Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association ("AIGA") filed an action against Mercy Medical Association, and Catholic Health East, Inc. ("CHE"), seeking to recover money it had paid on behalf of Mercy Medical and CHE on workers' compensation claims filed by employees of Mercy Medical as well as a judgment declaring its right to reimbursement of statutory benefits to be paid on the employees' claims in the future. AIGA, Mercy Medical, and CHE each moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Mercy Medical and CHE, determining: (1) that the 2000 AIGA Act applied because it was in effect at the time of the insolvency of Reliance National Insurance Company (CHE's workers' compensation insurer), and at the time the workers' compensation judgment was entered against Mercy Medical; (2) that the 2009 AIGA Act did not apply retroactively because the 2009 amendments to the AIGA Act substantively changed the law; and (3) that under the 2000 AIGA Act, Mercy Medical's net worth did not exceed $25,000,000, so AIGA could not recover any amounts it had paid on behalf of Mercy Medical. AIGA appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicable law governing the vesting of AIGA's right to reimbursement of claims paid was the law in effect on the date of the insurer's insolvency. Further, the Court also concluded that the addition of the net-worth definitions in the 2009 AIGA Act were substantive and did not apply retroactively in this case. Finally, the Court concluded that AIGA was not entitled to reimbursement from Mercy Medical or CHE because, under the 2000 AIGA Act, Mercy Medical's net worth did not exceed $25,000,000 and the payments were not made on behalf of CHE. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Mercy Medical and CHE. View "Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association v. Mercy Medical Association" on Justia Law

The City of Irondale appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment which declared its annexation of a parcel of property owned by the Black Warrior-Cahaba Rivers Land Trust adjacent to the Cahaba River as void. The property at the time did not lie within the corporate limits of any municipality, but fell within the police jurisdiction on the City of Irondale and the City of Leeds. Leeds sought a judgment to declare the annexation as invalid. In entering a summary judgment in favor of Leeds, the trial court concluded that "the Cahaba River, under Alabama state law, is a public waterway" and that the conditions for finding contiguity across a public waterway were not met. Accordingly, the trial court concluded, Irondale's annexation of the Land Trust property was improper and void. Agreeing with the circuit court's conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Irondale v. City of Leeds " on Justia Law

The president of the University of South Alabama and several hospital administrators petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order that denied their motion for summary judgment, and to enter an order granting their motion. The underlying suit arose from a contract dispute between the University and the former dean of the College of Medicine, Dr. Richard Teplick. Changes in duties to University Hospital administration lead to the elimination of certain positions and a reassignment of Dr. Teplick's duties. Dr. Teplick was unhappy with the reassignment and the University's substitution. Dr. Teplick sued the University and administration in their official and individual capacities alleging among other things, a violation of his due process rights, bad faith, emotional distress, punitive damages, backpay and reinstatement (or "front pay" in lieu of reinstatement). The University answered Dr. Teplick's complaint, raising among other defenses, immunity under Article I of the Alabama Constitution. The University moved for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order denying the University's motion without making any findings of fact or conclusions of law. In a lengthy review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded the University demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief they requested. The Court granted the petition for the writ and directed the circuit court to enter summary judgment in the University's favor. View "In re: Teplick v. Moulton" on Justia Law

Petitioners James Waltman and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their respective motions to transfer the underlying action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The underlying case arose from a truck accident in which a utility trailer Waltman was towing disconnected from his vehicle and struck Respondent John Owens' truck. Owens was injured from the accident. Owens filed suit against Waltman, Progressive and GEICO Indemnity Company, including a workers' compensation claim against his employer Griffin Wood, alleging that he was working within the scope of his employment when the accident took place. Owens filed the action in Perry County because Griffin Wood's principal place of business was in Perry County. Waltman filed a motion to transfer venue, contending that a more appropriate forum would be Tuscaloosa since the accident took place in Tuscaloosa County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Waltman's and Progressive's motions for change of venue, and granted their petitions for the writ of mandamus. The Court directed the Perry Circuit Court to transfer the case. View "Owens v. Griffin Wood Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough each petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decisions in their respective cases. The Court granted their petitions and consolidated the cases because both presented the same issue of first impression for the Court's consideration: whether the term "child" as used in section 26-15-3.2, Ala. Code 1975 (the chemical endangerment statute), included an unborn child. The appellate court concluded that it did, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court of Criminal Appeals judgments was affirmed in both cases. View "Ankrom v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Ryan Price-Williams sued Admiral Insurance Company and Gabriel Dean and Charles Baber in Circuit Court pursuant to Alabama's direct-action statute. Both Dean and Baber were alleged by Price-Williams to be covered under a commercial general-liability insurance policy Admiral had issued the national Kappa Sigma fraternity to which Dean and Baber belonged. Price-Williams alleged that Admiral was obligated to pay a judgment that had been entered in favor of Price-Williams and against Dean and Baber in a previous action. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Price-Williams and against Admiral, holding that the Admiral policy provided coverage to Dean and Baber for the negligent and/or wanton acts that formed the basis of the underlying action. Price-Williams sued Admiral after obtaining a judgment against Dean and Baber, who he alleged were insured by Admiral under a policy Admiral had issued to Kappa Sigma, by virtue of their positions as officers of the local chapter of Kappa Sigma. Following another bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Price-Williams, obligating Admiral to fulfill the judgment entered against Dean and Baber in the underlying action. Because the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court's conclusion that Admiral's policy with Kappa Sigma provided liability coverage to Dean and Baber with regard to the negligence and wantonness claims tried in the underlying action, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. View "Admiral Insurance Company v. Price-Williams " on Justia Law

Carl Weaver appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint filed against him by Roger D. Firestone. In May 1995, Firestone, Charles T. Amberson, Jr., and Darrell Thomas were assaulted, battered, and burned. Amberson and Thomas died from their injuries; Firestone suffered extensive physical injuries and incurred over $1,000,000 in medical expenses. In August 2012, Charles Richard Tooley, L.C. Collins, Jr., and Mickie Wayne Collins pled guilty to attempted murder as to Firestone. On August 20, 2012, Firestone sued Weaver; Tooley; Collins, Jr.; Collins; and fictitiously named parties A-M. Recognizing that his causes of action were filed outside their respective limitations periods, Firestone noted in his complaint that the defendants then-recently led guilty, and it was not until recently that Firestone discovered the identity of the [individuals] who had attacked him "because of the fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy and the identity of the conspirators." After conducting a hearing on Weaver's motion to dismiss, the trial court denied Weaver's motion, concluding that the statutes of limitations had been tolled. The Supreme Court reversed: because Firestone did not satisfy the "reasonable-diligence" standard for equitable tolling and Firestone's causes of action were filed undisputedly after the expirations of the applicable limitations periods, his claims against Weaver were barred by the limitations periods. View "Weaver v. Firestone " on Justia Law

Miller Trucking, LLC, Ben Miller, and Miriam Miller ("the Miller plaintiffs) appeal a summary judgment in favor of APAC Mid-South, Inc. (APAC), Oldcastle Materials, Inc., and Steve Reynolds (defendants). The facts of this appeal were based on contracts between the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ADOT") and APAC and between APAC and Miller Trucking. ADOT hired APAC to provide aggregate materials for distribution to counties, and APAC, in turn, hired Miller Trucking to haul the aggregate materials to the counties purchasing the aggregate materials from the State. At issue in this appeal were adjustments to the compensation of APAC paid Miller Trucking based on the cost of fuel during the time of the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a 2008 APAC-Miller Trucking contract and a 2009 hired-truck qualification agreement were modified to include fuel-price-adjustment agreements and, if so, what the terms of those agreements were. View "Miller Trucking, LLC, et al. v. APAC Mid-South, Inc., et al. " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, may a drug company be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based on statements it made in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a brand-name drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury from a generic drug manufactured and distributed by a different company?" Plaintiffs Danny and Vicki Weeks filed this action against five current and former drug manufacturers for injuries that Mr. Weeks allegedly suffered as a result of his long-term use of the prescription drug product metoclopramide, the generic form of the brand-name drug "Reglan." The Weekses contended that the Wyeth defendants had a duty to warn Danny's physician about the risks associated with the long-term use of metoclopramide and that the Weekses, as third parties, have a right to enforce the alleged breach of that duty. The Supreme Court concluded: "[i]n the context of inadequate warnings by the brand-name manufacturer placed on a prescription drug manufactured by a generic-drug manufacturer, it is not fundamentally unfair to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable for warnings on a product it did not produce because the manufacturing process is irrelevant to misrepresentation theories based, not on manufacturing defects in the product itself, but on information and warning deficiencies, when those alleged misrepresentations were drafted by the brand-name manufacturer and merely repeated by the generic manufacturer." View "Wyeth, Inc., et al. v. Weeks " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is a 'Potentially Responsible Party' ('PRP') letter from the Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA'), in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ('CERCLA') provisions, sufficient to satisfy the 'suit' requirement under a liability policy of insurance?" The plaintiff in the underlying action is Alabama Gas Corporation ("Alagasco"). Defendants St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company are all direct and indirect subsidiaries of defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al. v. Alabama Gas Corporation " on Justia Law