Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

C.E. (Mother) appealed the reversal of a Juvenile Court judgment originally in her favor. This case arose from T.C.'s (Father) proposal to relocate the parties' two minor children to New York State. In 2006, the Juvenile Court awarded T.C. primary physical custody of the children and awarded C.E. visitation. Both parties were awarded joint legal custody. In November 2008, T.C. sent C.E. a certified letter to notify her of his plan to relocate to New York with the children. The notice was in "substantial compliance" with the Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act. One month later, C.E. sent the father notice that she objected to the relocation. Furthermore, C.E. petitioned the court for an order to prohibit the relocation. The father filed a motion to dismiss as untimely filed. The court denied the father's motion, which he appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The appellate court concluded that C.E. had waived her right to file an action to oppose the relocation because her petition in Juvenile Court was not timely filed and reversed. A few days after the appeals court issued its judgment, C.E. filed an action in juvenile court to modify custody. T.C. moved to dismiss, and the court entered a "status quo" order. T.C. then petitioned for a writ of mandamus with the appellate court, arguing the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the modification action. The appellate court ultimately granted T.C.'s petition for mandamus, and ordered the Juvenile Court to vacate its status quo order. C.E. then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both the Juvenile Court and Court of Civil Appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in addressing the merits of the issues raised by the parties. The Court found that the Juvenile Court's decision that C.E. sought to reinstate was void for lack of jurisdiction; the appellate court likewise lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed T.C.'s appeal. Ultimately, C.E.'s original objection to the relocation was indeed untimely filed. The appellate court should have dismissed the case, but proceeded on the merits despite this technical defect. The Supreme Court granted C.E.'s petition for certiorari in order to vacate the both appellate court's and juvenile court's decisions to dismiss the case in its entirety. View "T. C. v. C. E." on Justia Law

A.S. and C.S., adoptive parents of a minor child, appealed an appellate court's order that affirmed visitation to the child's paternal grandparents without an opinion. A.S. and C.S. argued to the Supreme Court that the no-opinion affirmation was in direct conflict with the Court's opinion in "Ex part E.R.G." (2010). Upon review, the Court reversed the lower court's no-opinion order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: A. S. and C. S." on Justia Law

Alabama Title Loans, Inc., Accurate Adjustments, LLC and Kevin Sanders all appealed a trial court order that denied their motions to compel arbitration filed against them by Plaintiff Kimberly White. In 2009, Ms. White borrowed money from Alabama Title Loans (ATL), securing the loan with an interest in her automobile. ATL required Ms. White to surrender the title to the automobile. The title-loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Ms. White subsequently paid off her loan and borrowed more money against her car several more times. In August 2009, Ms. White said she went to ATL ready to pay off her loan in full. In January 2010, ALT contracted with Accurate Adjustments to conduct a "self-help" repossession of Ms. White's automobile. The police were called, and Accurate and ATL were required to release the automobile when it could not produce the title they claimed gave them the right to repossess. Ms. White filed suit alleging multiple theories: assault and battery, negligence, wantonness, trespass, wrongful repossession and conversion. At trial, the court denied the title-loan parties' motion to compel arbitration without making any findings of fact. Based on the broad language of the arbitration clause in the title-loan agreements executed by Ms. White, the Supreme Court held that the trial court should have granted the title-loan parties' motions to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alabama Title Loans, Inc. v. White" on Justia Law

Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc. (Thomasville Feed) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox County Circuit court to transfer the action filed against it by Roy Saulsberry and Roy Saulsberry, Jr. (The Saulsberrys) to the Clarke Circuit Court. The Saulsberrys own and operate a cattle farm in Wilcox County. Thomasville Feed is located in Clarke County. In April 2010, the Saulsberrys sued Thomasville Feed in Wilcox County Circuit Court, alleging that fertilizer they purchased from Thomasville Feed was defective and that Thomasville Feed was liable for damages under Alabama tort law. Thomasville Feed moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Thomasville Feed only does business in Clarke County, and that Clarke County had jurisdiction over it. The trial court denied Thomasville Feed’s motion to dismiss. Thomasville Feed then filed a motion to transfer the case to Clarke County, which the trial court denied. Thomasville subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for extraordinary relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that venue was proper in Clarke County. The Court vacated the Wilcox County order that denied Thomasville Feed’s motion to transfer, and issued the writ of mandamus to direct the court to transfer the case to Clarke County. View "Saulsberry v. Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc." on Justia Law

A circuit court judge petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to quash a writ of mandamus it issued to the circuit court through an unpublished order. Kevin Byrd pled guilty to first-degree assault. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. That sentence was suspended, and Mr. Byrd was ordered to serve 180 days in “boot camp” followed by years on probation. The Mobile County District Attorney’s office began collecting unpaid restitution from Mr. Byrd. In 2007, the DA’s office requested a hearing for Mr. Byrd to show cause why he should not have been held in contempt for failing to pay restitution. The trial court held hearings in January and October 2008, and May and September 2010. In October 2010, Mr. Byrd petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to set aside all orders respecting restitution since December 2000, the date which Mr. Byrd said his probation expired. In February 2011, the court granted Mr. Byrd’s petition and issued the writ. In its unpublished decision, the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Byrd. Upon careful consideration of the trial court and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found that nothing in the state restitution act prevented the trial court from taking the action it took in this case. "The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding otherwise." Accordingly, the Court issued the writ of mandamus to quash its decision. View "Alabama v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Defendant Wakilii Brown was convicted on three counts of capital murder. The jury returned a death sentence. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admissibility of the testimony of a child witness and alleged that there was an error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the record did not support the conclusion that the child’s testimony should have been excluded. Furthermore, the Court did not commit plain error when instructing the jury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s conviction and Defendant’s sentence. View "Brown v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified a question to the State Supreme Court. The Court was asked whether the failure of an insured to give notice of a proposed settlement to an insurance company causes the insured to forfeit underinsured motorist coverage (UIM), regardless of the insured’s actual knowledge of that coverage, and regardless of prejudice to the insurance company if the insured has a copy of the policy that contains the coverage. In 2007, Delbert and Lou Ann Downey were stopped at an intersection on their motorcycle when a vehicle driven by Wyndell Thompson failed to stop and hit them. At the time of the accident, multiple insurance policies were in force. The Downeys had underinsured motorist coverage. The Downeys, in consideration of $10,000 and while represented by counsel (but without having notified Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company that they were doing so), executed a general release to discharge Mr. Thompson and his insurance company from all liability arising out of the accident. Subsequently, and with different counsel, the Downeys notified Travelers of the accident for the first time and that they were making a claim under their underinsured motorist policy. Travelers denied the claim and the Downeys sued. The Supreme Court found that the Downeys were at all relevant times in possession of the policy, and it clearly provided UIM coverage. However, the Downeys did not meet the threshold of showing any condition under which their lack of notice could be excused. "In other words, the Downeys have ‘forfeit[ed]’ UIM coverage." View "Downey v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

First Union National Bank of Florida (First Union) appealed a judgment in favor of the Lee County Commission (Commission) and Philip Summers. Mr. Summers executed a mortgage on property he owned within the County on which he built a summer home. The home was ultimately subject to a tax sale by the County. The trustee for Mid-State Trust IV sued the Commission and Mr. Summers in 2009 seeking the excess redemption proceeds from the tax sale of the Summers property. The trustee later filed a motion to substitute First Union as the real party in interest. The trial court eventually entered a judgment finding that Mr. Summers was entitled to the excess funds from the tax sale because he was the last "owner" as defined by state law against whom the taxes were assessed. Upon careful consideration of the trial court’s record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "First Union National Bank of Florida v. Lee County Commission" on Justia Law

The United States Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated approximately 1800 cases involving claims that sought damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to welding fumes. Several dozen of these cases are governed by Alabama law, and the MDL court identified three issues of law that may be determinative in those cases. The Supreme Court responded in summary: (1) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance is limited to recovering damages attributable to injuries occurring within the period of limitations; (2) a six-year statute of limitations applies to wantonness claims filed before the Court’s holding in "Ex parte Capstone" was released; and (3) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance has the burden to establish what damages (if any) are attributable to his injuries occurring within the applicable limitation period. View "Jerkins v. Lincoln Electric Company" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether sufficient evidence on the element of "serious bodily injury" for the purposes of a first-degree assault offense could be established by the testimony of a lay witness, or, as a matter of law, it could be presented only through medical testimony or the victim’s testimony. The appeals court held that a mother’s testimony concerning her child’s suffering "serious and protracted disfigurement" was not sufficient evidence of the serious-bodily-injury element of first-degree assault to present the question to the jury. Defendant Timothy Reck was intoxicated when he drove his vehicle into the vehicle of Donna Loving. Her sons were passengers in the vehicle. She explained that her son’s face sustained numerous little scars caused by shattered glass that nicked his face. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that "serious bodily injury" in the form of "serious and protracted disfigurement" could be established by the testimony of a lay witness. The Court reversed the appellate court’s holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reck v. Alabama" on Justia Law