Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

EB Investments, LLC and Pavilion Development, LLC filed separate appeals to challenge an a court order that held Pavilion was entitled to redeem certain property in Madison County in which EB Investments, and multiple other parties, held legal interests. In 1997, Pavilion sought to redeem nineteen acres of land purchased by JBJ Partnership at a foreclosure sale. The land was purchased from a development project that went bankrupt. In 1995, the bankruptcy trustee supervised a settlement agreement through which the developer would make payments on the development to its creditors. When the developer defaulted on the settlement agreement, the property was foreclosed and sold. Over the following months and years, a host of counterclaims, cross-claims, and separate lawsuits were filed by various parties who had interests in the property. At issue in this particular case was which party is entitled to redeem the disputed property. The trial court determined that Pavilion was entitled to redeem the property. In its order, the court specified how Pavilion should perfect its redemption. If Pavilion failed to pay all sums required by the court's order, it would waive its right to redeem the property. The court denied the remaining post-judgment motions and certified its judgment as final. EB Investments and Pavilion both appealed that judgment. Though they took opposing sides on most issues in the case, both EB Investments and Pavilions challenged whether the trial court's order was indeed final. They argued that the judgment did not address all other pending issues before the court. JBJ and other parties responded and essentially asked the Court to end this long-running dispute. Upon careful review of the sixteen-year history of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's attempt to end it was ultimately insufficient. The Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion by certifying its judgment as final. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EB Investments, L.L.C. v. Pavilion Development, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Brady Farr appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Respondents The Gulf Agency, Orange Beach Insurance Agency and Lexington Insurance Company. Mr. Farr finished renovating his house in 2003. In 2004, he decided to sell his property to a developer who wished to turn the property into condominiums. In anticipation of the sale, Mr. Farr obtained a $1 million loan, secured by a mortgage. As part of the loan process, the mortgage company ordered an appraisal of the property. The property was appraised at $1.3 million and the improvements were valued at $313,000. In 2004, Mr. Farr contacted Orange Beach to insure the property against "total loss." Lexington, acting as Orange Beach's agent, submitted an insurance application for policy limits based on the appraisal to The Gulf Agency, who ultimately served as underwriter for the policy. In the fall of 2004, Mr. Farr was concerned that the policy limits were not sufficient to adequately cover a total loss of the property. In September, Mr. Farr's concerns were realized when Hurricane Ivan destroyed the property. He filed a claim with Orange Beach. In November, Mr. Farr sold his property for $1.18 million. The sales agreement was amended to reflect the total loss he suffered as a result of the hurricane. Lexington's adjuster visited the property to determine the cause of Mr. Farr's loss. The adjuster found the hurricane was the "proximate cause". Lexington subsequently paid Mr. Farr $50,000 for the damage. Alleging that the policy did not provide adequate coverage and that Lexington failed to pay the proper benefits under the policy, Mr. Farr sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The trial court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment, finding that some of Mr. Farr's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment pertaining to Mr. Farr's tort claims. The Court found that those claims were indeed barred by a statute of limitations. The Court however found that the breach of contract and bad faith claims should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Farr v. Gulf Agency" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant James Knight was convicted on theft and burglary charges. He was sentenced under the state Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) to life in prison for theft and to fifteen years for burglary, both sentences served concurrently. In 2000, the legislature amended the HFOA to make certain sentences less severe. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of his life sentence under the new HFOA. The judge who sentenced Defendant had since left office. Another judge was assigned pursuant to a standing administrative order that was entered in 2007. Without requiring an answer from the State, the court summarily dismissed Defendant’s motion. Defendant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending, among other things, that the judge was not the "sentencing judge" and that the administrative order did not appoint the judge to decide his motion as required by law. The appellate court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the administrative order gave the judge who decided Defendant’s reconsideration motion authority over his case. Upon review of the administrative order, the Court found that the order does not select the judge for any given case. The order provided that motions for reconsideration would be assigned to the judge holding the sentencing judge’s seat. The circuit clerk did not assign a judge to hear Defendant’s motion. Therefore, the judge that dismissed Defendant’s motion acted without authority. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further consideration. View "In re: Knight v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Virginia McClung appealed a circuit court judgment that reformed a deed that conveyed an interest in land to her and her brother. In 1979 Ms. McClung’s parents divorced. Their separation agreement conveyed two parcels of property to their adult children, Ms. McClung and Charles Green, as "tenants in common, reserving unto [the parents] a life estate therein." At that time, none of the parties recognized a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the actual deed, which conveyed the property to the siblings as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deed was recorded, the parents divorced, and the divorce decree "ratified and confirmed" the separation agreement. In 1992, Charles Green died. His sole heir was his 21-year-old daughter, Bridget Williams. Loretta Green, Ms. McClung’s mother died in 2007 leaving Ms. McClung as her sole heir. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Senior Green and his daughter over who was entitled to the rental income Loretta had previously received from the property. The father sued his daughter seeking all rents received from the property. In his suit, Mr. Green argued that he and his ex-wife intended that his children take the property as tenants-in-common after his and Loretta’s life estates expired. But owing to a mutual mistake, the deed had erroneously conveyed the property as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Mr. Green’s granddaughter joined in the lawsuit because she inherited her father’s interest in the property if the court reformed the deed. A month after he commenced his suit, Mr. Green died. The trial court ruled in his (and his granddaughter’s) favor, and Ms. McClung appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record, the court found that before the 1979 deed could be reformed, there must be evidence to indicate that Loretta Green did not intend to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Neither the separation agreement nor the recorded deed accurately reflected Loretta’s intent at the time either document was executed. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court’s reformation of the 1979 deed was inappropriate. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McClung v. Green" on Justia Law

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) appealed a trial court’s order that denied its "renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law" in its case against J-Mar Machine & Pump. J-Mar is a repair shop that held a commercial liability and property insurance policy with Nationwide. In 2004, in anticipation of its policy renewal, Nationwide sent an inspector to the shop. In his report, the inspector noted several safety hazards and a messy shop. The insurance policy was renewed in March but several months later Nationwide cancelled the policy. Nationwide cited the inspector’s report as reason for the cancellation. J-Mar management was not aware of the cancellation until late that year when shop property was stolen. When it tried to file a claim, Nationwide declined J-Mar’s claim. A jury trial was held on the disputed policy cancellation and coverage. At the close of J-Mar’s case, Nationwide moved the court for a "judgment as a matter of law" which was denied. Nationwide unsuccessfully motioned again at the close of all evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence J-Mar presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury verdict in its favor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment denying Nationwide’s motion and rendered a judgment in Nationwide’s favor. View "Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. J-Mar Machine & Pump, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Willard Ryals appealed a trial court's order enforcing a creditor's judgment against him in favor of Respondent Lathan Company, Inc. (Lathan). In 2004, Lathan sued Ryals Construction Company for breach of a construction sub-contract. The contract called for Ryals to obtain workers' compensation insurance for the project. Lathan claimed it made an advance payment for the insurance. When Ryals failed to get the insurance, Lathan sued. No one appeared on behalf of Ryals on the trial date. A default judgment was entered on behalf of Lathan. Two years later, Lathan tried to collect on its default judgment by serving a post-judgment discovery request on Ryals Construction. The request went unanswered. Lathan filed a motion for sanctions, naming "Ryals Real Estate," Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction Company. Through counsel, Willard Ryals moved to strike the motion for sanctions which the trial court granted. Lathan then amended its complaint to substitute Willard Ryals with fictitious parties. Rather than re-allege the allegations of its first complaint, Lathan sought to hold Ryals Real Estate and Willard Ryals liable as alter egos for the judgment it held against Ryals Construction Company. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that Lathan's amended complaint did not technically substitute Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate for fictitiously named parties in the original complaint; it added them and asserted a new cause of action. The court found that Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction were liable for the creditor judgment. Willard Ryals appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lathan's amended complaint. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as void: "The trial court's attempt to treat Lathan's amended complaint as a new action was in words only and was not sufficient to commence a new action." Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter its judgment against Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate. View "Ryals v. Lathan Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Monica Ware appealed a summary judgment in favor of Respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, the trustee for HSI Asset Securitization Corporation. The Bank foreclosed on Petitioner and published notice of the foreclosure in a local Birmingham newspaper. The court entered summary judgment against her. Petitioner then filed a motion to amend or vacate the judgment and requested a hearing. The trial court refused to rule on Petitioner’s motion or hold a hearing. The motion was deemed denied by operation of law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner challenged the timing and propriety of the summary judgment and its refusal to rule on her motion to amend or vacate. In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the Supreme Court "searched [Petitioner’s] briefs in vain for the argument that she actually made in the trial court, namely, that the foreclosure was "null and void. . . .[A] remand . . . would serve no purpose other than to afford her a 'second bite at the apple.'" The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.