Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Phenix City Board of Education ("the Board") sought mandamus relief from the Russell Circuit Court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment on claims brought against it by The Lisle Company, Inc. ("Lisle"). Because the Board is immune from suit pursuant to § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ. View "Lisle Company, Inc. v. Phenix City Board of Education" on Justia Law

Petitioners George D. Green and Wanda Green, the plaintiffs in a personal-injury action pending in the Monroe Circuit Court, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct that court to vacate its order transferring the underlying action to the Conecuh Circuit Court. The complaint sought damages for assault and battery; it alleged that the defendants Paul Battle and Garth Morris "shot[] [George] with a shotgun." George sought damages for physical injuries and mental anguish; Wanda sought damages for loss of consortium. The complaint further alleged that the Greens and Morris were residents of Conecuh County and that Battle was a resident of Pensacola, Florida. Battle filed a motion seeking, among other things, a transfer of the case to Conecuh County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that venue was proper in Monroe County; the Greens have thus demonstrated that the trial court erred in transferring the case. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order. View "Green v. Morris" on Justia Law

East Alabama Medical Center ("EAMC") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Randolph Circuit Court to transfer the action filed against it by John Tinney to the Lee Circuit Court. Tinney represented Jerry Benefield in a personal-injury action arising out of a motor-vehicle accident. Benefield was treated at EAMC for injuries he sustained in the accident. EAMC filed a hospital lien in Lee County for $3,361 against any recovery Benefield might receive in settlement of his personal-injury action. Tinney recovered a settlement for Benefield. As part of the settlement, Progressive Insurance Company issued a check made payable to EAMC and Tinney in the amount of $3,361. Tinney then filed the underlying lawsuit against EAMC in the Randolph Circuit Court, claiming that he had asked EAMC to allow him to receive 40% of the lien check as an attorney fee but that EAMC "failed and refused to negotiate the check or to agree on a division of the money." EAMC moved to transfer the action to Lee County stating that its principal office is located in Opelika, Lee County; that Lee County is where all actions taken by EAMC, such as telephone calls and letters, occurred; and that EAMC has no facilities and does no business by agent in Randolph County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that EAMC proved that venue was not proper in Randolph County, therefore the trial court erred in denying EAMC's motion to transfer the case to Lee County. View "Tinney v. East Alabama Medical Center" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the bank's motion to strike a jury demand in the complaint filed against it by Plaintiff Thomas L. Busby and to enter an order granting the Bank's motion, thereby enforcing Busby's waiver of a jury trial. The dispute arose from a construction loan to which Plaintiff Busby guaranteed. The loan agreement contained the jury trial waiver in the event of a dispute between the parties. The borrower defaulted on the loan, and the bank sought payment from Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the bank, alleging multiple counts of fraud, misrepresentation and breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank demonstrated that it had a clear legal right to have the jury demand stricken. Accordingly the Court granted the petition, issued the writ, and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the bank's motion. View "Busby v. BancorpSouth Bank" on Justia Law

According to Braden Furniture Company, Inc., between 2003 and 2010, Bonnie Manning, an assistant bookkeeper, accessed Braden Furniture's accounting program and created over 200 unauthorized checks, totaling over $470,000, that she then deposited in her account at Union State Bank. The majority of the checks did not identify a payee. Braden Furniture sued Union State Bank, RBC Bank, and Manpower, Inc., alleging common-law negligence and wantonness and violations of sections 7-3-404(d), 7-3-405(b), and 7-3-406, Ala. Code 1975. Union State Bank moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Bank. Upon review, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether provisions in the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code ("the UCC") displaced common-law claims of negligence and wantonness when a drawer seeks to recover the loss of payment for unauthorized checks. Braden Furniture contended that the trial court erred in holding that the provisions of the UCC displaced its common-law claims of negligence and wantonness because, allowing its common-law claims to proceed did not "create rights, duties and liabilities inconsistent" with the UCC. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment for Union State Bank in this regard. View "Braden Furniture Company, Inc. v. Union State Bank " on Justia Law

Black Warrior Electric Membership Corporation appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Ronald McCarter in McCarter's action seeking compensation for injuries he sustained when he contacted a power line owned and operated by Black Warrior. Black Warrior contended in its JML motions that there was no evidence indicating "that Black Warrior had actual or constructive notice that the height of the power line was defectively low so as to give Black Warrior reason to anticipate that a person, such as [McCarter], might come in contact with the power line." Although Black Warrior argued on appeal both that evidence of its liability was insufficient to present a jury question and that the verdict was against the weight and preponderance of the evidence, the resolution of this case turned on the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that McCarter failed to present substantial evidence that Black Warrior had constructive knowledge of the alleged defect in its lines before the time of the accident. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Black Warrior Electric Membership Corporation v. McCarter " on Justia Law

Christopher Anthony Floyd petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming his capital-murder conviction and his subsequent death sentence. The Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, following its plain-error review, failed to recognize as prejudicial any plain error it found in the proceeding in the trial court. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari review to consider: (1) whether the State used its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner in violation of "Batson v. Kentucky," (476 U.S. 79 (1986)); (2) whether the trial court properly excluded certain statements to police as inadmissible hearsay; and (3) whether the trial court properly denied Floyd's motion for a new trial based on allegedly newly discovered evidence. The Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision based on the Batson issue and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Floyd v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Shirley Spencer and Christy Gee petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Greene Circuit Court to vacate its judgment granting the motion of K & K Excavating, LLC ("K & K"), to enforce a forum-selection clause and transferring the petitioners' action against K & K to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. In 2007, Spencer contracted with K & K for the installation of a septic system at the petitioners' house in Eutaw. The petitioners separately contracted with S. Boyd, Inc. ("Boyd"), to conduct the excavation work necessary to install the septic system. The contract between the parties included a forum-selection clause. When mediation of the case proved unsuccessful, the Greene Circuit Court ordered another pretrial conference to be held. K & K filed a reply brief in support of the transfer motion. The Greene Circuit Court ultimately entered an order granting the transfer motion as to K & K and severing the petitioners' claims against K & K from those asserted against the Boyd defendants; the Greene Circuit Court denied the transfer motion as to the Boyd defendants. The petitioners did not challenge the validity of the forum selection clause. Instead, the petitioners argued only that K & K waived its right to enforce the forum-selection clause "by defending the lawsuit in Greene County for two years, through multiple pretrial conferences and completion of party discovery." The Supreme Court agreed. Under the facts of this case, K & K's substantial invocation of the litigation process in Greene County clearly evinced its intention to abandon its right to enforce the forum-selection clause in favor of the judicial process. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting the transfer motion. View "Spencer v. S. Boyd, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Randall Boudreaux, M.D., Don Ortego, and Coastal Anesthesia, P.C. appealed a $4,000,000 judgment against them, following a remittitur of a $20,000,000 jury verdict in favor of Paula Pettaway, as administratrix of the estate of Paulett Pettaway Hall, on her wrongful-death/medical-malpractice claim. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly denied the defendants' request for a new trial and appropriately refused to further remit the jury's punitive damages award. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Boudreaux v. Pettaway" on Justia Law

Carolyn Wilson Floyd petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Thomas ap R. Jones of the Hale Circuit Court to set aside his order denying her motion to dismiss the will contest filed by Carlean Wilson Wakefield on the ground that the action was barred by section 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, which provides that an action to contest a will must be filed within six months after the admission of the will to probate. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded that Floyd properly invoked the jurisdiction of the Court, and showed a clear legal right to the dismissal of the will contest because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the contest. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of mandamus was granted and the circuit court was directed to grant Floyd's motion to dismiss Wakefield's will contest. View "In re: Estate of S.L. Wilson, Sr." on Justia Law