Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Banking
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PNC Bank, National Association, and Sonja Moore-Dennis separately appealed a Circuit Court order denying their motion to compel arbitration as to Joseph Franklin's claims against them. Franklin had three bank accounts with the predecessor bank to PNC Bank, RBC Bank (USA), before RBC Bank merged with PNC Bank. Shortly before the merger, PNC Bank, in January 2012, allegedly mailed a welcome letter and a PNC Bank Account Agreement. The account agreement did not contain an arbitration provision. Tamara Franklin, Franklin's niece came to to visit one day. Tamara noticed a document that she thought was a bank statement from PNC Bank. After looking at the document, Tamara was concerned that Franklin owed money to PNC Bank. Franklin said he did not owe PNC Bank any money but that Tamara could call his financial advisor, Sonja Moore-Dennis, if she had any concerns. Franklin alleged that Moore-Dennis was a PNC Bank agent or employee at this time; PNC Bank denies that it had ever employed Moore-Dennis. After investigating the matter, Franklin and Tamara came to the conclusion that Moore-Dennis had been stealing funds from Franklin's accounts. Additionally, it appeared to Franklin and Tamara that Moore-Dennis had created an online banking profile for Franklin but had set up the profile so that account notifications were sent to her e-mail address. Franklin, who is elderly, did not have Internet access or an e-mail address and did not know how to use online banking. Franklin sued PNC Bank and Moore-Dennis alleging fraud, suppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and various forms of negligence and wantonness. PNC Bank moved to compel arbitration, raising the terms of the account agreement as grounds for its motion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, finding that the Bank and Moore-Dennis failed to prove that Franklin received the account agreement or accessed a specific web page that contained the arbitration provision as described in the account agreement. View "Moore-Dennis v. Franklin" on Justia Law

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Aliant Bank appealed the entry of an injunction against it by the Shelby Circuit Court enjoining it from interfering with a contract for the sale of real property between Kimberly and Kerry Carter, on the one hand, and Gregory and Robyn Nunley, on the other. The Carters owned, as joint tenants, a piece of real property located in Shelby County. The Carters used the property to secure a mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). In addition to the MERS mortgage, three creditors secured judgments against Kerry Carter against the property. Aliant was fourth to secure its judgment lien against Kerry Carter. On August 21, 2014, the Carters entered into a contract with the Nunleys for the sale of the property. At the time the Carters entered into the contract, the judgment liens against the property had not been satisfied. The preliminary settlement statement for the sale of the property indicated that a portion of the sale proceeds would be used to pay off the outstanding mortgage held by MERS on the property. The first judgment creditor thereafter agreed to release its judgment lien on the property in exchange for a smaller portion of the sale proceeds. The record did not indicate that the second or third judgment creditor agreed to release its judgment lien against the property. However, the record was clear that Aliant refused to release its judgment lien against the property. Apparently, Aliant's refusal to execute a release of its judgment lien inhibited the closing of the contract. On September 14, 2014, the Carters sued Aliant, alleging that Aliant had intentionally and maliciously refused to execute a partial release of the property "in order to prohibit [Kerry] Carter from being able to fulfill his obligations under the purchase contract even though all profits due Kerry Carter are being disgorged and paid to the appropriate judgment creditor, [the first judgment creditor]." The trial court granted an injunction against Aliant. Subsequently, Aliant petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its injunction order. The Supreme Court treated Aliant's petition for a writ of mandamus as a timely notice of appeal. After the Supreme Court recharacterized Aliant's petition, Aliant filed its appellant's brief. Instead of filing an appellee's brief, the Carters moved to dismiss Aliant's petition as moot, alleging that the property had been foreclosed upon by MERS. The Carters did not present the Supreme Court with any evidence indicating that MERS had, in fact, foreclosed upon the property. Aliant opposed the motion to dismiss. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Carters that the injunctive relief they requested was no longer attainable and that, consequently, the case was no longer justiciable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed Aliant's appeal. View "Aliant Bank v. Carter" on Justia Law

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U.S. Bank National Association ("USB"), successor in interest to Bank of America, N.A., which was the successor by merger to LaSalle Bank, National Association, as trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4 ("the Trust"), and Bank of America, N.A. ("BOA"), separately appealed a $3.9 million judgment entered against them on trespass and wantonness claims asserted by Chester and Emily Shepherd. USB also appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Shepherds on its claims related to an alleged error in a mortgage executed by the Shepherds upon which the Trust had foreclosed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed. "'Every single one of these cases . . . rejects the availability of negligence and wantonness claims under Alabama law under comparable circumstances to those identified by the [plaintiffs]. Every one of these cases undercuts the legal viability of [the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims], and rejects the very arguments articulated by the [plaintiffs] in opposing dismissal of those causes of action. ... the mortgage servicing obligations at issue here are a creature of contract, not of tort, and stem from the underlying mortgage and promissory note executed by the parties, rather than a duty of reasonable care generally owed to the public. To the extent that the [plaintiffs] seek to hold defendants liable on theories of negligent or wanton servicing of their mortgage, [those negligence and wantonness claims] fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.'" View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

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Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Rex Nichols ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. In late 2005, Sonny began talking to Winfree about obtaining financing from Colonial Bank ("Colonial"), Winfree's employer, for the purchase of approximately 500 acres of real property in Stapleton, Alabama. The Nicholses intended to develop the Stapleton property into a subdivision. In February 2006, the Nicholses executed a loan agreement with Colonial, in which Colonial agreed to lend the Nicholses close to $2.8 million to purchase the property. Sonny testified that in late 2007, as the maturity date on the note approached, he began contacting Colonial regarding renewing the loan; he further testified that, around the same time, Winfree became slow to communicate with him. Sonny also testified that before the February 27, 2008, maturity date on the promissory note, he spoke to Fullington about renewing the loan, with Colonial carrying the interest going forward. A few weeks later, the Nicholses were notified that Colonial would not carry the interest on the loan or provide additional funds for development of the property. Colonial ultimately renewed the terms of the note until Colonial failed in August 2009. The FDIC assumed control of its assets and liabilities. The FDIC sold many of Colonial's assets and liabilities to BB&T, including the Nicholses' loan. Fullington was hired by BB&T; Winfree was not. In early November 2009, BB&T informed the Nicholses that it would not lend them additional funds to develop the property. The Nicholses stopped making interest payments on the loan in November 2009. On March 10, 2010, the Nicholses sued the appellants and fictitiously named defendants, alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. The appellants separately moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. BB&T also filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Nicholses had defaulted on their obligations under a June 2009 promissory note and seeking damages related to that default. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss the complaint but granted a motion to strike the request for a jury trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses on their claims against the appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against them. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the circuit court to enter a judgment in favor of the appellants on the Nicholses' claims against them and in favor of BB&T on its counterclaim against the Nicholses and to determine the damages to be awarded on the counterclaim. View "Branch Banking & Trust Company v. Nichols" on Justia Law

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Sergio Acosta petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order granting a motion filed by Trinity Bank to strike Acosta's jury demand with respect to all counts in Acosta's counterclaim and third-party complaint in the bank's action against him. The bank filed filed suit seeking a judgment against Acosta for financial losses it incurred after Acosta defaulted on certain "Multipurpose Note and Security Agreement[s]" he had executed with the bank. The bank alleged that Acosta had executed two secured notes and one unsecured note, which, it said, Acosta had failed and/or refused to pay; that the bank had foreclosed on the properties pledged as collateral on the secured notes; and that proper credit had been applied to the notes. The bank sought a judgment for the balance due on the notes, plus interest, fees, costs, and attorney fees. Acosta filed a counterclaim against the bank, as well as a third-party complaint against two of its officers, alleging that he had entered into a business relationship with R&B Properties under the name of SilverPalm Properties, LLC; that loans from the bank were the principal source of funding for SilverPalm; that the financing plan was for SilverPalm to procure from the bank the funds to construct the properties, for SilverPalm to pay the interest on the notes until the properties were rented, and for SilverPalm to pay off the notes once the properties generated sufficient rental income to do so. Acosta and R&B Properties dissolved SilverPalm because of a downturn in the economy; but the bank induced that Acosta was personally liable for the notes previously secured only by SilverPalm The bank at some point advised Acosta that additional security was required to continue financing the notes, that Acosta declined to pledge additional security. The bank then called the notes due and foreclosed on the properties securing the notes. Acosta requested an accounting for the amounts claimed by the bank on the notes and the mortgages securing the notes, and he sought damages based on allegations of wantonness, breach of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The counterclaim and third-party complaint included a demand for a jury trial. In its motion to strike Acosta's jury demand, the Bank relied on a jury-waiver provision in four Assignments of Rents and Leases that Acosta had executed in consideration of the notes. The trial court initially denied the bank's motion to strike, and then granted it after reconsideration. The Supreme Court concluded that Acosta demonstrated a clear legal right to a jury trial on the claims asserted in his counterclaim and third-party complaint. As such, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order striking Acosta's jury demand. View "Ex parte Sergio Acosta." on Justia Law

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Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a Circuit Court judgment in favor of Rex ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against the appellants, and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. The dispute arose over loans made by BB&T's predecessor-in-interest, Colonial Bank. After a development loan was made, but before it could be paid back, Colonial became insolvent and entered receivership. BB&T purchased much of Colonial's assets, including the loan made to the Nicholses for development of their parcel. After refusing to extend the terms of the original Colonial loan, or to provide any additional funds to finish the development, the Nicholses stopped making payments on their loan and sued alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses and on BB&T's counterclaim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking, Contracts
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Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. ("TCVH"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of First Tuskegee Bank on breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims stemming from a construction loan TCVH received from First Tuskegee in September 2004. The gravamen of those claims was that TCVH was injured by First Tuskegee's alleged insistence that TCVH use PJ Construction as the general contractor on the project although PJ Construction was not licensed as a general contractor in Alabama, that PJ Construction's work product was below what one would expect from a properly licensed general contractor, and that using PJ Construction resulted in delays, cost overruns, and, TCVH argued, the ultimate failure of its business. However, because TCVH's claims accrued in approximately July 2005 and TCVH did not formally assert them until after it initiated this action in April 2009, those claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that governed them. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of First Tuskegee was affirmed. View "Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. First Tuskegee Bank " on Justia Law

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In 2004, Paint Rock Turn, LLC purchased a sod farm and related farm equipment. To partially finance the purchase, Paint Rock borrowed $1,706,250 from First Jackson Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the sod farm and a security interest in the equipment used on the farm. By February 2009, reflecting in part a drop in demand for sod caused by the collapsing market for new homes, Paint Rock had defaulted on the loan. In early 2009, Paint Rock filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The filing of the petition operated as an automatic stay and precluded First Jackson from foreclosing on the sod farm or retaking the equipment. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed later that year, and a few months later, First Jackson moved forward with its intent to foreclose by publishing the first of three notices of a foreclosure sale on the Paint Rock property. On the morning of the scheduled sale, Paint Rock filed a second bankruptcy petition, which stayed the sale. This second petition was dismissed a month later for failure to file the proper schedules and statements. First Jackson published another notice that the foreclosure sale was rescheduled for December 30, 2009. December 26, Paint Rock filed a third bankruptcy petition. Four days later, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, expressly finding that Paint Rock misused the bankruptcy process to "hinder and delay First Jackson's efforts to foreclose its mortgage and security agreement." First Jackson was the high bidder at the sale, purchased the property, and sent Paint Rock a letter demanding possession of the sod farm. In early 2010, First Jackson filed an ejectment action. The same day, Paint Rock demanded access to the farm to recover "emblements in the form of sod which is being grown on the real property recently foreclosed upon ...." Paint Rock also requested the return of its equipment. First Jackson denied Paint Rock's request. Paint Rock, relying on a section of the Alabama Code that permits a tenant at will to harvest its crop, counterclaimed for damages for harm suffered as the result of being unable to harvest the sod. Paint Rock also sought damages for conversion of "plats of sod" contained on the sod farm. First Jackson sold the sod farm to Mrs. Goodson, subject to any claim Paint Rock may have to the emblements growing on the property. Paint Rock filed a joint third-party complaint against First Jackson and Mr. and Mrs. Goodson, alleging conversion and detinue, as well as the emblements claim. After the trial court denied motions for a summary judgment filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Paint Rock and Jones's case, the trial court granted a motion for a JML filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons on Paint Rock's counterclaim for emblements on the ground that Paint Rock was not an at-will tenant. After Paint Rock withdrew its detinue claims and the trial court granted a JML on the wantonness claims, leaving only the conversion and negligence claims. The jury awarded Paint Rock damages against First Jackson for conversion of a sod cutter and cut sod that had been loaded on a tractor-trailer when First Jackson took possession of the property. The jury also awarded Paint Rock damages against the Goodsons for conversion of business property and equipment. Paint Rock appealed the JML in favor of the defendants on the emblements claim; First Jackson cross-appealed the judgment awarding Paint Rock damages for conversion of the cut sod. The Supreme Court affirmed with regard to Paint Rock's emblements claim, but reversed on the conversion of the cut sod claim. View "Paint Rock Turf, LLC v. First Jackson Bank et al. " on Justia Law

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Regions Bank appealed a trial court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration in its dispute with Jerry Neighbors. Neighbors obtained a home loan from Regions in 1999. As part of the loan application, Neighbors executed a dispute-resolution agreement (DRA). In 2008, Neighbors modified the loan. Neighbors denied he signed the loan-modification agreement; he claimed that his signature on that document was forged. The loan-modification agreement also contained an arbitration provision. In 2013, Neighbors sued Regions, alleging that Regions had negligently and wantonly allowed an imposter to forge Neighbors's signature on the loan-modification agreement. Relying on the DRA, Regions moved to compel the arbitration of Neighbors's claims. Neighbors opposed the motion to compel, arguing that because the dispute in this case involved an alleged forgery, the dispute could not be subject to the provisions of the DRA. Neighbors also suggested that the DRA did not cover his claims because, pursuant to the terms of the judgment divorcing him and his wife, he stopped making payments on the original mortgage in 2006 when his ex-wife remarried. Although Neighbors characterized the dispute otherwise, the Supreme Court concluded that the dispute in this case concerned the scope of the DRA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Neighbors" on Justia Law

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Troy Bank sued Citizens Bank seeking to recover damages Troy Bank claimed to have suffered as a result of a check encoding error made by Citizens Bank. Troy Bank alleged that it was entitled to recover damages under Alabama's check-encoding warranty, 7-4-209, Ala. Code 1975. Citizens Bank filed a motion for a summary judgment arguing that it was not strictly liable for its encoding error, but that Troy Bank "had an obligation to mitigate its damages and attempt to avoid loss altogether. [Troy Bank] failed to do this when it sent no written notice of dishonor or nonpayment before its midnight deadline and it allowed final payment to be made from [the accountholder]...." In this case, the encoding warranty, which is applied to determine liability as between banks, operated to shift the liability to Citizens Bank. "To hold that Citizens Bank is not liable for the damage it caused Troy Bank based on Citizens Bank's encoding error would render the encoding warranty useless and strip Troy Bank of a legislatively enacted protection." The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in its application of the law to the facts of this case. View "Troy Bank & Trust Company v. Citizens Bank " on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking