Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph Lester Pate petitioned the Supreme Court Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance by unpublished memorandum of the circuit court's denial of his motion for reconsideration of his sentence imposed pursuant the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("the HFOA"). The trial court dismissed Pate's "Kirby" motion because it erroneously believed that it lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in "Ex parte Pate," affirmed the trial court's order because it determined that Pate was not entitled to review (on the merits) of a second "Kirby" motion because, it said, there was no indication that Pate's first "Kirby" motion had not properly been considered. The Supreme Court concluded that there was indeed no indication in the record that Pate's first "Kirby" motion was considered on the merits. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pate v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Jessica Eastman, as the dependent widow of David Bentley, and on behalf of Bentley's three minor children, appealed a judgment entered in favor of R. Warehousing and Port Services Inc. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) that she was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on R. Warehousing's affirmative defense based on the "loaned-servant" doctrine; and (2) she was entitled to a new trial because counsel for R. Warehousing implied during opening statements that she had recovered workers' compensation benefits from Richway Transportation Services,Inc. in violation of the collateral-source rule. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Eastman v. R Warehousing & Port Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

Michelle D. Morgan appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Publix Super Markets, Inc., on her claim alleging a violation of the Alabama Medical Liability Act. Morgan sued Publix, asserting that she had suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries based on its negligence in partially filling her amlodipine prescription with furosemide. Following the close of discovery, the trial court granted Publix's motion for a summary judgment, holding that Morgan was unable to prove her case because she had not identified an Alabama-licensed pharmacist as an expert witness and could not, therefore, establish a breach of the applicable standard of care as required by the AMLA. Morgan appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment entered by the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that a pharmacy's negligence in dispensing the wrong medication is so apparent that a layperson can understand it without the assistance of expert testimony. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Morgan v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. " on Justia Law

Rebecca B. McDonald, as administrator of the estate of her son Jeremy Wayne McDonald, sued Kubota Manufacturing of America Corporation, Kubota Corporation, and Kubota Tractor Corporation, asserting various claims after her son died as a result of injuries sustained when a Kubota lawnmower he was operating rolled over, pinning him underneath it. Following a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Kubota defendants, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. McDonald's subsequent motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court, and McDonald appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that she was entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct and errors the trial court made when instructing the jury. Finding no abuse of discretion nor errors at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McDonald v. Kubota Manufacturing of America Corporation et al. " on Justia Law

In case no. 1111525, M & F Bank ("M & F") appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of First American Title Insurance Company ("FATIC") on negligence, breach-of-contract, and bad-faith-failure-to-pay claims M&F asserted against FATIC related to a title-insurance policy ("the title policy") FATIC issued M & F in connection with a mortgage loan made by M & F to a developer of property in Auburn. In case no. 1111568, FATIC appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of M & F on FATIC's counterclaims asserting abuse of process, conspiracy, breach of contract, and negligence. Upon review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed both judgments. View "M & F Bank v. First American Title Insurance Company " on Justia Law

Garfield W. Ivey, Jr. appealed circuit court judgment in favor of James C. King. In 2007, King sued Dollar & Eads, P.C., Rhonda Dollar, and Phillip Eads ("Dollar & Eads"), Peggy G. Northcutt a/k/a Peggy G. Fannin ("Northcutt"), who was employed by Dollar & Eads, P.C., and Al Northcutt, asserting various claims related to an alleged embezzlement of funds belonging to dissolved entities in which King and Ivey were members. King and Ivey entered into a settlement agreement with Dollar & Eads, which settled King's and Ivey's respective claims against Dollar & Eads for $627,684. King and Ivey agreed to divide the settlement amount between them based on their ownership interests in the various dissolved entities. A dispute over the split of the settlement proceeds was the subject of this appeal: Ivey claimed King was entitled to a certain amount based on Ivey's computation of King's ownership interest in each of the dissolved entities. But the parties' disagreement over how to split the settlement was the subject of a series of motions and circuit court orders in an attempt to resolve the dispute. The last order from the circuit court denying Ivey's motion to alter, amend or vacate an April 11, 2012 judgment was denied, and that was appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found no error or abuse of discretion in denying Ivey's motion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Ivey, Jr. v. King " on Justia Law

Felice McGathey appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Brookwood Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Brookwood Medical Center, and Scott Appell, M.D., in her medical malpractice action; she also challenged the trial court's order denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint to substitute real parties for fictitiously named defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. McGathey suffered a severe burn on the little finger of her left hand, permanent disfigurement and impaired mobility following left-shoulder arthroscopy, subacromial decompression, and distal clavicle resection. A Spider Limb Positioner was used in the surgery. A part of the positioner was sterilized, but was not given a chance to cool down before it was used in the surgery. And because defendants allowed the hot part to be used on McGathey during the surgery, she suffered her injuries. Based on a review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that McGathey produced substantial evidence of negligence for one of the Brookwood employees and reversed the grant of summary judgment in that defendant's favor. The Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Appell. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McGathey v. Brookwood Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

South Alabama Gas District (SAG) appealed a circuit court order enjoining it from selling liquified petroleum ("LP") gas and related appliances outside its member cities. Four individual taxpayers and Fletcher Smith Butane Co., Inc., sued SAG seeking both an injunction and damages for SAG's alleged violation of 11-50-266, as made applicable to gas districts by 11-50-399. The trial court bifurcated the claim for injunctive relief and the damages claim, and held a bench trial on the claim for injunctive relief. SAG argued that the notice and buy-out provisions did not apply to it because LP gas is not a "manufactured gas" within the terms of the statute. The trial court found otherwise and enjoined SAG from selling LP gas if it did not comply with 11-50-266. The circuit court found that the taxpayers lacked standing to challenge SAG's appliance sales. With regard to Fletcher Smith, SAG argued (among other things), that Fletcher Smith lacked standing because it sold its assets and was no longer engaging in the LP gas business. As proof, SAG cited Fletcher Smith's to "Requests for Admissions of Fact." After review of the circuit court record and the admissions cited by SAG in its appeal brief, the Supreme Court found that Fletcher Smith's claims for prospective relief became moot. "Because mootness goes to justiciability, this Court will not consider the merits of a claim that is moot." View "South Alabama Gas District v. Knight" on Justia Law

Precision Gear Company, Precision Gear LLC, and General Metal Heat Treating, Inc. were granted permission to appeal an interlocutory order denying their motion to dismiss the third-party claims against them filed by Continental Motors, Inc. The trial court certified a question to the Supreme Court of whether, in a suit for non-contractual indemnification arising from an accident and alleged damage that occurred out of state, Alabama's six year statute of limitation for implied contract actions controlled because the foreign jurisdiction's law considered its common law and statutory claims for indemnity as claims based upon contract implied in law or quasi-contract, or whether Alabama's two year statute of limitation for tort actions controlled. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Alabama's two-year statute of limitations applied in this case and that Continental Motors' claims against the gear manufacturers were time-barred. View "Precision Gear Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc. " on Justia Law

Defendant Reginald Tyrone Lightfoot challenged his conviction for trafficking in cocaine and his sentence of 15 years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine, as a matter of first impression, whether an Apprendi error in applying a sentence enhancement was automatically harmless when the erroneous application of the enhancement did not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense. The Court held that it was not, and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Lightfoot v. Alabama " on Justia Law