent who resided in Tallapoosa County. After letters of administration had initially been issued to her by the Montgomery Probate Court, subsequent proceedings transferred jurisdiction to the Tallapoosa Probate Court, which admitted a document as the decedent’s will and appointed other individuals as personal representatives. The woman then filed a pro se complaint in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, contesting the will and requesting various relief, including a DNA test to establish her relationship to the decedent.The Tallapoosa Circuit Court held a hearing, denied her request to compel DNA testing of the proponents, allowed her to submit her own certified DNA evidence, and later dismissed the action on the ground that she had failed to provide proof of relationship as required. She appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to jurisdictional reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that, due to statutory changes enacted by Act No. 2022-427, original jurisdiction for will contests relating to wills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023, lies with the probate court, not the circuit court, except in cases where a proceeding has been properly removed to the circuit court. Finding that no removal had occurred, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court made no determination as to the woman’s ability to bring a will contest in the probate court. View "Glenn v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Tara Grall and her former husband, William Grall, were the sole shareholders of G-Team, P.C., an Alabama professional corporation that had ceased business operations. Amid their divorce proceedings, William initiated a derivative action against Tara, seeking to enforce the corporation's right to sell its real property to pay off mortgage debt. Tara argued that the property could not be sold due to an existing Small Business Administration lien. The trial court ordered the sale of the property and scheduled a hearing to determine the distribution of proceeds and finalize the winding up of G-Team. Tara, representing herself, filed multiple motions, including requests to stay hearings, appear remotely, and recuse the judge, but these were denied.Tara appealed several interlocutory orders to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, describing her appeal as interlocutory and requesting a stay, which was denied. Despite her pending appeal, the trial court conducted a final hearing and entered a purported final judgment on May 1, 2025, winding up G-Team. Tara then appealed that judgment as well. The Court of Civil Appeals transferred both appeals to the Supreme Court of Alabama, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined it lacked jurisdiction over both appeals. It held that the first appeal was not from a final judgment nor from an appealable interlocutory order under Rule 4(a)(1), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, and therefore must be dismissed. The second appeal was from a judgment entered while the first appeal was pending, at which point the trial court was divested of jurisdiction; this made the subsequent judgment void and the second appeal also subject to dismissal. Both appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. View "Grall v. Grall" on Justia Law

A homeowner alleged that he hired a roofing company in 2011 to install a specific type of roof on his residence. After installation, problems with roof materials became apparent, including issues with a protective layer that remained unresolved despite multiple repair attempts by both the roofing company and the manufacturer over more than a decade. The homeowner asserted that these defects persisted, and that communication from the roofing company ceased in early 2024. As a result, he filed a lawsuit in Etowah County, Alabama, alleging breach of express and implied warranties, as well as negligent or wanton installation and repair, and sought damages.The roofing company moved to dismiss the lawsuit for improper venue, arguing that a forum-selection clause in a “Service Agreement” required all disputes to be heard in Madison County, Alabama. The company attached an unsigned and undated sample agreement to its motion, but did not produce a copy signed by the homeowner or any evidence that the homeowner had agreed to such a clause. The homeowner responded that he had never signed, nor was he aware of, the agreement submitted by the company and also challenged the clause’s reasonableness. The Etowah Circuit Court denied the company’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the company’s petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to compel the lower court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Madison County. The Supreme Court held that the company failed to meet its burden of proving that the forum-selection clause applied, as it did not present evidence linking the blank agreement to the parties’ actual contract. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition, concluding that the circuit court did not clearly err in refusing to dismiss or transfer the case. View "Ex parte Continental Roofing Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman who had resided at an apartment complex in 2021 was injured when a bullet, fired from outside her apartment, struck her. She filed a pro se complaint with the Montgomery Circuit Court before the expiration of the statute of limitations, seeking to hold the apartment management responsible for her injuries on the basis that tenants were supposed to have 24-hour security due to increasing crime. The complaint, in the form of a letter, did not explicitly name a defendant or assert specific legal claims, but accompanying documents identified Hubbard Properties as the defendant and provided an address for service. However, she did not include summonses or provide instructions regarding service of process.No action was taken in the case until a status conference was held nearly two years later. Several months after that, and after the limitations period had expired, the plaintiff amended her complaint with the assistance of counsel, formally naming both Stonebridge and Hubbard Properties as defendants and asserting claims of negligence, wantonness, and failure to provide safe premises. At that time, she also included summonses and requested service by certified mail, and both defendants were served after the limitations period expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff had not made a bona fide attempt to have the original complaint immediately served. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the motions to dismiss without explanation.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that, although the complaint was filed before the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff did not have the bona fide intent to have it immediately served, as objectively required for timely commencement of an action under Alabama law. Because of this, and because service occurred after the limitations period, the court directed the circuit court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. View "Ex parte Stonebridge, LLC" on Justia Law

A Delaware limited liability company entered into an agreement to purchase real property in Jefferson County, Alabama, from an Alabama limited partnership. The agreement included provisions for the recovery of attorneys’ fees by the prevailing party in litigation arising from the contract. Disputes arose regarding whether the buyer satisfied conditions to extend the closing date, leading the seller to declare the agreement terminated. The buyer sued the seller, the seller’s general partner (a California corporation), and various individual limited partners (in both their personal capacities and as trustees of family trusts), seeking among other relief, damages for breach of contract and a declaration of rights under the agreement. The contract also provided for reimbursement of transaction costs and attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances.The case proceeded in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The court granted summary judgment for the buyer on liability, finding the seller had breached the agreement, and set the issue of damages for a jury trial. Subsequently, disputes arose about whether attorneys’ fees should be decided by the jury or the court. The circuit court ruled that attorneys’ fees recoverable by the prevailing party under the contract would be determined by the court after trial, not by the jury. The seller, general partner, and limited partners sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing they were entitled to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to a jury determination of prevailing party attorneys’ fees under the contract, because they did not adequately show that the Alabama Constitution or statutes provide such a right for this type of claim. The Court declined to overrule the circuit court’s decision to reserve the issue of attorneys’ fees for judicial determination following the trial on damages. View "Ex parte Vestavia Hills, Ltd." on Justia Law

The case involves the family of a deceased inmate who alleged that certain medical professionals and a health services foundation, after performing an autopsy at the request of correctional authorities, removed and retained the decedent’s organs without family consent. The family contended they were not informed or asked for permission regarding the autopsy or retention of organs, and only learned the organs were missing when preparing the funeral. They claimed to have relied on statements from hospital staff that such practices were standard, and only discovered in December 2023, through media reports, that retention of organs without next-of-kin consent was allegedly unlawful.The Montgomery Circuit Court reviewed and denied the defendants’ consolidated motion to dismiss, finding that statutory limitations could be tolled due to alleged fraudulent concealment. The court determined that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could justify equitable tolling under Alabama law, and that the family’s claims were not time-barred because they filed suit within two years of learning the alleged conduct was illegal.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a petition for writ of mandamus by the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Stephanie Reilly. The Court held that mandamus relief was appropriate because, from the face of the complaint, the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. The Court reasoned the causes of action accrued by November 6, 2021, when the family learned the organs were missing, and rejected arguments for tolling or for treating the alleged conduct as a continuous tort. The Court distinguished between statutes of limitations governing different claims, and found that all claims against the petitioners except the AUAGA claim were time-barred. It therefore granted the petition and directed dismissal of all claims against the petitioners except for the AUAGA claim. View "Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation" on Justia Law