Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While represented by counsel, Defendant Stanford Earl Pritchett pled guilty to murder. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to set aside his guilty plea, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied Defendant's motion without conducting a hearing and without making a determination that he had validly waived his right to counsel with respect to the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as to that decision, asserting that it conflicted with "Berry v. Alabama," (630 So. 2d 127, 129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)). The Court granted the petition, and reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case. View "Pritchett v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Lawton Higgs, Sr., formerly a pastor and pastor emeritus at the Church of the Reconciler ("COR"), a United Methodist church, brought an action against Tom Bole, a lay member of COR, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During the proceedings, Higgs filed a civil subpoena requesting the production of certain documents from Reverend Ron Schultz, the district supervisor of the South Central District of the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church ("the Conference"). Reverend Schultz filed a verified objection to and a motion to quash the civil subpoena based on First Amendment concerns. Subsequently, Bole filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him, alleging that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the trial court denied Bole's motion. The trial court later entered an order in which it granted in part and denied in part Reverend Schultz's motion to quash. In case no. 1110868, Bole petitioned for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court dismiss Higgs's claims against him. In case no. 1110892, Reverend Schultz petitioned for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to quash the subpoena in its entirety on the basis that the records subpoenaed by Higgs were privileged, ecclesiastical records of the United Methodist Church. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition in case no. 1110868 and dismissed the petition in case no. 1110892. View "Higgs, Sr. v. Bole" on Justia Law

One petition for the writ of mandamus and three appeals were brought before the Supreme Court to challenge a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court awarding Hugh McInnish $196,625 in attorney fees and costs in his action against: (1) the Governor of the State of Alabama, (2) the State finance director, (3) the State comptroller, and (4) the State treasurer, all in their official capacities. The underlying case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the community-services grant-making process set forth in Ala. Code 1975, section 29-2-123. There, the Court held that "section 29-2-123, which authorizes a permanent joint legislative committee to award community-services grants, [as well as that portion of the annual education-appropriations act] by which those grants are funded," violated the separation-of-powers provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 925 So. 2d at 188, and the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case. Subsequently, McInnish filed a series of motions in the trial court, seeking "an award of attorney fees, reasonable expenses, and costs against the [State officials]." He also sought an order declaring that he was "a prevailing party, that this litigation provided a common benefit to all taxpayers of the state of Alabama, and that the amount that was prohibited from being disbursed illegally was in an amount of approximately $13.4 million." The State officials opposed McInnish's motions, arguing that "[t]he clear holding in Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro[, 950 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2006),] is that section 14 of the Alabama Constitution prohibits the awarding of attorney fees and expenses in any state court action against the State of Alabama or against state officials in their official capacities." The trial court entered a judgment awarding "counsel for Plaintiff McInnish a judgment for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $196,625.00 to be paid by the [State officials]." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that section 14 bars an award of attorney fees and costs even if a plaintiff has prevailed on a claim against State officials in their official capacities for a violation of the State constitution that results in preservation of significant funds in the State treasury. The trial court lacked authority to award such attorney fees and costs. Consequently, the judgment was reversed. View "McInnish v. Bentley " on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 64, and three employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, and Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale in the employees' action regarding the suspension of merit pay raises for classified employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 64 v. Personnel Board of Jefferson Cty." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Eastern Division certified two questions of first impression to the Alabama Supreme Court: whether a coverage exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy applied to the use of the vehicle used for transporting people or delivering newspapers (as part of the insured's job) was enforceable. A secondary issue was whether that exclusion applied when an accident takes place after the delivery of the last paper, "but while the insured is driving back to his point of origin or some other location." Scott and Lori Touart Thomas were injured as the result of an automobile accident; Lori had been driving. The Thomases recovered a judgment in state court against defendant Kenneth Gooden, Jr., the driver of the other vehicle. The dispute involved whether the Thomases were entitled to recover from Nationwide under the provisions of a Nationwide automobile liability insurance policy naming Gooden as an insured. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the answer to the first certified question is "yes:" a clause in an automobile liability-insurance policy excluding coverage for the "use of any motor vehicle to carry persons or property for a fee" could be enforced as to an insured if the finder of fact concludes that the insured delivers newspapers for a fee and that the insured was using the covered vehicle for that purpose at the time of the accident. With regard to the second question, the Court concluded that the answer to the second certified question is "no:" a clause in an automobile liability-insurance policy excluding coverage for the "use of any motor vehicle to carry persons or property for a fee" cannot be enforced as to an insured after the delivery of the "property," i.e., newspapers in this case, is complete. View "Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Limestone Creek Developers, LLC ("LCD"), sued Stuart Trapp and two companies in which Trapp had a controlling interest (Kyvest, Ltd., and Redesign, Inc.) after Trapp was unable or unwilling to close on a contract he had personally entered into agreeing to purchase all the lots in a new subdivision owned by LCD. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Trapp defendants, and LCD appealed. While expressing no opinion with regard to whether that contract violated state law, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that the contract in question was void because it violated section 1.2.3 of the MCSR. Accordingly, the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of the Trapp defendants on LCD's breach-of-contract claim, as well as LCD's other claims, which were dependent on that contract. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Limestone Creek Developers, LLC v. Stuart Trapp et al. " on Justia Law

Lexington Insurance Company and Chartis, Inc. appealed a circuit court order that appointed a third arbitrator to the arbitration panel established to settle a dispute between Lexington and Southern Energy Homes, Inc. ("SEH"). From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH purchased from Lexington three commercial general-liability ("CGL") policies. An endorsement to a CGL policy insuring SEH from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2002, provided that SEH is responsible for a $100,000 self-insurance retention ("SIR") "per occurrence." Endorsements to two successive CGL policies that together provided coverage to SEH through October 31, 2004, provide that SEH is responsible for a $250,000 SIR per occurrence. The SIR applied both to costs of defense incurred by SEH and to amounts SEH pays in settlement or pursuant to a judgment. From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH was named as a defendant in 46 lawsuits alleging property damage and personal injury resulting from SEH's using a vinyl-on-gypsum product in the homes it manufactured. SEH gave notice of these lawsuits to Lexington, and that it had exhausted its SIR amounts in the litigation and was entitled to reimbursement from Lexington. More than 120 days passed without SEH receiving a decision from Lexington as to whether it agreed with SEH's claim for this amount. SEH made an arbitration demand pursuant to the arbitration clauses of the CGL policies, including the SIR endorsement to the 2002 policy. Upon review of the policies in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in appointing the third arbitrator. The order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lexington Insurance Co. v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. " on Justia Law

John Woodruff appealed a circuit court order dismissing his malicious-prosecution, false imprisonment, and tort-of-outrage claims against the City of Tuscaloosa ("the City") and several of its employees. On October 16, 2006, Woodruff went to the Tuscaloosa Police Department headquarters to resolve a warrant that had been sworn against him for harassing communications. After presenting himself, Woodruff was arrested and handcuffed by a Tuscaloosa police officer and told to wait until another officer could arrive to complete the booking process. While waiting in the public lobby of police headquarters, Woodruff became involved in a verbal altercation with an off-duty Tuscaloosa police officer, and he was subsequently charged by Officer Canterbury with disorderly conduct, another Class C misdemeanor. Woodruff was thereafter booked and transported to the county jail, where he was released on bond later that night. On October 19, 2006, Woodruff returned to the Tuscaloosa Police Department to file a written complaint regarding the events surrounding his arrest and booking on October 16. The Tuscaloosa Police Department ultimately determined that Woodruff's complaint was without merit. On November 15, 2006, Woodruff was convicted of disorderly conduct. He thereafter sought a trial de novo on the charge in Circuit Court; however, in December 2008, while the matter was still pending, Woodruff and the City apparently reached an agreement to nol-pros the charge if Woodruff would undergo counseling. On January 2, 2009, the disorderly conduct charge was formally dropped. On January 3, 2011, Woodruff filed the this action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "evident" that Woodruff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court affirmed the circuit court in denying his claims. View "Woodruff v. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

Alanna Nail, Paul Watson, and Gennie Farragher, all registered nurses, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Calhoun Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the summary-judgment motion they filed, which raised a statute-of-limitations defense. George Dulin was admitted to the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center ("the Center") in May 2005 for treatment of "crush injuries to his chest." Dulin's tracheostomy tube allegedly became dislodged during a bath administered by the nursing staff, resulting in the loss of oxygen for an undetermined period. He allegedly suffered brain damage as the result of oxygen deprivation. One month later, Vivian Dulin, George's wife, obtained and reviewed the hospital records. Included in the records was a "Cardiopulmonary Pulmonary Arrest Flow Sheet," purported to identify, by handwritten entries, eight members of a "Code Team" involved in the incident. The Dulins commenced a medical malpractice action against the Center and 17 fictitiously named defendants. Subsequently, Nail, Watson, and Farragher moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the amended complaint, which purported to substitute their names for certain fictitiously named defendants, was filed more than two years after the alleged incident on June 3, 2005, and did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint, because, they argued, the Dulins failed to exercise "due diligence" in ascertaining the nurses' identities. The trial court denied the nurses' motion, and they filed this petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "[d]ue diligence means ordinary, rather than extraordinary, diligence." Under the circumstances of this case, including (1) the Dulins' prompt acquisition of the medical records, (2) the state of the names of the nurses in the room with George Dulin in his medical records, and (3) the promptness of discovery and of the substitution, the Court could not say, as a matter of law, that the Dulins failed to exercise due diligence in substituting the nurses for the fictitiously named defendants. The Court denied the nurses' application for a writ of mandamus. View "Dulin v. Northeast Alabama Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Eliot Hoff appealed a circuit court order that remanded the administration of the conservatorship of his grandmother, Susan Bibb Kidd, to the Jefferson Probate Court. In 2006, the probate court adjudged Kidd to be an incapacitated person and appointed Mark Goolsby as conservator of her estate. Sometime in August 2008, Goolsby sold some personal property in Kidd's estate to Anita Kidd Goyer, one of Kidd's three daughters. When another of Kidd's daughters, Susan Louis Hoff, and her son Hoff found out about the sale, they filed an objection in the probate court. Meanwhile, on September 29, 2009, Kidd died. On February 21, 2011, the probate court issued an order that, among other things, approved the August 2008 sale of Kidd's personal property to Goyer. The Hoffs promptly moved the probate court to reconsider. An initial hearing on their motion was held on June 8, 2011; however, the matter was continued and another hearing scheduled for September 15, 2011. On June 24, 2011, Goolsby petitioned the probate court to be appointed administrator of Kidd's estate because he could not conduct business as conservator after her death. The Hoffs thereafter also filed a motion to continue the hearing scheduled for September 15, 2011. The probate court ruled on those motions, setting the hearing on the Hoffs' motion to reconsider and denying Goolsby's motion to be appointed administrator of Kidd's estate. Instead, the probate court, on its own motion, appointed attorney Elizabeth W. McElroy, the general administrator for Jefferson County, as administrator of Kidd's estate. Hoff appealed the order entered by the circuit court remanding the administration of the conservatorship of his grandmother to the probate court, arguing that he had properly petitioned for removal. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded Hoff did not have standing to seek removal, that the circuit court's order of remand was properly entered. View "Hoff v. Goyer " on Justia Law