Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Allen Jenkins was convicted in March 1991 of two counts of capital murder which was committed during the course of a robbery and during the course of a kidnapping. By a vote of 10-2, the jury recommended that Jenkins be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Jenkins to death. In early 2012, the Supreme Court granted Jenkins's petition for a writ of certiorari only as to the ground challenging the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's order dismissing Jenkins's Rule 32 petition on the bases that the trial court adopted verbatim the State's proposed order, and the Court held in abeyance the other grounds raised in Jenkins's petition pending resolution of this issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it upheld the trial court's adoption of the State's proposed order denying Jenkins's Rule 32 petition; as to the remaining grounds the Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. View "Jenkins v. Alabama " on Justia Law

In December 2005, Charles Baggett and Diana Morris were involved in an automobile accident, as a result of which Baggett was injured. Baggett sued Morris, who was insured by Sagamore Insurance Company. Baggett added his underinsured-motorist ("UIM") carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as a party to the action. The limit of State Farm's UIM policy was $60,000. Before Baggett commenced the action against Morris, State Farm paid Baggett $25,000, the limit of the liability policy issued by Sagamore to Morris, to protect its potential subrogation interest against Morris. At the time State Farm advanced the $25,000 to Baggett, Baggett executed an agreement entitled an "Advancement of Funds to Protect Future Subrogation Rights." State Farm opted out of the action. Following a jury trial, Baggett obtained a judgment against Morris for $181,046. Therefore, Baggett was entitled to $85,000--the total of the limits of both the Sagamore policy ($25,000) and the State Farm policy ($60,000). Sagamore paid $25,000; State Farm, rather than paying Baggett $35,000 and receiving credit pursuant to the "Advancement of Funds" agreement for the $25,000 it had advanced, mistakenly paid $60,000, resulting in an overpayment to Baggett of $25,000. As a result of the overpayment, the trial court ordered Baggett to reimburse State Farm $25,000, less a one-third attorney fee under the common-fund doctrine. State Farm appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. State Farm petitioned the Supreme Court seeking review of the application of the common-fund doctrine. Upon review, the Court found that State Farm was entitled to a refund of the overpayment, and that if an attorney fee was due Baggett's attorney with respect to all or part of the $85,000 actually owed in the aggregate by Sagamore and State Farm, then the fee should be taken from the $85,000, not from the $25,000 State Farm overpaid and as to which it was entitled to be reimbursed. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Baggett" on Justia Law

Following an automobile accident in which Tracy Mitchell was injured when the vehicle in which she was a passenger, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Mitchell's insurer, paid Mitchell's medical expenses, among other coverage payments, and then sought, through subrogation, reimbursement from the driver Amy Kirk's insurer, Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company. Mitchell filed a personal-injury action against Kirk, State Farm, and fictitiously named defendants, alleging as to State Farm, among other things, that State Farm's right to recover from any damages awarded its payment of Mitchell's medical expenses was subject to a reduction, pursuant to the common-fund doctrine, for attorney fees incurred by Mitchell in pursuing the personal-injury action. The circuit court granted State Farm's summary-judgment motion, holding that the common-fund doctrine did not obligate State Farm to pay a pro rata share of Mitchell's attorney fees. Mitchell appealed the circuit court's decision to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's summary judgment, concluding that a common fund was created requiring State Farm to contribute to Mitchell's attorney fees; that the common-fund doctrine had not been contractually abrogated; and that the common-fund doctrine was not negated by State Farm's "active participation" in pursuing subrogation recovery. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine, as a matter of first impression, the narrow question whether, under the common-fund doctrine, the subrogated insurance carrier was responsible for a pro rata share of the injured insured's attorney fees incurred in the process of obtaining an award against which the carrier has asserted a right of reimbursement. The Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment. View "Mitchell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. and Regions Bank (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Regions") appealed an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court which granted in part and denied in part their motions to compel arbitration in an action filed against them by Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"). In 2001 BCSS began discussing with AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth"), the predecessor-in-interest to Regions Bank, options to finance its existing debt. AmSouth recommended that BCSS finance its debt through variable-rate demand notes ("VRDNs").1 In its complaint, BCSS alleged that in late 2008 it received a notice of a substantial increase in the variable interest rates on its 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007 VRDNs, which constituted BCSS's first notice that the interest-rate-swap agreements recommended by Regions did not fix the interest rate on the VRDNs but, instead, exposed BCSS to "an entirely new increased level of market risk in the highly complex derivative market." BCSS sued Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan asserting that Regions falsely represented to BCSS that swap agreements fixed BCSS's interest rates on all the BCSS debt that had been financed through the VRDNs. Following a hearing on the motions to compel arbitration, the trial court entered an order in which it granted the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the credit agreements but denied the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the failure of the swap transactions to provide a fixed interest rate. The trial court reasoned that the "Jurisdiction" clause in a master agreement, in combination with its merger clause, "prevent[ed] any argument that the VRDN arbitration agreement applies to disputes concerning the swap agreements" and that those clauses demonstrated that it was "the parties' intention, as it relates to the interest-swap agreement and any transaction related to that agreement, that the parties would not arbitrate but instead [any dispute] would be resolved by proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Regions presented evidence of the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of the disputes at issue. The Court reversed the order of the trial court denying the motions to compel arbitration of BCSS's claims concerning the master agreement and the swap agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC " on Justia Law

Respondents William Harris, in his official capacity as president of Alabama State University ("ASU"), and the individual members of ASU's Board of Trustees, in their official capacities as members of the Board, appealed a circuit court's order granting the petition filed by Felisa Owens seeking a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief as a result of the termination of her employment with ASU and awarding Owens full backpay and benefits. Upon review, the Court determined that Respondents were statutorily immune from suit for any claim for monetary damages. Therefore, the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Owens's claim for backpay and benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order with regard to the backpay issue, but affirmed the lower court in all other respects. View "Harris v. Owens " on Justia Law

Carson Sweeney petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order of May 26, 2011, insofar as the order granted Timmy Joe Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's demand for a trial by jury in Holland's trespass action against him. In 2010, Holland sued Sweeney, alleging that Sweeney had entered Holland's property and damaged it by, among other things, "remov[ing] trees, timber and other foliage, [and] soil"; "redirect[ing] water flow"; and "install[ing] drainage apparatuses." The complaint stated the following causes of action: "trespass - trespass to chattels," negligence, negligent supervision, and conversion. The circuit court ultimately entered an order that, among other things, granted in part and denied in part Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint. In its order, the circuit court found that Sweeney's failure to file his answer and counter-complaint in a timely manner "was unreasonable and inherently prejudicial" to Holland and that "[g]ood cause has not been shown for said failure." Nonetheless, the circuit court denied Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint because, the circuit court said, "the interest of preserving a litigant's right of trial on the merits is paramount." However, the circuit court granted Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's demand for a jury trial, concluding that Sweeney had "waived his right to demand a trial by jury." Sweeney filed a "motion for reconsideration, modification, new hearing, or in the alternative, motion to alter, amend or vacate" the order striking his jury-trial demand, which the circuit court denied. Sweeney then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus, seeking relief from the circuit court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Sweeney demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought in his petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Holland v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Rodgetta Colvin Jett n/k/a Octavia R. Cantelow-Jett ("Jett") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against her in a legal-malpractice action against attorney James M. Wooten and his law firm, the Law Offices of James M. Wooten, P.C. ("Wooten P.C."). Jett was injured when she fell down the stairs while leaving a YMCA facility in Birmingham. Jett filed a legal-malpractice action against the Wooten defendants as a result of their failure to initiate legal actions on her behalf against the YMCA before the limitations period expired on those claims. The trial court thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of the Wooten defendants, holding that Jett's claims against them were themselves barred by the two-year statute of limitations that applied to Alabama Legal Services Act (ALSA) claims because Jett did not initiate her action until December 30, 2010, more than two years after the two YMCA incidents. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALSA tolled the statute of limitations and that the two-year period in which Jett could initiate an action against the Wooten defendants based on Wooten's failure to file actions against the YMCA did not begin to run until Jett discovered that Wooten had not filed the legal actions she alleged he told her he had filed. Accordingly, her lawsuit against the Wooten defendants was timely filed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Jett v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision that denied her second petition for a writ of mandamus in a child-custody matter. The Supreme Court granted Jennifer's petition to examine the rationale applied by the Court of Civil Appeals, which appeared to be premised upon a perceived conflict between Ala. Code 1975, section 6-5-440 and Ala. Code 1975, section 30-3-5. Jennifer argued on appeal that the Court of Civil Appeals' rationale conflicted with the mandate of 6-5-440: it did not follow from the principle that venue in child-custody-modification proceedings could be waived and that a forum-shopping parent could "file a postdivorce proceeding in an improper venue and thereby bar the other former spouse from filing a postdivorce proceeding in the proper venue," because the respondent parent could always object in his or her first responsive pleading in the court in which venue is alleged to be improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded this case for further consideration of 6-5-440 and any other arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis. View "Vest v. Vest " on Justia Law

The City of Gadsden appealed an order of injunctive relief in favor of John Boman, a retired Gadsden police officer. Boman and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police officers sued Gadsden alleging, among other things, that they had "been deprived of Social Security and Medicare protection which other police officers have been provided" and that, after 20 years of service, they were being required to pay a higher pension charge or percentage of base pay than their counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986. Boman filed a "motion for immediate relief for medical care." He alleged that when he was hired, Gadsden "provided police and firemen a 20 year retirement program whereby police and firemen would receive 50% retirement benefits after 20 years of service and lifetime medical care." He averred that Gadsden had "breached its contract with [him] to provide continuing medical insurance," and he requested "immediate relief by ordering [Gadsden] to pay for [his] medical care or in the alternative ordering [Gadsden] to pay for Medicare coverage for ... Boman so he will have continuing medical insurance as agreed by the Board filed a motion to dismiss the action as to it and the plan. As to it, the Board alleged that it was an agency of the State and, therefore, was entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Also, according to the Board, the plan is not a legal entity subject to suit, but "merely a program administered by the Board to provide insurance." It also averred that, "[e]ven if [the plan] were an entity subject to suit, it would be immune for the same reasons [the] Board is immune." Boman's response to the Board's motion failed to acknowledge or mention the immunity question. The trial court, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, entered an "order granting motion for emergency relief." It ultimately dismissed the claims against the Board and the plan. Gadsden appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed based on the failure to join the officials of the Board, in their official capacities, as necessary parties. On remand, the trial court was directed to entertain an amendment to the complaint adding claims against those officials of the Board who are charged with administering the plan, in their official capacities. View "City of Gadsden, Alabama v. Boman et al. " on Justia Law

Darren Woods and his half sister Joni Wood, appealed a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Karrie Hayes and against Joni in the amount of $437,761.52 and against Darren in the amount of $86,540.49 for violating the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("AUFTA"). In 2004, Karrie Hayes, then age 14, was alone inside the house where she resided with her mother in Florence. Jason Earl Pruitt, at the request and under the direction of Stevie Woods, the father of Darren and Joni, released a large amount of propane gas into the residence and then ignited the gas, causing the residence to explode into flames. As a result of the explosion, Hayes sustained severe burns to over 70 percent of her body. Investigators quickly learned of Pruitt's involvement, and Pruitt thereafter implicated Stevie Woods. In 2006, Stevie Woods was arrested and charged with arson for the burning of the residence in which Hayes was living. Both Stevie Woods and Pruitt were convicted of arson in the first degree. Hayes, through her mother, filed a civil action against Stevie Woods and Pruitt seeking damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of the destruction of the residence. In amended complaints Hayes added claims alleging the fraudulent transfer of assets against Stevie Woods, Darren, Joni, and Flower Wood Development, LLC ("Flower Wood"), and conspiracy to engage in the fraudulent transfers and seeking injunctive relief to bar further transfers. With regard to these claims, Hayes specifically alleged that, with the knowledge of the existence of Hayes's claims against him, Stevie Woods fraudulently transferred real and personal property to various relatives, including Darren and Joni, as well as to Flower Wood. A jury awarded Hayes $5 million against Stevie Woods and Pruitt on her personal-injury claims. Stevie Woods did not appeal the verdict. The trial court determined that 11 deeds had been used to fraudulently transfer 9 parcels of real property from Stevie Woods to Darren, Joni, and Flower Wood, and the trial court set aside those deeds. The defendants did not challenge the order on appeal. Darren and Joni argued that the judgments based on the fraudulent transfers claims should be reversed on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence highly prejudicial photographs, medical records, and testimony concerning Hayes's injuries and photographs and testimony concerning the explosion. Upon review of this issue, the trial court's admission of evidence that was entirely irrelevant to Hayes's fraudulent-transfer claims and that was highly prejudicial to Darren and Joni. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that warranted reversal of the jury verdicts against Darren and Joni. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Wood v. Hayes " on Justia Law