Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Terminix International Company, L.P., and Terminix International, Inc. appealed a trial court's order denying Terminix's motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award entered in favor of Walter Scott III and his wife, Paige. Terminix also appealed the trial court's order referring the Scotts' motion for sanctions to arbitration. In 2001, the Scotts entered into a termite-control-services contract with Terminix for a service known as the Termite Baiting System Protection Plan. Pursuant to the baiting plan, Terminix agreed, among other things, to install the baiting system, to monitor it, and to add or remove termite bait from the system as needed. In 2004 or 2005, Terminix lost the licensing rights to service or sell the termite-baiting-system plan. As a result, Terminix was no longer allowed to monitor or service the baiting system it had installed at the Scotts' house. The Scotts were not informed of this development until 2007, when they received a letter from Terminix which encouraged the Scotts to "update" their baiting system with another Terminix service or to convert their baiting system to the Terminix Liquid Defend System. The Scotts then entered into a new termite-service contract with Terminix for the new system. No live termite infestation was found in the Scotts' house since Terminix began servicing the house in 2001. However, in February 2010, a Terminix employee discovered extensive termite damage throughout the Scotts' house. Terminix agreed to repair the damage. Terminix stated it expended approximately $52,645 in repairs when a dispute arose with the Scotts over the scope of repairs to be made in a bathroom. Later that year, the Scotts petitioned the trial court, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("the FAA"), to arbitrate certain fraud claims arising from their dispute with Terminix. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed with Terminix to the extent that it argued the trial court erred in denying its postjudgment motion to vacate the ultimate arbitration award without first conducting a hearing on the motion as to the issue of arbitrator bias, and that was not harmless error. However, the Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the postjudgment motion to vacate the arbitration award without first conducting a hearing on the motion as to the issue whether the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under the termite-service contract. Furthermore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate in any respect the Scotts' ALAA claim because that claim did not survive the trial court's failure to reserve jurisdiction to hear the claim. View "Terminix International Company, L.P. v. Scott " on Justia Law

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company appealed an adverse judgment entered on a jury verdict in in favor of homeowner and policyholder Shawn Brechbill on his claim of "abnormal" bad-faith failure to investigate an insurance claim. "A bad-faith-refusal-to-investigate claim cannot survive where the trial court has expressly found as a matter of law that the insurer had a reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for refusing to pay the claim at the time the claim was denied. Because State Farm repeatedly reviewed and reevaluated its own investigative facts as well as those provided by Brechbill, it is not liable for a tortious failure to investigate." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Brechbill " on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to reverse Curtis Maurice Sanders's conviction for third-degree burglary. Sanders entered a guilty plea. As a matter of first impression, the issue in this case before the Court was whether an unoccupied house that was scheduled for demolition constituted a "building" as defined in 13A-7-1(2), Ala. Code 1975, for purposes of 13A-7-7(a), Ala. Code 1975. "If the legislature had intended to exclude an abandoned building awaiting demolition from the purview of the statute, it could have included express language to that effect in the statute. However, it did not do so, and this Court will not read such language into the statute." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanders v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling discovery of a post-accident investigation report related to an accident that occurred at the Birmingham facility of Schnitzer Southeast, LLC (a subsidiary). In 2008, Jason Jackson had part of his leg amputated as a result of a workplace accident that occurred at Schnitzer Southeast's metal-recycling facility in Birmingham. After the accident, Schnitzer Steel instigated a post-accident investigation. Josephine Cetta, who was a safety director at Schnitzer Steel at the time of Jackson's accident, conducted the investigation. Cetta testified in her deposition that in-house counsel at Schnitzer Steel reviewed and edited the report. She also testified that in-house counsel marked the report as privileged. Sometime after the accident but before Cetta's report was created, Jackson filed a worker's compensation claim with Schnitzer Southeast. In September 2010, Jackson and his wife, Latonya Jackson, filed a separate action against Schnitzer Steel and certain of its employees, seeking additional recovery for the injuries Jackson suffered. The trial court ordered Schnitzer Steel to produce, among other things, "reports of safety inspections." Here, the evidence before the Supreme Court indicated that, although anticipation of litigation may not have been the sole factor for preparing the report, it was "a significant factor" in the company's decision to have the report prepared. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion by ordering Schnitzer Steel to produce the report, which was prepared in reasonable anticipation of litigation. Therefore, the Court granted Schnitzer Steel's petition and issued the writ. View "Jackson v. Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Deidre W. Lee and Samuel G. McKerall appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Town of Magnolia Springs Mayor Charles Houser and Town Councilman Robert C. Holk. The Town of Magnolia Springs and the Magnolia Springs Planning Commission (the remaining defendants in the underlying action), appealed a judgment entered on a jury award to Lee and McKerall. In 2005, Lee purchased 47 acres of property in Baldwin County. In 2006, she submitted an application for preliminary subdivision-plat approval detailing a 124-lot residential subdivision to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The Town of Magnolia Springs incorporated in June 2006, six months before Lee submitted her plat application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The first mayor and council for the Town of Magnolia Springs were sworn in 13 days before Lee submitted her application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. When Lee submitted her application, the Town of Magnolia Springs had no jurisdiction over Lee's property, and only the Baldwin County Planning Commission had the authority to consider Lee's application because her property was outside the town limits. The Baldwin County Planning Commission tabled Lee's application. The Town of Magnolia Springs' mayor informed the Baldwin County Planning Commission that the jurisdiction of Magnolia Springs would extend to include Lee's property and that Magnolia Springs intended to pass a moratorium on subdivision approvals because "a couple of [the town's] council members ... have been involved in ... trying to get [Lee's plat application] delayed." He also acknowledged that Magnolia Springs had "no rules and regulations" regarding applications for preliminary subdivision-plat approvals. Lee sued when the plan was ultimately denied. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Lee against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission, as well as the summary judgment in favor of Houser and Holk, and pretermitted any remaining issues. The Court held that McKerall's claims against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission were barred by his failure to timely file a notice of claim, and reversed the judgment in his favor. View "Lee v. Houser" on Justia Law

The Alabama Educational Television Commission and Ferris W. Stephens, Rodney D. Herring, Les Barnett, J. Holland, Dannetta K. Thornton Owens, Bebe Williams, and Gregory O. Griffin, Sr. (collectively, "the Commissioners"), petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss claims brought against them by Allan Pizzato and Pauline Howland and to strike Pizzato and Howland's second amended complaint. In 2012, Pizzato requested certain materials from the Commission pursuant to the Open Records Act. Pizzato sued the Commission and the Commissioners alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Pizzato also requested a judgment declaring that Stephens improperly held the office of assistant attorney general while he was serving as a commissioner. The Commissioners moved the circuit court to dismiss Pizzato's claims against them, arguing that Pizzato did not have standing to bring an Open Meetings Act claim, that the Open Meetings Act did not provide for the recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, and that the complaint failed to state a claim. Furthermore, the Commissioners argued that Pizzato's Open Records Act claim was moot because the requested documents had been produced. Because Pizzato and Howland did not establish standing to bring their action against the Commission and the Commissioners under the Open Meetings Act, the claims asserted in both the first amended and second amended complaints should have been dismissed. The Court therefore granted mandamus relief and issued the writ. View "Pizzato v. Alabama Educational Television Commission" on Justia Law

F.V.O., respondent in a dependency action, appealed a trial court's orders after a dispositional review hearing in a dependency case. A majority of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the orders; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Both arguments presented by the motherÐ-regarding the finding by the trial court as to the efforts made by DHR to reunite the mother and the children and the announcement of a new permanency plan--failed to adjudicate any rights of the mother from which an appeal would lie. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to dismiss the mother's appeal and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "F.V.O. v. Coffee County Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Foundation Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to vacate its order staying the Bank's attempted redemption in the probate court of certain property. The property at issue consisted of two parcels of contiguous property located in Autauga County, which included equipment for outdoor entertainment opportunities for the community. Emerald Falls, LLC, and its only member, Alice L. Smith owned the property originally. In 2010, Rob Riddle purchased the property at a tax sale as a result of Emerald Falls' failure to pay the ad valorem taxes on the property. Riddle assigned his interest in the property to CMC Properties, LLC. Riddle then sent notice to Working Capital No. 1, LLC, the mortgagee of the property, advising Working Capital that he had purchased the property. Riddle then filed a complaint against Emerald Falls alleging that Emerald Falls had abandoned the property and that Riddle was entitled to immediate possession. The circuit court entered a consent order, in which Emerald Falls and Riddle acknowledged that Riddle had purchased the property subject to the redemption rights of Emerald Falls, that Riddle had made improvements to the property, and that Riddle was entitled to be reimbursed for those improvements. Riddle sent written notification to the Bank, after discovering that Working Capital had assigned its mortgage on the property to the Bank as additional security for a line of credit held by the Bank. The Bank sent CMC written notice of its intent to redeem the property. CMC moved to stay the redemption, arguing that a resolution had not been reached between the parties with regard to the amount necessary to redeem the property. When the Bank attempted to redeem the property by depositing with the probate court the amount it believe to be owing, but the probate court denied the redemption. Finding that the Bank was within its right to redeem the property, the Supreme Court granted the Bank's petition and issued the writ. View "CMC Properties, LLC v. Emerald Falls, LLC" on Justia Law

George Mason petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment for him on the basis of State-agent immunity in an action filed against him by Kola Oyedepo, individually and as grandfather and next friend of Joshua Dosunmu. George Mason was a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education. Joshua Dosunmu, a fifth-grade student in the Macon County school system, was a passenger on the school bus Mason was driving. After the bus had continued on its route, Dosunmu attempted to cross the highway. He was struck and injured by an automobile, driven by Janie Pearson Sellers. Oyedepo sued Mason and others alleging negligence and wantonness arising from Mason's alleged failure to properly supervise Dosunmu and/or his alleged failure to ensure that Dosunmu got off the bus at the appropriate school-bus stop. Mason moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to State-agent immunity because as a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education at the time of the accident, he was exercising judgment in transporting and supervising students on the day of the incident. The Supreme Court concluded that Mason demonstrated that he was entitled to State-agent immunity as to the claims asserted against him in his individual capacity in Oyedepo's action. Therefore the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Oyedepo v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. Defendants sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. Pettway sued the defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. In a second complaint, Pettway alleged that because defendants constituted a majority of the conference committee, the private meeting at which HB 84 was revised was a de facto meeting of the conference committee. Therefore, alleged Pettway, that meeting was an "unannounced executive session" and violated both the Open Meetings Act and Rule 21. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to quash service. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion but issued a stay of the proceedings and certified the matter for the Supreme Court's review. Defendants responded with a petition for permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. Civ. P., or in the alternative, a writ of mandamus. After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus to order the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's second complaint on related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the scope of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involved nonjusticiable claims. View "Pettway v. Marsh et al." on Justia Law