Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Amy Hamilton, individually and on behalf of her stillborn son, sued Dr. John Blakely Isbell, Dr. Steven Coulter, Dr. Warren Scott, and the Isbell Medical Group (IMG), as well as several fictitiously named defendants, claiming that their negligent and wanton acts had wrongfully caused the death of her son and also caused her to suffer emotional distress. The DeKalb Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that a wrongful-death action could not be maintained for the death of an unborn child who died before he was viable. The trial court also held that Hamilton was not in the "zone of danger" and, thus, could not recover damages for emotional distress. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found that in applying "Mack v. Carmack," ([Ms. 1091040, Sept. 9, 2011] _So. 3d_ (Ala. 2011)), the Court concluded that summary judgment, insofar as it held that damages for the wrongful death of a previable unborn child were not recoverable "must be reversed" for reconsideration of the defendants' summary-judgment motions. View "Hamilton v. Scott" on Justia Law

AltaPointe Health Systems, Inc. (AHS), appealed a Mobile Probate Court's order finding it in contempt of its "Order of Outpatient Commitment" for Donald Bernoudy based on AHS's failure to comply with 22-52-10.3(e), Ala. Code 1975. Bernoudy refused treatment and was appointed a guardian ad litem to appear for several status hearings before the probate court, but the sheriff was unable to find him. When it did, Bernoudy was taken into custody, where subsequently he was deemed a "real and present threat of substantial harm" to himself and the public. At a show cause hearing, the court found that Bernoudy was "a long time mental health consumer, who [was] well known to the Court and should [have been] well known to AHS" and that AHS failed on multiple occasions to comply with its orders with regard to Bernoudy's commitment orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while "[t]he probate court's frustration in this case [was] understandable. . . it [was] clear that the probate court did not find AHS in contempt because it had not complied with a specific provision of its . . . outpatient commitment order. Rather, the probate court found AHS in contempt because it had not complied with the reporting provisions set forth in 22-53-10.3(e). . . a violation of a statute is not a proper ground for a finding of contempt." Accordingly, the Court dismissed this appeal with instructions that the probate court set aside its order finding AHS in contempt. View "AltaPointe Health Systems, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs sued Frank S. Smith, Jr. in the Jefferson Circuit Court, stating a claim of ejectment and sought possession of Mr. Smith's house in Bessemer. The mortgage to Mr. Smith's home was assigned to the Secretary, and the Secretary had sold the house at a foreclosure sale in 2007. The auctioneer who sold the house executed an auctioneer's deed conveying the house to the Secretary. The Secretary demanded that Mr. Smith vacate the house, but Mr. Smith failed to leave. The trial court granted summary judgment, asserting as a matter of law he was entitled to possession of the house. Mr. Smith opposed the summary-judgment motion by filing a pleading titled 'Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.' In his response, Mr. Smith argued, among other things, that the Secretary had failed to establish that he was entitled to possession of the house because, Frank said, the affidavit filed with the Secretary's motion did not comply with Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. Mr. Smith appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals which reversed the summary judgment and remanded the action for further proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Smith should have moved to strike the offending affidavit in the Secretary's summary judgment motion in his response: "an objection to the inadmissible evidence alone is not sufficient." The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Smith, Jr. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

T.J. sought a writ of mandamus to order the Montgomery Juvenile Court to adjudicate T.J. as the presumed father of S.W. (the child) and to vacate the juvenile court's order authorizing genetic testing to establish the child's paternity. In 2009, T.J. filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking custody of the child. T.J. contended that in his custody petition he alleged that he was the biological father of the child and that the child had lived with him since the child was born. The mother filed a petition seeking custody of the child. According to the briefs filed with the Supreme Court, the mother named "J.H." as the father of the child. The mother filed a motion requesting genetic testing of T.J. and J.H. to establish paternity of the child. T.J. objected. That same day, T.J. filed a motion to reconsider and an affidavit of paternity with the juvenile court. The juvenile court found that, because T.J. was incarcerated at the time the child was conceived and the mother was five months' pregnant when T.J. was released from prison, it was "unlikely" that T.J. in good faith believed he was the biological father of the child. Based on this finding, the juvenile court concluded that T.J. could not be the child's presumed father and authorized the genetic testing. On December 29, 2010, T.J. filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil Appeals, asking that court to direct the juvenile court to adjudicate him, the presumed father of the child and to vacate the order authorizing genetic testing to determine the paternity of the child. The Court of Civil Appeals denied the petition on the ground that, because there was no record of the proceedings before the juvenile court, there was no way to know whether T.J. had presented sufficient evidence from which to determine that he had held the child out to the public as his natural child. Based on the briefs submitted to the Court, the evidence in that regard was disputed. Therefore, the Court could not conclude that there was sufficient evidence to hold that T.J. was the presumed father of the child. The Court remanded the case back to the juvenile court for further factfinding. View "In re: R.W. v. T.J." on Justia Law

The Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association (AIGA) sued the Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery, seeking, among other things, to recover money it had paid on behalf of the Board on a workers' compensation claim filed by one of the Board's employees. AIGA and the Board each moved for a summary judgment. The circuit court granted the Board's motion and entered a judgment limiting AIGA's recovery to the payments it had made on the workers' compensation claim during the two years immediately preceding the filing of the action and denying AIGA's request for attorney fees. AIGA appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that AIGA's claims were subject to a six-year statute of limitations and that, therefore, the circuit court had erred in limiting AIGA's recovery to payments made within two years of the filing of the action. The Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case for the circuit court to reassess the damages award and to consider further AIGA's claim for attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine, as a matter of first impression, which statute of limitations -- the two-year or the six-year -- applied to AIGA's claims. Upon review, the Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment. View "Alabama Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education (the Board), several of its members, and a teacher in the school system petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacated its order that denied their motion for summary judgment. Third-grade student "S.K." went to the restroom with two friends. Her teacher did not accompany them. S.K. claims that when she attempted to leave the restroom stall, the door jammed. She tried to climb over the door to get out of the stall but slipped and fell, cutting her face on a metal hanger on the back of the door. S.K. (by and through her mother Tetrina Capehart) sued the Board, its members individually and in their official capacities, and the teacher asserting negligence and wantonness claims, and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The Board and teacher argued that there were no genuine issues of fact, and that S.K. was contributorily negligent from "playing" in the restroom. The circuit court denied the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated that under the state constitution, it had absolute immunity from suit for claims asserted against it. The Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to rule in the Board's favor. View "In re: S.K." on Justia Law

Altaf Virani filed an action against 600, L.L.C. (the LLC), attempting to redeem real property the LLC purchased from the bank that had foreclosed on that property. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment establishing the amount Virani was required to pay to redeem the property. The LLC appealed, arguing that the amount the judgment required him to pay was incorrect. Because the trial court erred in setting the redemption price under 6-5-253(a), Ala. Code 1975, and in not including interest in the redemption price, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "600, LLC v. Virani " on Justia Law

Respondents James Casey, Sr. and his daughter Julie Toner sought a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss Petitioner Jo Ann Casey's (Julie's mother) petition to remove a guardianship and conservatorship proceeding from probate court to the circuit court. In 2008, Jo Ann filed for divorce. In her petition, Jo Ann alleged that James Sr. had committed domestic violence against her. According to James Sr. and Julie, the divorce proceeding was initiated as the result of undue influence exerted on Jo Ann by James Casey Jr. James Sr. moved to dismiss the divorce on the grounds that the then 74-year-old Jo Ann was mentally incompetent. The domestic-relations court held that James Sr.'s motion was moot, but the record never reflected why. Nevertheless, the court set the divorce for trial. James Sr. moved to have Jo Ann undergo an independent medical examination and for the court to appoint her a guardian ad litem. Jo Ann refused the examination, and moved the probate court to remove the guardianship proceeding to the circuit court. James Sr. and Julie argued on appeal that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to remove the guardianship proceeding when it entered the removal order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the probate court had not entered an order creating a guardianship or conservatorship for Jo Ann. "Logically, because no guardianship or conservatorship has been created for Jo Ann, there [was] no 'administration or conduct' of such guardianship or conservatorship to be removed from the probate court to the circuit court." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the removal petition and issued the writ. View "Casey v. Casey" on Justia Law

Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc. and GIBCO Construction petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer their case to another circuit court. In 2008, Rogers Whited was involved in a two-vehicle accident at a quarry located in Jefferson County. Both Whited and the driver of the other vehicle were employed by GIBCO, who, along with Wright Brothers, was engaged in a project at the quarry. In 2010 Whited filed a complaint against Wright Brothers, GIBCO, and Sharon Gilbert, the owner and president of GIBCO, in the Walker Circuit Court seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the accident. In May 2010 Wright Brothers moved to transfer the action to Jefferson County, stating that Whited alleged in his complaint that he was a resident of Blount County, that the accident occurred in Jefferson County, and that therefore Jefferson County, not Walker County, was the proper venue for Whited's action. In June, Whited filed his response in opposition to Wright Brothers' motion, stating that he was a resident of Walker County, not Blount County. Contemporaneously with that response in opposition, Whited also filed an amendment to his complaint stating that his statement that he was a resident of Blount County was a "clerical error." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the proper venue for this case was Jefferson County, and that the trial court had "an imperative duty to transfer the case and refused to do so." Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted Wright Brothers' petition and issued the writ. View "Whited v. Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

John McGee (Jack) appealed the grant of summary judgment and a judgment as a matter of law in favor of his brother Willis McGee individually and in his capacity as executor of their mother Elizabeth's estate. Wills appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees when his brother contested their mother's will. Shortly after Willis presented the will for probate, Jack filed suit to contest the will. He claimed it was not executed as required by law, Mrs. McGee lacked testamentary capacity, and that the will was the product of undue influence. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Willis on all counts of Jack's complaint except the undue-influence count, which was tried to a jury. However, at the close of Jack's case, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law (JML) in favor of Willis on that count, "with leave for [Willis] to prove reasonable costs and fees." Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed part, and reversed part of the trial court's decision. The Court found that Jack presented no credible evidence to support any ground upon which he challenged his mother's will. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court erred in refusing to award Willis fees and costs. The Court remanded the case with regard to an issue of whether Jack converted certain items from his mother's estate prior to her death, but in all other respects, affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "McGee v. McGee" on Justia Law