Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jean W. Reed, Mary W. Haynes, and Susan W. Stockham ("the sisters") sued Regions Bank ("Regions"), Morgan Asset Management, Inc. ("MAM"), Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. ("Morgan Keegan"), and Regions Financial Corporation ("RFC"), alleging several claims related to the investment of assets belonging to two trusts set up for the benefit of Reed and Haynes. MAM, Morgan Keegan, and RFC unsuccessfully moved the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss the claims against them, arguing among other things, that the claims were derivative in nature and could be asserted only in compliance with Rule 23.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., with which the sisters did not comply. MAM, Morgan Keegan, and RFC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the sisters had not alleged an injury distinct from that suffered by the trusts' funds; the claims against MAM, Morgan Keegan, and RFC in their complaint were derivative and did not comply with Rule 23.1 for asserting such claims. The sisters therefore lacked standing to sue. The Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Reed v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law

Faye Gilmer sued Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. ("Crestview"), Garland Jones, Barry Taul, and Mary Caldwell, alleging claims related to services Crestview had provided with regard to the funeral of Mrs. Gilmer's husband. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all the claims against them. Mrs. Gilmer appealed, and the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the claims against Jones, (2) affirmed the negligent-supervision claim against Jones and Crestview, and (3) affirmed the negligent- or wanton-conduct claim against all the defendants. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the tort-of-outrage, suppression, and breach-of-contract claims against Crestview, Taul, and Caldwell. The case was then remanded the case for further proceedings. Taul and Caldwell were eventually dismissed from the action. The trial court granted Mrs. Gilmer's motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on the breach-of-contract claim. The suppression and tort-of-outrage claims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in Crestview's favor on the tort-of-outrage claim and in Gilmer's favor on the suppression claim. Crestview appealed the trial court's judgment as to the breach-of-contract and suppression claims, as well as the compensatory-damages and punitive-damages awards. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the breach-of-contract and suppression claims: "Crestview presented substantial evidence creating a question of fact requiring resolution by the jury as to the materiality of the alleged breach of the contract, the trial court erred in entering a JML in favor of Gilmer with regard to that claim." Moreover, the Court was unable to determine from the lump-sum award of compensatory damages what damages were assessed with regard to the suppression claim and the breach-of-contract claim, respectively: "[t]herefore, we must reverse the trial court's judgment as to both claims and remand the case for a new trial on the suppression and breach-of-contract claims." View "Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. v. Gilmer" on Justia Law

Defendant Melvin Gene Hodges petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted for the limited purpose of determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court's summary denial of Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief (alleging juror misconduct during the voir dire examination) conflicted with the Court's decision in "Ex parte Burgess." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it did: "The rule of 'Burgess' is that a petitioner seeking relief under Rule 32 for the alleged failure of jurors to respond accurately or truthfully to voir dire questioning is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim, unless it appears on the face of the record that he knew or reasonably should have known of the inaccuracy in time to raise it on appeal." When the State sought a summary dismissal of the claim, Defendant replied that his counsel could not have known about the alleged juror misconduct in time to raise the issue at trial or on appeal. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hodges v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Defendants Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, L.P. (KKR), KKR Associates, KKR Partners II, and Crimson Associates, L.P., as well as several individuals, petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint because it lacked personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in this action were 46 individuals, partnerships, corporations, foundations, trusts and retirement and pension funds located throughout the country that invested in certain promissory notes issued as part of a leveraged recapitalization of Bruno's Inc., a supermarket-grocery business with its headquarters in Alabama. Plaintiffs contended that despite a negative due-diligence report from its forensic accountant, KKR decided to proceed with its acquisition of Bruno's. In order to achieve the recapitalization, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants made material, fraudulent misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs' investment money manger that induced them into purchasing the notes. Based on the torts allegedly committed by the individual defendants, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied Defendants' application for the writ of mandamus, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "27001 Partnership v. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P." on Justia Law

Defendant Alabama Power Company filed a petition for the writ of mandamus to ask the Supreme Court to direct the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff Capitol Container, Inc.'s claims against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Alabama Power argued the Alabama Public Service Commission (APSC) had exclusive jurisdiction over those claims Capitol filed, and Capitol failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its action. Upon review of the record below, the Supreme Court found that Capitol indeed failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit against the power company. The Court issued the writ. View "Capitol Container, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jerry Elliott sought workers' compensation benefits from his employer, International Paper Company, Inc. (IP). He petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to quash a Court of Civil Appeals' writ of mandamus directed to the Conecuh Circuit Court. Plaintiff lived in Conecuh County for over 15 years and for 21 years worked as a machine operator at the plywood-manufacturing plant owned by IP located in Butler County. In 2007, he allegedly sustained an injury to his shoulder while at work. He filed an action at the Conecuh Circuit Court seeking workers' compensation benefits. IP filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's action or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to Butler County. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss or to transfer. IP then filed a petition for the writ of mandamus at the Court of Civil Appeals to review the trial court's denial of its motion. The Court of Appeals granted the writ directing the Conecuh Court to transfer the case to Butler County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's decision was in error, and quashed the writ that was issued transferring venue to Butler County. View "Elliott v. International Paper Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address whether an indigent defendant, who has no right to initially choose a particular court-appointed attorney, had a right to continued representation by a particular court-appointed counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an indigent defendant had such a right. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ because the trial court, when it considered the State's motion, did not evaluate the evidence regarding the question of disqualification and did not weigh the constitutional rights at issue. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the record of Defendant Thomas Lane's case, the Supreme Court concluded "an indigent defendant is not entitled to legal counsel of his choice, when counsel is to be paid by public funds, but rather is entitled to competent legal representation." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lane v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Branson Machinery, LLC appealed a circuit court's decision that set aside a default judgment granted in its favor against Hilltop Tractor, LLC and Jeffrey Williams. According to Branson, Hilltop owed it money for equipment it had purchased. Because it had not received payment, Branson filed a breach-of-contract action against Hilltop and Mr. Williams. The Blount Circuit Court entered a default judgment in favor of Branson. Following the entry of the default judgment, Branson's counsel engaged Hilltop and Mr. Williams (acting without counsel) in settlement negotiations. The parties negotiated a "workout" agreement, and at some point, Hilltop became unable to meet the payment terms. Branson filed garnishment paperwork with the trial court seeking to enforce the original default judgment. Hilltop and Mr. Williams hired counsel and successfully moved the court to set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Hilltop and Mr. Williams' motion to set aside the default judgment. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case to reinstate the original default judgment. View "Branson Machinery, LLC v. Hilltop Tractor, LLC" on Justia Law

The Industrial Development Board of the City of Montgomery (IDB) appealed a circuit court's interlocutory order that denied its motion for summary judgment as to a breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by George and Thomas Russell as co-executors and co-trustees of the wills and testamentary trusts of Earnest and Myrtis Russell, Price and Mary McLemore and several others. In 2001, various officials of the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, the Montgomery County Commission, Montgomery Chamber of Commerce and the local water works board began making preparations to secure options to purchase property in the Montgomery area in an attempt to persuade Hyundai Motor Company to build an automobile plant in the area. All the trusts owned acres of land in the targeted area. The IDB signed separate options with the Russells, the McLemores and other trusts to purchase the respective properties. Hyundai's plans for its manufacturing plant changed, and subsequently, not all of the options were exercised. The Russells and the McLemores each filed breach-of-contract actions against the IDB and Hyundai alleging that neither adhered to the terms of their respective options. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the IDB's motion for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Indust. Develop. Bd. of the City of Montgomery v. Russell" on Justia Law

Two appeals between MPQ, Inc. (d/b/a Freedom Enterprises) and Birmingham Realty Company were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purposes of this opinion. The parties entered into a commercial lease agreement. Birmingham Realty filed suit against MPQ for unpaid rent in circuit court. MPQ filed a counterclaim. Birmingham Realty filed a separate unlawful-detainer action against MPQ in district court. The district court dismissed the detainer action, reasoning that the simultaneous actions in the district and circuit courts violated Alabama's abatement statute. Birmingham Realty appealed the district court's dismissal to the circuit court and filed a motion to dismiss MPQ's counterclaim. The circuit court conducted a hearing on all pending motions. It then entered an order affirming the district court's dismissal of the unlawful-detainer action and dismissed MPQ's counterclaims in the rent action. The court suggested that Birmingham Realty move to dismiss the rent action without prejudice so it could refile its unlawful-detainer action in the district court and then later refile an action in circuit court to seek the unpaid rent. Birmingham Realty took the court's advice and filed the suggested motions. MPQ filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the court's decision in its counterclaim. The circuit court did not rule on either motion. The parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Birmingham Realty's appeal from the district court to the circuit court was not timely, and as such, the court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal with regard to the unlawful-detainer action and remanded the remaining issues for further proceedings. View "MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co." on Justia Law