Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Bessemer and Bessemer City Councillors Jimmy Stephens, Dorothy Davidson, Sarah W. Belcher, and Albert Soles sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former City Councillor Louise Alexander and the law firm of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C. ("WAD"). The City councillors also sought to have a racial-discrimination claim dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2006 and 2007 Alexander received three donations from a Tuscaloosa real-estate developer, which were properly used for charitable projects in her district. In this same period (according to the complaint), Davidson and Belcher, received similar donations from the same individual for charitable projects in their respective districts. According to the complaint, beginning in the early spring of 2007, plaintiff Alexander opposed several projects the donor had proposed to the City and, the donor "vowed to retaliate." The complaint alleged that because of the donor's complaint to the Attorney General, a five-count indictment against Alexander was filed in August 2008 alleging violations of the Alabama Ethics Law. The complaint asserted that similar charges were not brought against Davidson and Belcher. WAD represented Alexander during her criminal proceedings. Alexander was ultimately acquitted. Alexander and WAD alleged that the City had a "policy and practice" of paying legal fees for city officials charged with crimes relating to their official duties if and when they were found not guilty. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief as it related to the bad-faith claim against the City. The Court denied the petition with regard to plaintiffs' claim against the City councillors regarding the racial discrimination claim: the councilors did not demonstrate entitlement to legislative immunity, and whether they were entitled to qualified immunity was a question requiring further consideration of facts outside of the pleadings. View "Alexander v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC"), the defendant in an action pending at the Lamar Circuit Court filed by the City of Vernon on behalf of itself and other similarly situated entities, appealed the court's order that certified a class in that action. Vernon stated that it had reached an agreement with AMIC regarding individual claims and therefore no longer wished to pursue them. AMIC filed a response to Vernon's motion in which it argued that the Supreme Court should remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss it because now the case was missing its named representative, and therefore the requirements for a class action could not be met. Vernon argued it had the right to withdraw from the pending litigation, but because the trial court certified the class, the litigation remains viable. Vernon requested time in which to allow the class to name a new representative. The Supreme Court agreed with Vernon that the trial court should have the opportunity to determine whether a new named plaintiff should be certified. "The trial court is the proper entity to decide whether to allow the class members to amend their complaint to substitute a new named plaintiff and to determine whether that plaintiff meets the adequacy requirements in Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., so as to represent the class." As such, AMIC's appeal was dismissed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Vernon et al. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pavilion Development, L.L.C., sought to redeem certain foreclosed real property. In this appeal, it challenged the trial court's judgment assessing the "lawful charges" due the various parties holding a legal interest in the property. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and thus proper for immediate appeal. As such, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. View "Pavilion Development, L.L.C. v. JBJ Partnership et al. " on Justia Law

George Patrick Stacey and Innovative Treasury Systems, Inc. ("I.T.S."), sued Anthony Lee Peed for breach of contract, account stated, and money lent. Peed denied he was indebted to Stacey and I.T.S., moved for dismissal and asserted various affirmative defenses. The trial court granted Peed's motion. Stacey and I.T.S. moved to alter, amend, or vacate that judgment, which was ultimately denied by operation of law. Stacey and I.T.S. then appealed the circuit court's judgment, arguing the circuit court received substantial evidence of the formation of a contract and of "open account [stated]" and because Peed had failed to present a counterargument regarding their claim for money lent. After careful review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed summary judgment with respect to Stacey and I.T.S.'s claim for open account stated and reversed as to Stacey and I.T.S.'s claims of breach of contract and money due on an open account and as to the determination that the money was a gift. View "Stacey v. Peed " on Justia Law

Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc. petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to grant its Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Richard Kimbrough alleged that a deer ran across the road causing a truck traveling in the opposite direction to swerve into the Kimbrough's lane. According to Kimbrough, the truck struck his vehicle and ran him off the road and into a creek bed. The driver of the truck allegedly fled. Kimbrough broke his right femur, right hand, and nose. Kimbrough sued Safeway, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith, alleging that Safeway, without justification, had intentionally refused to pay Kimbrough's claim. Safeway moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claim for uninsured-motorist benefits was not ripe for adjudication until liability and damages were established. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as Safeway's subsequent motion to reconsider. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded Safeway did not clearly demonstrate this case was not ripe or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Safeway did not have a clear legal right to mandamus relief. View "Kimbrough v. Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

Carolyn Christopher petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the a Court of Appeals judgment that affirmed an order requiring her to pay postminority educational support on behalf of her child, C.C. In "Ex parte Bayliss," (550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989)), the Court interpreted 30-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, as authorizing a trial court to require a noncustodial parent to pay college expenses for children past the age of majority. The Court granted Carolyn's petition to consider whether Bayliss was correctly decided, and reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded the Bayliss Court failed to recognize the ordinary and common-law definitions of "child" as a minor, did not defer to the legislature's designation of the age of majority, and failed to observe the canon of construction that courts cannot supply what a statute omits. Accordingly, the Court expressly overruled Bayliss. Because the child-custody statute did not authorize a court in a divorce action to require a noncustodial parent to pay educational support for children over the age of 19, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals n this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Christopher v. Christopher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it affirmed Derek Baker's conviction for trafficking in marijuana. Baker was entitled to production of the seized substance in his case for the purpose of having it independently tested. The denial of the motion for production resulted in prejudice to Baker and violated his right to due process. Additionally, because the record did not indicate that Baker ever requested funds for an expert to conduct the independent testing, he was not required to demonstrate that there was a particularized need for such testing. Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied Baker's motions seeking independent testing and evaluation of the substance purported to be marijuana. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Baker v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Sandra Chavers sued the City of Mobile seeking damages based on claims of negligent maintenance, continuing trespass, continuing nuisance, and inverse condemnation, all related to that part of the City's storm water-drainage system that abutted her property. After the Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the City, Chavers appealed. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Chavers repeatedly notified the City of damage to her property, and an inspector came to her home after she complained. After that visit, the inspector recommended that repairs be made to certain aspects of the City's drainage system, including an open concrete-lined ditch. The record indicated that those repairs were not made until well after Chavers had filed a notice of claim and had sued the City. The Court concluded the evidence in the Circuit Court record was sufficient to withstand a motion for a summary judgment based on the City's allegation that there was no evidence to support a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the inverse-condemnation claim and as to the negligent-maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages based on the cracking and uneven settling of her house. The Court reversed the summary judgment as to the negligent- maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages for sinkholes allegedly caused by the City's negligent maintenance of the open concrete-lined ditch. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Chavers v. City of Mobile " on Justia Law

Tammie Boyles, as mother and next friend of Colton Elijah Powell Boyles ("Eli"), filed a lawsuit on behalf of her son for injuries he allegedly sustained from an arterial stick while he was hospitalized at University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital. Eli's treating physician ordered a blood culture, which was taken by registered nurse Denise Dougherty from Eli's right arm. Later that day, Eli's mother, who is also a nurse, noticed that Eli's fingertips on his right hand were blue or "dusky." Dougherty applied a warm compress to Eli's right hand. The discoloration in Eli's fingertips moved upward from his right hand toward his shoulder. Later Eli was transferred to Children's Hospital of Alabama for treatment of a bowel perforation. While at Children's Hospital, the fingertips of Eli's right hand auto-amputated or fell off. Boyles then filed suit against the nurse. Dougherty filed an answer denying that she was guilty of negligence and denying that there was a causal relationship between her and the injury alleged in the complaint. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Dougherty. The trial court concluded that a summary judgment in favor of Dougherty was proper because "[Boyles] lacked an expert capable of testifying as to causation [and] there has been no evidence presented to the [trial court] that [Eli]'s injuries were probably a result of a breach of the standard of care by Dougherty." Boyles appealed. Upon careful review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient to warrant the child's injuries occurred as alleged. Therefore, the Court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of Dougherty, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Boyles v. Dougherty" on Justia Law

John and Judith Valloze and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company; State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company; Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation; Freightliner, Allison Transmission, Inc. ("Allison Transmission"); and Cummins Atlantic, LLC, separately petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Franklin Circuit Court to dismiss the declaratory-judgment actions filed against them by Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. Tiffin manufactured and sold custom-made motor homes. In its complaint in the Valloze action, Tiffin alleged that the Vallozes, who reside in Florida, purchased a Tiffin "Allegro Red" motor home that was manufactured by Tiffin in Red Bay, Florida. In 2011, the Vallozes' motor home caught fire somewhere in South Carolina and was declared a total loss. Nationwide insured the motor home, and it paid the Vallozes for their loss. Tiffin subsequently filed a complaint against the Vallozes, Nationwide, Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins in Alabama, describing Allison Transmission and Cummins as manufacturers of component parts for Tiffin that Tiffin alleged were the source of the fire. The Vallozes, Nationwide, Allison Transmission, Freightliner and Cummins filed motions to dismiss which were ultimately denied. The trial court did not provide reasons for its rulings. All parties appealed. In the Katnich action, Tiffin alleged that Karen Katnich purchased a Tiffin "Phaeton" motor home in Virginia, and somewhere in North Carolina, the motor home caught fire and suffered a total loss. Tiffin sued State Farm, Custom Automated Services, Inc., Waterway, Inc., Maxzone Auto Parts Corporation and Freightliner, alleging each manufactured parts for Tiffin that were the source of the fire. In both cases, Tiffin asserted that a real, present justiciable controversy existed between the parties as to the cause and origins of the motor home fires. Again the trial court denied motions to dismiss, and provided no reasons for its ruling. After its review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded with the conclusion of the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions that declaratory-judgment actions were not intended to be a vehicle for potential tort defendants to obtain a declaration of nonliability. Because a bona fide justiciable controversy did not exist either action, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the petitioners' motions to dismiss Tiffin's complaints. View "Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. v. Valloze " on Justia Law