Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kurtrina Smith and Rickey Levins separately initiated actions against defendants the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. ("the AME Church"); James L. Davis, bishop and presiding officer of the AME Church's Ninth Episcopal District (collectively, "the Ninth District"); and Lincoln National Life Insurance Company ("Lincoln National") after Lincoln National denied their respective claims for benefits filed pursuant to a group life-insurance policy Davis had purchased from Lincoln National on behalf of the Ninth District. Smith and Levins alleged the group policy provided coverage for Smith's mother and Levins's father. The defendants moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions that were allegedly part of the group policy and certificates. The trial court denied those motions, and defendants appealed. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for arbitration proceedings. View "African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Levins" on Justia Law

Regions Bank appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration. In October 2011, Mary Rice opened both a savings account and a checking account with Regions. Rice opened each account by signing a one-page signature card indicating that she was agreeing to certain terms. Among other things, the signature cards referred to a Deposit Agreement, the terms of which contained the arbitration clause at issue here. In March 2015, Rice sued Regions, alleging that Regions was liable for a fall she suffered on Regions' premises. Regions filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the deposit agreement. Rice opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that her claim was beyond the scope of the arbitration provision in the Deposit Agreement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the arbitration clause at issue clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of substantive arbitrability of matters between the parties to the arbitrator. Pursuant to the delegation provision, the arbitrator had to resolve the disputed issue whether Rice's claim is arbitrable under the arbitration provision. View "Regions Bank v. Rice" on Justia Law

PNC Bank, National Association, and Sonja Moore-Dennis separately appealed a Circuit Court order denying their motion to compel arbitration as to Joseph Franklin's claims against them. Franklin had three bank accounts with the predecessor bank to PNC Bank, RBC Bank (USA), before RBC Bank merged with PNC Bank. Shortly before the merger, PNC Bank, in January 2012, allegedly mailed a welcome letter and a PNC Bank Account Agreement. The account agreement did not contain an arbitration provision. Tamara Franklin, Franklin's niece came to to visit one day. Tamara noticed a document that she thought was a bank statement from PNC Bank. After looking at the document, Tamara was concerned that Franklin owed money to PNC Bank. Franklin said he did not owe PNC Bank any money but that Tamara could call his financial advisor, Sonja Moore-Dennis, if she had any concerns. Franklin alleged that Moore-Dennis was a PNC Bank agent or employee at this time; PNC Bank denies that it had ever employed Moore-Dennis. After investigating the matter, Franklin and Tamara came to the conclusion that Moore-Dennis had been stealing funds from Franklin's accounts. Additionally, it appeared to Franklin and Tamara that Moore-Dennis had created an online banking profile for Franklin but had set up the profile so that account notifications were sent to her e-mail address. Franklin, who is elderly, did not have Internet access or an e-mail address and did not know how to use online banking. Franklin sued PNC Bank and Moore-Dennis alleging fraud, suppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and various forms of negligence and wantonness. PNC Bank moved to compel arbitration, raising the terms of the account agreement as grounds for its motion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, finding that the Bank and Moore-Dennis failed to prove that Franklin received the account agreement or accessed a specific web page that contained the arbitration provision as described in the account agreement. View "Moore-Dennis v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC, d/b/a 0791-Kindred Transitional Care and Rehabilitation-Whitesburg Gardens ("Whitesburg Gardens"), owned and operated a long-term care and rehabilitation facility. Whitesburg Gardens was sued by Lorene Jones, and appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Jones's claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: Jones was mentally competent when she was admitted to and during her stay at the facility. Because precedent held that competent residents of nursing homes could be bound by arbitration agreements executed by their representatives, the Court held that Jones was so bound. Moreover, in view of the evidence indicating that Jones passively permitted her daughter Yvonne Barbour to act on her behalf in signing the admission forms and the lack of evidence indicating that Jones ever objected to Barbour's signing those forms, the Court held that Barbour had the apparent authority to bind Jones at the time Barbour signed the admission documents. Under these circumstances, Whitesburg Gardens proved the existence of a valid contract calling for arbitration. The trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Hoover General Contractors – Homewood, Inc. ("HGCH"), appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration of its dispute with Gary Key regarding work performed by HGCH on Key's house in Jasper after that house was damaged by a fire. Six months after Key sued HGCH asserting claims stemming from HGCH's work rebuilding Key's house after a fire, HGCH moved the trial court to compel Key to arbitrate those claims pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract Key had entered into with HGCH. The trial court denied HGCH's motion to compel; however, that denial was error because Key failed to establish through substantial evidence that HGCH had waived its right to arbitration by substantially invoking the litigation process. Accordingly, the order entered by the trial court denying HGCH's motion to compel arbitration was reversed by the Supreme Court and the case remanded for the trial court to enter a new order compelling Key to arbitrate his claims ursuant to the terms of his contract with HGCH. View "Hoover General Contractors - Homewood, Inc. v. Key" on Justia Law

Defendants Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. and Robert Shackelford, appealed the Circuit Court's order denying, in part, their motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against them by the plaintiffs Paul and Eleanor Jones. Specifically, defendants challenged the circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the nonsignatory plaintiffs conceded that they were third-party beneficiaries of the agreement at issue here. The scope of the arbitration provision in the agreement was "indisputably" broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. Moreover, as the defendants noted, "[t]he events surrounding the change of beneficiary [on the Ameriprise accounts] form the basis for all of the [plaintiffs’] claims." Under this reasoning, the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim is, like their other claims, subject to the arbitration provision in the agreement. The circuit court, therefore, improperly denied the defendants' motion seeking to compel arbitration of all of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2010, Yan Chen, who had a business interest in a restaurant, entered into a 10-year lease agreement with Russell Realty, LLC, and MRT, LLC. The property to be leased was located in Greenville. The lease agreement was drafted by Russell Realty and contained an arbitration clause. In 2012, Russell Realty and MRT sued Chen along with Qiaoyun He, Joe Zou, and Yami Buffet, Inc., alleging breach of contract. Chen filed a response to the motion, alleging that she had been in China for a few months, and that she had not been personally served with notice of the lawsuit. She subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the lease agreement contained an arbitration clause and that "said complaint[] fails to state any measures that have been taken in lieu of the fulfillment of such agreed Arbitration Clause." The trial court denied both Russell Realty and MRT's motion for a default judgment and Chen's motion to dismiss. About a month after this, Chen filed a motion to compel arbitration, asserting that, as "part of Plaintiffs['] lease agreement, plaintiff[s] agreed to binding arbitration. In 2013, Chen filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that Russell Realty and MRT had refused to mediate and had refused to arbitrate. Russell Realty and MRT filed an objection to Chen's second motion to dismiss, asserting that "time of the stay set by the court has almost expired and Defendant Yan Chen has not made any movement, act, or effort to seek Arbitration to resolve the issues." Russell Realty and MRT again sought a default judgment against the defendants, including Chen. She asserted that counsel for Russell Realty and MRT had failed to respond to her attempts to seek a settlement before the hiring of a mediator or arbitrator and that, subsequently, she had contacted a mediator/arbitrator and Russell Realty and MRT had not responded to her choice of mediator/arbitrator. The trial court then entered an order stating that the Chen's appeal was moot as the court had not yet entered a final order. In early 2015, the trial court entered an order awarding Russell Realty and MRT $682,050.10 against all the defendants, including Chen, jointly and severally. Chen appealed. Based on its review of the facts in the circuit court record, the Supreme Court reversed with regard to Chen and remanded the case for the trial court to enter an order requiring arbitration in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement. View "Chen v. Russell Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

Southeast Construction, L.L.C. ("SEC"), appealed a circuit court order that found WAR Construction, Inc., had provided SEC with certain releases as previously ordered by the circuit court and that SEC was accordingly now required to pay the outstanding $263,939 remaining on a $373,939 judgment previously entered on a February 16, 2011, arbitration award obtained by WAR against SEC, along with interest accruing from February 16, 2011. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment to the extent it held that WAR provided all required releases and that SEC was obligated to fulfill the judgment entered on the arbitration award. However, the Court reversed the judgment inasmuch as it held that SEC is required to pay interest on the award as calculated from February 16, 2011. On remand, the circuit court was instructed to calculate interest on the principal at the rate set forth in the arbitration award accruing from September 8, 2014. View "Southeast Construction L.L.C. v. WAR Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Gladys Tellis, Sherry Bronson, Gwendolyn Moody, Nadine Ivy, and Uneeda Trammell (collectively, "the policyholders") initiated separate actions against American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, asserting generally that American Bankers had sold them homeowner's insurance policies providing a level of coverage they could never receive, even in the event of a total loss involving the covered property. American Bankers moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions it alleged were part of the subject policies; however, the trial courts denied those motions, and American Bankers appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the five appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion, and reversed those orders denying the motions to compel arbitration. The Court based its decision on its holdings that the policyholders manifested their assent to the arbitration provision in their policies by continuing to renew the policies, that the sale of the policies affected interstate commerce, and that the arbitration provision in the policies was not unconscionable. View "American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Tellis" on Justia Law