Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

American Suzuki Motor Corporation petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion to dismiss the claims filed against it by John Burns and Jill S. Hearn. Plaintiffs sued Defendants American Suzuki, several local dealerships and the dealerships' owner, alleging breach of contract based on Suzuki vehicle warranties, diminution in value of their vehicles, fraudulent misrepresentations, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs purported to bring the action on behalf of themselves and all members of a class composed of individuals who had purchased Suzuki vehicles from Defendants and had active warranties or service contracts on those vehicles. According to the complaint, new Suzuki vehicles carried a manufacturer's warranty, and that Defendants also sold purchasers of Suzuki vehicles extended warranties and maintenance agreements. In early March 2009, "the defendants closed dealerships … and [that] there are no other Suzuki dealerships closer than Nashville, Tennessee, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, or Birmingham, Alabama, to perform service work on the warranted vehicles." As a result of the dealerships being closed, Plaintiffs alleged they were "constructively barred from obtaining warranty work on their vehicles." The complaint did not allege that Plaintiffs needed or sought service under the warranties on their vehicles or that any of the Defendants refused to honor the warranties on vehicles. American Suzuki filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of American Suzuki's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting American Suzuki's motion. View "American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Burns" on Justia Law

Stenum Hospital, Sue Hart, James Rider, Malte Peterson, Dr. Jens Dannenberg, Dr. Karl Ritter-Lang, Dr. Heiner Beese, and Dr. Hans-Georg Zechel, third-party defendants in an action pending in the Madison Circuit Court (collectively "the hospital parties"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss the third-party complaint filed against them by Madison Square Associates, Ltd. (Madison Square), ERMC II, L.P., CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., and CBL & Associates Management, Inc. (collectively "the mall parties"), and to enter an order dismissing the third-party complaint. In 2007, Elizabeth Duncan slipped and fell on a wet tile floor at Madison Square Mall. According to her second amended complaint, Ms. Duncan sustained a fracture to her left patella and "aggravated and/or sustained injuries to her spine, including her neck and back." She became partially paralyzed after she underwent disk-replacement surgery at Stenum, which is located in Germany. Ms. Duncan and her husband, John, subsequently sued the mall parties. Ms. Duncan alleged claims of negligence and wantonness resulting in the injuries she suffered when she fell; her husband alleged a claim of loss of consortium. The hospital parties argued that the dispositive issue presented by their petition for the writ of mandamus was whether the mall parties had standing to assert the claims made in the third-party complaint. The hospital parties maintained that the mall parties do not have standing; therefore, the hospital parties argued, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the hospital parties' motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court concluded the mall parties lacked standing to assert the claims they asserted against the hospital parties in the third-party complaint. View "Duncan v. Madison Square Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Dallas County Sheriff Harris Huffman, Jr., and Deputy Sheriff Ernest Larry Donaldson petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss a complaint filed by Plaintiff Marie Jemison alleging multiple claims against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleged that on August 23, 2008, she was traveling in Selma while, at the same time, Deputy Donaldson "was operating a motor vehicle in the line and scope of his agency and/or employment with the Dallas County Sheriff's Department." According to Plaintiff, as she entered the intersection of Lauderdale Avenue and Dallas Avenue, she was struck by Deputy Donaldson's vehicle and, as a result, sustained serious personal injuries. Jemison sued Deputy Donaldson, Donaldson's supervisor Sheriff Huffman, the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, and the Dallas County Commission. Among other claims, Plaintiff alleged negligence and wantonness against Deputy Donaldson for the manner in which he operated his vehicle, negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Sheriff Huffman, and vicarious liability against the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and the Dallas County Commission. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims, asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, Deputy Donaldson was acting in the line and scope of his employment and was entitled to State immunity. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to dismiss all claims against Deputy Donaldson and Sheriff Huffman. View "Jemison v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. (the corporation), Robert S. Grant (RSG), and Pam E. Grant (PEG) (collectively referred to as "the Grants") appealed an order striking their jury demands in an action commenced by Frontier Bank (the bank) against the Grants and others alleging breach of contract, fraud, and the fraudulent conveyance of real estate. This case arose out of a loan from the bank to the corporation. The loan ultimately involved a number of related agreements, including a construction-loan agreement between the corporation and the bank and a series of "continuing guaranties," whereby RSG personally guaranteed repayment of the loan. The Supreme Court was unable to reach the merits of the Grants' contentions, and dismissed the appeal because, despite the invocation of Rule 54(b), the trial court's order was not final and appealable. View "Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. v. Frontier Bank " on Justia Law

Sammy Thomas and Pam Thomas appealed the Blount Circuit Court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Sloan Homes, LLC ("Sloan Homes"), David Sloan, and Teresa Sloan in the Thomases' action alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct in relation to the construction of a house by Sloan Homes, the grantor under the residential sales agreement. The question presented by this appeal was whether, under the doctrine of merger, the execution and delivery of the deed in this case nullified an arbitration clause included in the antecedent residential sales agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause was still valid, thereby affirming the circuit court's order granting Sloan Homes and the Sloans' motion to compel arbitration of the Thomases' claims. View "Thomas v. Sloan Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Cantrell Brown appealed the grant of the writ of mandamus by the Court of Civil Appeals to Arlington Properties, Inc. Arlington filed an unlawful detainer claim against Brown in district court in 2009. After a trial, the district court rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on July 21. The court advised Brown that she had until August 4 to appeal the judgment. The judgment was entered into the State Judicial Information System on July 27; Brown filed her appeal August 4. Arlington moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed, which the district court denied. At issue in this case before the Supreme Court was the delay between the court's judgment at trial and the official entry of the judgment, and whether Brown's appeal was indeed timely filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Brown's appeal was timely filed, and that the circuit court properly denied Arlington's motion to dismiss. View "Arlington Properties, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Don Drennen Motor Co., Inc. ("Drennen"), an automobile dealership, appealed a Jefferson Circuit Court order requiring it to pay the costs of arbitration stemming from an action filed by one of Drennen's former employees, William B. McClung. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's decision "is due to be reversed insofar as it orders Drennen to pay the entire costs of arbitration." The arbitration agreement provided that the parties must "share equally the costs, fees and expenses incurred by arbitration." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Don Drennen Motor Co.,Inc. v. William B. McClung" on Justia Law

April Mack, mother of "Baby Mack" appealed the grant of summary judgment in her action against Thomas Carmack and Matthew Taul for the wrongful death of her unborn child. In 2007, Mack and her fiancee Reginald Thomas (father of Baby Mack) needed to go to the grocery store, but were without transportation. Mack contacted Thomas Carmack and asked him to take her and Thomas to the grocery store. Carmack agreed to do so after Mack offered to pay for the trip. En route, Carmack's vehicle was struck by Taul's vehicle when Carmack "knowingly proceeded to turn left even though the traffic light was red . . . [in] violation of the law to do so." The force of the collision caused severe damage to Carmack's vehicle and injuries to Mack and Thomas. While hospitalized, Mack suffered a miscarriage. The trial court found that the state Wrongful Death Act did not allow for a cause of action for a nonviable fetus and entered summary judgment on behalf of Carmack. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding "it is an unfair and arbitrary endeavor to draw a line that allows recovery on behalf of a fetus injured before viability that dies after achieving viability but that prevents recovery on behalf of a fetus injured that, as a result of those injuries, does not survive to viability . . . We cannot conclude that 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the drawing of such a line; instead, 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the application of the Wrongful Death Act to circumstances where prenatal injuries have caused death to a fetus before the fetus has achieved the ability to live outside the womb." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mack v. Carmack" on Justia Law

Callan Associates petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Carol Perdue in her role as the legal guardian of Anna Perdue, who sued on behalf of the Wallace-Folsom Prepaid College Trust Fund. Ms. Perdue opened an account with the Trust Fund on behalf of her Daughter Anna. After making monthly payments, Anna would be entitled to reduced in-state tuition and fees. The Trust's assets pooled all such contributions and invested them so that designated beneficiaries would receive the promised benefits. The Trust hired Callan Associates as an investment consultant. The Trust's management notified beneficiaries that because of the stock market downturn of 2009, the Trust's assets were negatively impacted. Subsequently, Ms. Perdue sued on behalf of Anna and the Trust, contending that Callan and the Trustees mismanaged the Trust's assets. Callan moved to dismiss which the Circuit Court denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Callan argued that Ms. Perdue lacked standing to bring her claims. Furthermore, Callan argued that Ms. Perdue's claims were not ripe for adjudication since none of the beneficiaries have had tuition paid from the Trust. The Supreme Court concluded that "Callan's motion to dismiss in the trial court was well founded"; therefore the Court granted Callan's petition and issued the requested writ to direct the trial court to dismiss Ms. Perdue's claims. View "Perdue v. Callan Associates, Inc." on Justia Law