Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
by
Faya Rose Toure sued the City of Selma, Chief of Police Spencer Collier, and police officer Devon McGuire following her arrest for fourth-degree theft of property and attempting to elude. Toure claimed McGuire and Collier committed assault and battery, false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, abuse of legal process, unreasonable seizure, and defamation/libel. She also accused the City of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and fostering a custom of police abuse. Toure sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.The defendants filed for summary judgment, citing peace-officer and State-agent immunity. They provided evidence including deposition testimonies, incident reports, and body camera footage showing McGuire witnessed Toure removing a campaign sign and subsequently attempting to elude him. Toure argued she removed the sign believing it was illegally placed and felt intimidated by McGuire, who was in an unmarked vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City but denied it for McGuire and Collier.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that McGuire and Collier were performing discretionary functions within their law enforcement duties, entitling them to immunity. The court determined that McGuire had at least arguable probable cause for Toure's arrest, and Toure failed to provide substantial evidence that McGuire or Collier acted willfully, maliciously, or beyond their authority. Consequently, the court held that McGuire and Collier were entitled to peace-officer and State-agent immunity and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in their favor. The petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte McGuire" on Justia Law

by
Nathan Nash was involved in an automobile collision in Tuscaloosa County with a truck driven by Joshua Hunter Jones and owned by Davis Ice Cream Alabama, LLC. Nash filed a complaint in Jefferson County against Jones for negligence and wantonness, and against Davis Ice Cream for negligent training and hiring. Nash and Jones reside in counties adjacent to Jefferson County, and Davis Ice Cream's principal place of business is in Jefferson County. Nash received medical treatment and had an employer in Jefferson County.The Jefferson Circuit Court transferred the case to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court based on a motion by Davis Ice Cream, citing Alabama's forum non conveniens statute. Nash objected, highlighting his medical treatment and employer connections in Jefferson County. After the transfer order, Nash filed a motion for reconsideration and then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Jefferson Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in transferring the case. The Court noted that Davis Ice Cream's principal place of business and Nash's medical providers and employer were in Jefferson County, establishing a strong connection to the action. In contrast, Tuscaloosa County's only connection was the location of the collision. The Court concluded that Davis Ice Cream failed to demonstrate that Tuscaloosa County had a strong connection to the action and that Jefferson County had a weak connection. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted Nash's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring the case to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Nash" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
by
Michael Straus wired $60,000 to an account at GBC International Bank (GBC) owned by Apex Oil and Gas Trading, LLC (Apex). Apex allegedly failed to provide the services Straus paid for, withdrew the funds, and disappeared. Straus sued GBC in May 2024, claiming negligence and wantonness, alleging GBC closed Apex's account knowing Apex was engaged in fraud. Straus argued GBC's website acknowledged its obligations under the Patriot Act to prevent such fraud.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied GBC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. GBC then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. GBC argued it had no general or specific personal jurisdiction in Alabama, supported by an affidavit from its executive vice president and chief financial officer, Richard Holmes. Holmes stated GBC had no business operations, property, or targeted advertising in Alabama. Straus's response included an unsworn declaration, which the court found insufficient to establish jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that Straus's unilateral action of wiring money to GBC did not establish specific personal jurisdiction. GBC's general statements on its website about compliance with federal law did not constitute purposeful availment of conducting activities in Alabama. The court concluded that GBC did not have the minimum contacts necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Alabama. Therefore, the court granted GBC's petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss Straus's complaint. View "Ex parte GBC International Bank" on Justia Law

by
Eric Jackson, a commercial tractor-trailer driver, was injured in a motor-vehicle collision in Morgan County, Alabama, on December 20, 2020. Jackson's personal vehicles were insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company under policies issued in Kentucky, which included uninsured/underinsured-motorist (UIM) coverage. In April 2022, Jackson sued the alleged at-fault driver in the Morgan Circuit Court. Later, he sought to amend his complaint to add State Farm as a defendant to recover UIM benefits. State Farm denied the claim, asserting that Jackson failed to file his UIM claim within the two-year period required by Kentucky law, as stipulated in the insurance policies.The Morgan Circuit Court granted State Farm's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Kentucky law governed the claim and that Jackson did not file his complaint within the required two-year period. Jackson appealed, arguing that Alabama's six-year statute of limitations should apply and that any contractual provision shortening this period was void under Alabama law.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court noted that Alabama enforces choice-of-law provisions in contracts unless they violate public policy. Jackson's policies explicitly incorporated Kentucky's two-year statute of limitations for filing accident-related tort claims. The court found that the policies were clear and unambiguous in this regard and that Kentucky law, which allows such contractual limitations, applied. The court distinguished this case from others where no specific choice-of-law provision was present or where the provision did not explicitly include procedural laws like statutes of limitations.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the contractual provision incorporating Kentucky's two-year statute of limitations was valid and enforceable, thus barring Jackson's UIM claim. View "Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

by
Walter F. Scott III filed an appeal against the Alabama Department of Revenue, challenging the Jefferson County Board of Equalization's valuation of 176 parcels of real property for property-tax purposes. Scott identified himself as "Agent for Owners" in his notice of appeal. The Department, Jefferson County, and the Board moved to dismiss Scott's appeal, arguing that he had incorrectly filed the tax appeal and had not paid the necessary filing fees.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Scott was improperly attempting to aggregate 176 separate and distinct parcels of property into one lawsuit for the purpose of appealing tax assessments on each parcel. The court concluded that each parcel required a separately filed lawsuit accompanied by the appropriate filing fees. Scott then appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the tax appeal. The court held that the relevant statutes, §§ 40-3-24 and 40-3-25, Ala. Code 1975, do not require a taxpayer to appeal each assessment separately. The court found that the language of the statutes allows for multiple contested assessments to be included in a single appeal to the circuit court. The court also noted that consolidating challenges to multiple parcels into one appeal is consistent with the liberal joinder allowed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not address whether multiple owners could use a single appeal to contest the assessments of multiple parcels, as this issue had not been sufficiently explored at this point in the action. View "Scott v. Alabama Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
Daniel Flickinger, a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative political commentary on his personal social media. In June 2020, he posted a controversial message about George Floyd's death. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (the King law firm), sent this post to Flickinger's supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, expressing concern. Wainwright and other WPM partners, who were not familiar with social media, reviewed Flickinger's posts and asked him to resign, which he did.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed his claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference claim and remanded the case. The King defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no substantial evidence that their actions caused Flickinger's damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the King defendants, concluding that the WPM partners' decision to terminate Flickinger was based on their independent review of his social media posts.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment for the King law firm, finding that King's actions were not within the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for King, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether King's actions were a substantial factor in Flickinger's termination and whether King was justified in sending the post. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also upheld the denial of Flickinger's motion to compel King's cellular-telephone records and his motion to continue the summary-judgment hearing. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

by
In February 2017, Lily T. Ojano-Bracco, Mountain West IRA, Inc., Angelina M. Sharman, and James R. Sharman sued Bradley C. Lewis, Birmingham Income Property, LLC (BIP), MAC, LLC, and Bryan Conwill, alleging fraud by BIP, which Lewis and Conwill owned. A process server delivered a summons and complaint to Lewis's stepson, Xavier Young, at Lewis's marital home. Despite evidence linking Lewis to this address, he did not respond to the complaint or subsequent court documents. In May 2021, the trial court entered a default judgment against Lewis, BIP, and Conwill. Lewis did not respond until April 2023, when he was personally served with a contempt order.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied Lewis's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the default judgment, which he based on claims of improper service. Lewis appealed, arguing he was unaware of the case and not properly served.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the Letson Farms address was Lewis's "usual place of abode" as he listed it on tax returns, a bankruptcy filing, and with the Alabama Secretary of State. Additionally, Young, who accepted the summons, resided at the Letson Farms address, as evidenced by his own official documents and previous acceptance of service on Lewis's behalf.The court held that service of process was valid under Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P., as it was performed at Lewis's usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing there. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's denial of Lewis's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. View "Lewis v. Ojano-Bracco" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
by
Teresa Williams and Barney's Childcare and Learning Center, Inc., doing business as Pooh Bear Academy, filed a complaint against various officials and employees of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (ADHR) and the Elmore County Department of Human Resources (EDHR). The complaint included tort claims related to the suspension and revocation of the day-care provider's operating license and the denial of its license renewal application.The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint on April 25, 2024. Williams and the day-care provider filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment on May 23, 2024. The court set a hearing for July 1, 2024, but it did not occur. A hearing was eventually held on September 5, 2024, where both parties' counsel stated on record that they had agreed to extend the time for the court to rule on the postjudgment motion beyond the 90-day limit. However, the court did not enter an order denying the postjudgment motion until September 12, 2024.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was untimely. The court noted that under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the trial court had 90 days to rule on the postjudgment motion, which expired on August 21, 2024. Since the parties' consent to extend the time was not placed on the record before the 90-day period expired, the postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on August 21, 2024. Consequently, Williams and the day-care provider had until October 2, 2024, to file their notice of appeal, but they did not do so until October 17, 2024. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Williams v. Dodd" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (collectively "RSA"), which received a land-use certificate from the Baldwin County zoning administrator to construct a five-story structure at The Grand Hotel. The Point Clear Property Owners Association, Inc. (PCPOA), representing around 400 members in the district, appealed the issuance of the certificate to the Baldwin County Board of Adjustment. The Board agreed with PCPOA and rescinded the certificate.RSA appealed the Board's decision to the Baldwin Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board's ruling. RSA then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that PCPOA was not "aggrieved" by the issuance of the certificate and thus lacked standing to appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals held that RSA had waived this argument by not raising it before the Board and cited the precedent set in City of Mobile v. Lee. The court also noted in a footnote that PCPOA did qualify as a "person aggrieved."The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that whether PCPOA was "aggrieved" was a waivable issue of capacity, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, RSA's failure to raise the issue before the Board constituted a waiver. The court did not address whether PCPOA was actually "aggrieved," as it affirmed the lower court's decision based on the waiver. View "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Department" on Justia Law

by
Yadira Ordonez, individually and as mother and next friend of her minor daughter, S.C.O., sued Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. (CFMI) in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries S.C.O. sustained from hot soup purchased at Capitol International Market. CFMI moved for summary judgment, claiming it did not operate the market. Ordonez opposed the motion and requested more time for discovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CFMI, and Ordonez appealed.The trial court entered summary judgment for CFMI, finding that CFMI did not operate the grocery store or the deli where the incident occurred. Ordonez argued that more discovery was needed, particularly the deposition of CFMI's owner, John Yim, to test the veracity of his statements. The trial court denied Ordonez's motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery and granted summary judgment to CFMI.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Ordonez's motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f) to take Yim's deposition. The court noted that the health department records and other evidence raised questions about CFMI's assertions that it had no employees and did not operate the grocery store or deli. The court concluded that Yim's deposition was critical to Ordonez's opposition to the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ordonez v. Capitol Farmers Market, Inc." on Justia Law