Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

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Consolidated Pipe filed the underlying action against The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty"), Bolt Construction & Excavating, LLC ("Bolt Construction"), and Michael Bolt (collectively, defendants). The West Morgan East Lawrence Water and Sewer Authority ("the Water Authority") contracted with Bolt Construction to perform a public work known as "the Vaughn Bridge Road Water Line Relocation Project No. 14018.00" ("the project"). In the course of performing its contract with the Water Authority, Bolt Construction entered into a contract with Consolidated Pipe pursuant to which Consolidated Pipe was to supply materials for use in the project. Bolt executed a guaranty in conjunction with the contract with Consolidated Pipe in which he agreed to unconditionally and personally guarantee full and prompt payment of all sums owed to Consolidated Pipe by Bolt Construction in the event Bolt Construction failed to pay the contracted-for amount. In its complaint, Consolidated Pipe alleged Bolt Construction failed to pay Consolidated Pipe for the materials it furnished to Bolt Construction for the project. At issue in this case was venue: the Alabama Supreme Court determined that based on a forum-selection clause, the only proper venue for this action was Morgan County. Therefore, the circuit court erred by granting the motion to transfer. Accordingly, the Court granted Consolidated Pipe's petition for mandamus relief, and directed the Morgan Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring this case to Jackson County. View "Ex parte Consolidated Pipe & Supply Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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On October 8, 2016, Rita Kay filed a complaint against "Brookwood Baptist Health LLC" and fictitiously named defendants pursuant to the Alabama Medical Liability Act, based on injuries she allegedly suffered at the hands of another patient while she was being treated in the Psychiatric and Behavioral Health Inpatient Services Unit at Brookwood Baptist Medical Center from October 8, 2014, until October 12, 2014. She asserted claims of medical negligence, false imprisonment, negligence and wantonness, breach of contract, and negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, and/or supervision. Brookwood Health Services, Inc., filed a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Kay's action against it. Assuming, without deciding, that service on Brookwood Baptist Health LLC, the original defendant, was proper, the materials before the Alabama Supreme Court established that Brookwood Baptist Health LLC did not receive the complaint until February 13, 2017 -- 128 days after the lawsuit was commenced. Therefore, the Court concluded Brookwood established it was added as a defendant after the expiration of the applicable limitations period and that relation-back principles do not apply. Therefore, it has demonstrated that it had a clear legal right to the relief sought. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its September 7, 2017, order denying the motion to dismiss filed by Brookwood Health Services, Inc., and to dismiss Kay's complaint. View "Ex parte Brookwood Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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Philip Richardson filed a complaint against Ben Chambless ("Ben"), Alaspec Residential Inspections, LLC, and Good Cents Home Inspections & Energy Management, LLC, in which he requested a jury trial on multiple claims arising from an allegedly faulty inspection the defendants had performed on a house Richardson was in the process of purchasing. In June 2012, the trial court entered a default judgment against Good Cents for failure to answer and, following a hearing, entered an order awarding Richardson $80,281.28 against Good Cents based on findings that the inspection report failed to disclose material defects in the house and that Richardson would not have purchased the house if the inspection report had disclosed those defects. In March 2013, Richardson amended his complaint to add Rosemarie, who was Ben's wife at the time, as a defendant. Richardson alleged that, in December 2012, Ben had transferred his interest in the Chamblesses' marital residence to Rosemarie ("the transfer") and that Ben had made the transfer because, Richardson said, Ben "knew he was going to incur ... a foreseeable judgment in the lawsuit filed by ... Richardson" and knew that making the transfer "would impair his ability to pay this ... judgment." Rosemarie filed a motion for a summary judgment on Richardson's claims against her. The trial court found no genuine issues of material fact as to Richardson's claims against Rosemarie, therefore she was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those claims. Richardson's claims against Ben and Alaspec remained pending, but the trial court, finding that there was no just reason for delay, certified its partial summary judgment as final. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded resolution of Richardson's pending claims against Ben regarding the allegedly faulty inspection could potentially moot the claims adjudicated by the trial court's partial summary judgment; the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification of that judgment was therefore improper. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that it arose from a nonfinal judgment. View "Richardson v. Chambless" on Justia Law

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G.R.L.C. Trust, formed under the laws of Texas, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Garrison Decatur Crossings, LLC ("Garrison Decatur"), in Garrison Decatur's action for a judgment declaring the need for reformation of a recorded memorandum of lease on the ground of a mutual mistake. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court's finding that there had been a mutual mistake in omitting Exhibit A from the lease memorandum was supported by the evidence; therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Garrison Decatur reforming the lease memorandum was affirmed. View "G.R.L.C. Trust v. Garrison Decatur Crossings, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Jimmy Larry Beddingfield ("Larry"), his wife, Rebecca, and their adult son, James Cody Beddingfield ("Cody") appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants Mullins Insurance Company, Mullins & Company Insurance, Rand Mullins, and David Mullins (referred to collectively as "Mullins"), on the Beddingfields' claims stemming from Mullins's alleged failure to properly procure insurance coverage. In 1997, Larry and Rebecca purchased a homeowners' liability-insurance policy from Rand Mullins that protected Larry and Rebecca's primary residence. In 2001, Larry and Rebecca purchased a second liability-insurance policy that provided coverage for a rental house located in Florence; they later constructed another house in Guntersville and, in 2003, purchased an additional liability-insurance policy for that property. In July 2003, Mullins canceled the insurance policy on the Florence house allegedly based on a belief that "the policy was issued in duplicate." Allegedly unbeknownst to Larry and Rebecca, however, the requested cancellation left the Florence house uninsured. One month later, pursuant to a mortgage refinance on the Beddingfields' residence, Larry and Rebecca paid one year's insurance premium on that residence; the check was endorsed and deposited into Mullins's account. In March 2004, the policy on the Beddingfields' residence was canceled because of nonpayment of the premium; neither Larry nor Rebecca, however, was able to recall receiving notice of the cancellation. After those two events, Larry and Rebecca were without insurance on their residence and the Florence house, leaving them with liability insurance only on their Guntersville house. In July 2004, a minor guest at the Beddingfields' Guntersville house, Trace Linam, suffered a serious eye injury in a fireworks-related incident. In 2008, Linam and his father, Linam, sued the Beddingfields, alleging that they, and particularly Cody (who was a minor at the time), were responsible for the injury. Because the underwriter of the Beddingfields' policy had been placed into receivership in Texas in 2006, the Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association ("AIGA") covered the Beddingfields' legal-defense costs in the Linam litigation; however, the maximum amount of liability coverage available was limited to $100,000 –- the amount of the liability- insurance policy Larry and Rebecca had obtained from Mullins to insure that property -- and not $500,000, the amount they say would have been available had the other two policies not been canceled. In February 2011, a judgment was entered on a $600,000 jury verdict against the Beddingfields in the Linam litigation. The Beddingfields appealed that decision. Because, however, AIGA did not post the requisite supersedeas bond, and the Beddingfields were allegedly unable to obtain a bond, execution of the judgment was not stayed during the pendency of the appeal. In July 2011, while their appeal was pending, the Beddingfields sued Mullins, alleging numerous counts of negligence and wantonness with relation to Mullins's handling of the various insurance policies. After review of the trial court record, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment as to the negligence claims, reversed as to the wantonness claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Beddingfield et al. v. Mullins Insurance Company et al." on Justia Law

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William Veitch was a Republican candidate for district attorney for the 10th Judicial Circuit of Alabama. His request for a declaration was denied, and he petitioned for a writ of mandamus when the trial court refused to direct that the names of candidates running for the office of district attorney for the 10th Judicial Circuit be included not only on the ballot to be used in the primary election in the Birmingham Division of Jefferson County, but also on the ballot to be used in the primary election in the portion of Jefferson County known as the Bessemer Cutoff. The trial court dismissed Veitch's action based on its conclusion that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, based on the doctrine of laches. Veitch appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court found a jurisdiction-stripping statute did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and Veitch was not precluded by the doctrine of laches from bringing his action. At this point, the Court expressed no opinion on the merits of Veitch's arguments regarding the alleged repeal of the 1953 Act, its alleged unconstitutionality, or its alleged unconstitutional application. The trial court's judgment was therefore reversed and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Veitch v. Vowell" on Justia Law

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In consolidated petitions, defendant Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("MIMC") sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate portions of its May 5, 2017, discovery orders. More specifically, in case no. 1160731, MIMC sought mandamus review of the portion of the trial court's order compelling MIMC to produce certain documents previously submitted to the trial court for in camera review on the ground that the documents are protected from discovery under section 6-5-551 and/or section 22-21-8, Ala. Code 1975. In case no. 1160815, MIMC sought mandamus review of another May 5, 2017, order denying MIMC's motions seeking reconsideration of, or in the alternative, a protective order regarding the trial court's November 10, 2016 order compelling MIMC's response to various discover requests. The underlying case centered on a negligence action brought by the administrator of the estate of Rhonda Lynn Snow who sought surgery at an MIMC facility in 2013. At around 5:50 a.m. on December 11, 2013, a nurse allegedly administered a dose of Dilaudid to Rhonda; thereafter, at 6:40 a.m. Rhonda was found "non-responsive" in her room and the staff at the medical center were unable to resuscitate her. Rhonda remained on life support until her death on January 3, 2014. The Alabama Supreme Court determined MIMC demonstrated the trial court exceeded its discretion in requiring MIMC to respond to the discovery requests at issue, and accordingly, issued writs in both cases. View "Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center." on Justia Law

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Joshua Ward petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Shelby Circuit Court to vacate its October 7, 2017, order setting aside a default judgment entered against Johnathan Motors, LLC, and its principal Jacques C. Chahla (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the dealership") and to enter an order reinstating the default judgment. In 2017, Ward filed a 12-count complaint against the dealership and fictitiously named defendants alleging, among other things, that on August 5, 2016, he purchased a vehicle from the dealership and that the dealership unilaterally voided the sale of the vehicle and unlawfully repossessed and converted to its own use the vehicle, the down payment, the monthly installment payment, and the personal property in the vehicle when it was unlawfully repossessed. On August 14, 2017, Ward requested the clerk of the circuit court to enter a default against the dealership pursuant to Rule 55(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., based on the dealership's failure to answer or otherwise to defend in the case; the clerk subsequently made an entry of default in the case. On October 3, 2017, the dealership moved the trial court to set aside the default judgment. On October 7, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting the dealership's motion to set aside the default judgment, but requiring the dealership to file an answer within seven days from the date of that order; the dealership did not file an answer within seven days as ordered. On November 1, 2017, Ward moved the trial court to reconsider its order setting aside the default judgment, the trial court denied Ward's motion to reconsider the order setting aside the default judgment. On November 13, 2017, the dealership filed an answer to the complaint. Ward thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. After review, the Supreme Court ordered the trial court to vacate its order setting aside the default judgment, to enter an order reinstating the default judgment against the dealership, and to schedule a hearing on damages. View "Ex parte Joshua Ward." on Justia Law

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The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama ("the Board") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, based on Article I, section 14, Ala. Const. 1901, an action filed against it by Paul F. Castellanos, M.D. ("Dr. Castellanos"). Dr. Castellanos filed an action against six named defendants and other fictitiously named defendants asserting claims of intentional interference with contractual and business relations, civil conspiracy, and "intentional infliction of mental anguish -- outrageous conduct" and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court determined the circuit court lacked the power to compel the Board to arbitrate Dr. Castellanos's claims against it. Instead, it was incumbent upon the circuit court to grant the Board's motion to dismiss the claims against it, as Dr. Castellanos himself conceded. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to vacate its order insofar as it compelled arbitration with regard to the Board and to dismiss the claims against the Board based on section 14 immunity. View "Ex parte the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama." on Justia Law

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Defendant Mark Price d/b/a J&M Movers ("J&M") filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Alabama Supreme Court requesting the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order granting a motion for relief from judgment filed by plaintiffs Lawrence and Margaret Brewer. In 2013, the Brewers sued J&M and fictitiously named defendants, asserting a single claim alleging trespass based on the June 23, 2009, repossession of a mobile home that was located on their real property. According to the Brewers, on or about June 23, 2009, J&M unlawfully entered their real property to repossess the mobile home and caused damage to their property during the process. J&M filed an answer in which it denied the allegations in the complaint. In 2015, the Brewers filed an amended complaint, substituting Brandon Scott Asberry d/b/a Scott Asberry Transportation as "the proper party Defendant in this case." Thereafter the Brewers filed a motion to dismiss J&M as a defendant in the case, which the trial court granted. J&M was dismissed as a defendant. Over two years later, the Brewers filed a motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal, citing Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and asking the trial court to reinstate J&M as a defendant. The trial court granted the Brewers' motion for relief from judgment. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded J&M established that the Brewers were not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting the Brewers' motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order granting the motion for relief from judgment filed by the Brewers. View "Ex parte Mark Price d/b/a J&M Movers." on Justia Law