Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mary Ann Wilkinson was employed by the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama for several years, until the Board terminated her employment in December 2009. In July 2010, Wilkinson sued the Board, seeking compensation she alleged was due her pursuant to her employment contracts. The Board filed a motion to dismiss Wilkinsons complaint, in which it alleged that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Board, as a State agency, is immune from suit under Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, sec. 14; that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., because it failed to state a claim; and that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., for improper venue. In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Board argued this case presented an issue of first impression regarding whether the Board is a State agency that is entitled to section 14 immunity and whether the Board was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjustment. The Board argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it concluded that the Board was not a State agency entitled immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board was a State agency and therefore entitled to immunity pursuant to section 14, the courts of this State were without jurisdiction in this case, and the Board of Adjustment would have jurisdiction over Wilkinsons claims. For these reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it reversed the trial courts judgment dismissing Wilkinsons complaint against the Board and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted T.C.s writ of certiorari to review an issue of first impression: interpretation of 12-15-601, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the 2008 Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, which became effective January 1, 2009 (the 2008 AJJA). Specifically, the question was whether the 2008 AJJA provided for an appeal from an interlocutory order. On March 11, 2010, the juvenile court issued an order awarding the maternal grandparents pendente lite custody of the child and ordering the Department of Human Resources to complete home studies on both the parents and the maternal grandparents. The mother was allowed supervised visitation, and an attorney was appointed to represent her. The juvenile court entered another more detailed order continuing the award of pendente lite custody of the child to the maternal grandparents and awarding the mother and the father supervised visitation pending a hearing on dependency. An attorney was appointed to represent the father. The juvenile court entered another pendente lite order continuing custody of the child with the maternal grandparents and denying the fathers motion to modify that aspect of the order awarding supervised visitation. Subsequently, the trial court found the child dependent based on the fathers prescription drug abuse, and a suggestion that the mother had died. The father then appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that had the legislature intended to provide for appeals from an order finding a child dependent, it could have easily done so without the unintended consequences of allowing all nonfinal orders in juvenile cases to be appealable. Accordingly, the Court did not interpret the omission of the word final from 12-15-601 as indicating an intent on the part of the legislature to allow every interlocutory juvenile court order to be appealable. Therefore, when the legislature enacted the 2008 AJJA (revising, reorganizing, and repealing parts of the former AJJA) it may not have referred to the right to appeal from a final judgment or order, but merely referred to the right to appeal a judgment or order. That language choice, however, does not reflect the legislatures intent to make all orders in juvenile proceedings appealable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the fathers appeal as being a nonfinal judgment. View "In re: T.C." on Justia Law

Marcus Lydell Walker, an employee of the Macon County Sheriffs Department, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter an order holding him immune from suit based on Art. I, sec. 14, Ala. Const. 1901. He further asked the Court to direct the Macon Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against him by Miguel Harris. While acting within the scope of his duty for the Sherriffs Department, Walker and Harris were in a vehicle accident in which Harris was injured. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Walker demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief he sought. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the claims asserted against Walker. View "Harris v. Walker" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a workplace accident in which Lee Calhoun, Jr., Plaintiff Lula Calhoun's husband, was fatally injured. Mrs. Calhoun filed a complaint against her husband's employer seeking worker's compensation death benefits. The circuit court eventually entered an order awarding Mrs. Calhoun 375 weeks in death benefits. The order also released one party, Linden, Inc., from further liability. The court did not certify this order as final. In the meantime, litigation involving a host of other parties proceeded. The parties exchanged correspondence regarding settlement of Mrs. Calhoun's claims. While the back-and-forth continued on settlement, Mrs. Calhoun filed suit against three parties, including Linden, alleging the torts of outrage, fraud and conspiracy. In this suit, she alleged that while attempting to negotiate settlement with Linden, a dispute arose over the terms of Linden's waiver, ending with Linden halting the workers' compensation death benefit payments. Linden and its two co-defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Mrs. Calhoun's last suit. The case was tried solely on outrage, ending with a jury awarding Mrs. Calhoun over $3.6 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Attenta, Inc., one of Linden's co-defendants, appealed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Attenta argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the outrage claim, contending that the controlling issue was at the center of the dispute in the wrongful death action. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, vacated the circuit court's judgment, and dismissed the case and appeal. View "Attenta, Inc. v. Calhoun " on Justia Law

Dr. Zenko J. Hrynkiw and Zenko J. Hrynkiw, M.D., P.C., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Thomas and Barbara Trammell in their medical-malpractice action. In 2005, Dr. Hrynkiw, a neurosurgeon, performed fusion surgery on Thomas's spine to relieve pain in his lower back and pain and numbness in his right leg and foot caused by a herniated disk that was creating pressure on a nerve. Immediately following the surgery, Thomas experienced weakness, numbness, and pain in his lower extremities. A second surgery provided Thomas no relief, and he was permanently partially disabled. In 2007, Thomas and his wife Barbara sued Dr. Hrynkiw, alleging negligent diagnosis, treatment and postoperative care. Barbara asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Dr. Hrynkiw raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not granting Hrynkiw's judgment as a matter of law on the Trammells' claim relating to Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care because the Trammells failed to present substantial evidence that any of Thomas's injuries were probably caused by Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony under the learned-treatise exception when, Hrynkiw says, the foundational requirements of Rule 803(18), Ala. R. Evid., were not met. Finding sufficient evidence to support the judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Hrynkiw v. Trammell" on Justia Law

Pamela Ruttenberg, Harold Ruttenberg's widow, and two of the Ruttenberg's three children, Warren Ruttenberg and Jodi Ruttenberg Benck appealed a final judgment of the probate court that granted the petition of Karl B. Friedman and Daniel H. Markstein III, the coexecutors of Harold's estate, for final settlement of the estate. Ruttenberg's third child, Don-Allen Ruttenberg, who had worked with his father in the family business, Just For Feet, Inc., and who was involved in civil litigation and criminal prosecution surrounding Just For Feet, did not object to the coexecutors' administration and settlement of his father's estate. Upon review of the record of the nine-day trial and the considerable documentary evidence, the Supreme Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the probate court's decision. The Court concluded that the probate court did not exceed its discretion. Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the probate court was affirmed. View "Ruttenberg v. Friedman" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, appointed the Trust Company of Virginia (TCVA) as conservator of property owned by Amy Falcon Morris when that court declared Ms. Morris to be incapacitated in 2008. Ms. Morris died in 2011 in Alabama, and her will was admitted to probate in the Montgomery County Probate Court. The probate court entered orders compelling TCVA to turn over funds in the conservancy estate to the estate opened in the probate court and enjoining TCVA from expending funds without prior approval. TCVA moved to vacate those orders, and the probate court denied the motion. TCVA then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ to direct the probate court to vacate those orders on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to enter those orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in this case a writ of mandamus was the appropriate remedy by which to order a vacatur of the probate court's orders. Furthermore, because TCVA was not properly served with process or provided adequate notice of the proceeding before the probate court, the Supreme Court directed the probate court to vacate the contested orders concerning the assets to which TCVA was conservator. View "In re: Estate of Amy F. Morris" on Justia Law

Three appellate proceedings were consolidated for a single Supreme Court opinion. All three cases appealed the dismissal of their respective cases from the Etowah Circuit Court. The Appellants all sued Donald Stewart individually and as the trustee of the Abernathy Trust and the Abernathy Trust Foundation, in a line of cases arising out of a toxic tort action against Monsanto Company, its parent corporation and a spin-off. The Monsanto Corporations manufactured and disposed of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). A jury found the corporations liable on claims of wantonness, outrage, "suppression of the truth," negligence and public nuisance. After 500 trials on damages, the parties reached a settlement in 2003. $21 million was placed into a trust (the Abernathy Trust) established to pay health and education benefits for those Plaintiffs who qualified for assistance. Each plaintiff signed a retainer agreement and received and cashed his or her settlement check. Plaintiffs in this case challenged the settlement agreement and the award of attorneys fees. Further, they asked for a trust accounting regarding the use of the settlement funds. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the cases that asked for an accounting of the use of the trust's funds; one case was dismissed as moot; in the third case, the Court granted a writ of mandamus as to all portions of a circuit court order that sought review of the Abernathy trust document as compared to the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court was directed to lift any freeze of distributions from the trust. View "Bates v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. and Charles Browdy, a resident of the unincorporated Fort Morgan area of Baldwin County and a member of the Association (collectively "the FMCA"), sued the City of Gulf Shores and its mayor and city council seeking a court order declaring the City's annexation of a 19.3-mile segment of the land on which Fort Morgan Road is located and the adjacent land to be invalid.1 Following a nonjury trial, the trial court held that the FMCA had failed to establish that the Fort Morgan annexation was invalid; it accordingly entered a judgment in favor of the City. The FMCA appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "because the FMCA submitted evidence at that trial indicating that two parcels of property included in the Fort Morgan annexation were owned by private individuals and because the City failed to submit any evidence indicating that those same parcels were owned by the State, the trial court exceeded its discretion in upholding the annexation." View "Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. v. City of Gulf Shores" on Justia Law

Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC (Southeast), and Michael J. Smith petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Chambers Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer the underlying action to Lee County on the ground of forum non conveniens. In 2011, a vehicle driven by Patricia Webster allegedly collided with timber that had come loose from a tractor-trailer rig owned by Southeast, driven by its employee Smith. She sued Southeast and Smith for negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. Southeast's principal office is located in Chambers County. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Southeast and Smith's motion for a change of venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court granted their petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to transfer the case to Lee Circuit Court. View "Webster v. Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC" on Justia Law