Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daniel Ernest Hegarty, M.D., and the Monroeville Medical Clinic appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Dixie Hudson in her medical-malpractice action. Dr. Hegarty delivered Hudson's baby via cesarian-section ("C-section") in 2004. During the operation, but after the baby had been delivered, the placenta became detached from the baby's umbilical cord. Dr. Hegarty searched within and beyond Hudson's uterus but was unable to locate the placenta. Dr. Hegarty requested assistance from his partner at the time, who also tried to locate the placenta but was unsuccessful. Following the operation, Hudson experienced severe pain in her abdomen and dramatic weight loss. Dr. Hegarty eventually ordered a CT scan to be performed and at that time, a mass was located in Hudson's abdomen. Dr. Hegarty then referred Hudson to Dr. Fahy, who subsequently referred her to a doctor in Mobile, who identified and surgically removed the retained placenta from Hudson's abdomen. Hudson sued in 2006 alleging medical negligence. The defendants contended on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing Hudson's expert witness to testify as an expert regarding the applicable standard of care and Dr. Hegarty's alleged breach of it. Defendants also argued that the trial court's charge to the jury was improper and that the judgment against Dr. Hegarty violated public policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing Hudson's expert to testify, and as such, erred in denying the doctor's motions for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of Dr. Hegarty. View "Hegarty v. Hudson " on Justia Law

Jermaine Parker was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime (the unlawful distribution of cocaine), and of obstructing governmental operations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the convictions in an unpublished memorandum, conflicted with "Ex parte Williams," (468 So. 2d 99, 101 (Ala. 1985)) regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support Parker's conviction for conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime. The Court denied certiorari review with regard to Parker's conviction for obstructing governmental operations. After review of the trial court record and the unpublished appellate court opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented in this matter "speculative" in nature: "Such proof is always insufficient, unless it excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis, but that of the guilt of the accused. No matter how strong the circumstances, if they can be reconciled with the theory that some other person may have done the act, then the defendant is not shown to be guilty, by that full measure of proof which the law requires...." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Parker" on Justia Law

On rehearing, Clay C. Slagle moved the Supreme Court to "disqualify" Robert Bernard Harwood, Jr., from sitting as a Special Justice on this case on the ground, among others, that he was then-currently engaged in the private practice of law. Slagle based this argument solely on the text of Art. VI, section 147(a), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). "In effect, Slagle [was] contending that, notwithstanding the provision in 12-2-14, Ala. Code 1975, for the appointment of 'member[s] of the bar' to sit as Special Justices in certain circumstances, the Constitution prevents such an appointee from engaging in the private practice of law." The Supreme Court rejected Slagle's contention and overruled his application. View "Slagle v. Ross" on Justia Law

Following an automobile accident in which Ron'Drequez Cortez White was killed by a drunk driver, Elizabeth McElroy, the county administrator for Jefferson County and appointed personal representative of White's estate, hired an attorney to file a wrongful-death action against the drunk driver. The wrongful-death action resulted in a recovery, and, following litigation on the issue of the personal representative's fee, the Circuit Court awarded McElroy a fee from the wrongful-death proceeds. Samuel Rodgers, White's father, contended in the litigation below that, as personal representative, McElroy was not entitled to be compensated for her services from the recovery in the wrongful-death action. Rodgers appealed the circuit court's judgment awarding McElroy a fee to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a personal representative may be compensated out of the proceeds recovered in a wrongful-death action. Upon review, the Court concluded that McElroy was not entitled to compensation out of the proceeds of the wrongful-death recovery for her services as personal representative and that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in awarding McElroy compensation out of that recovery. View "Rodgers v. McElroy" on Justia Law

SSC Montgomery Cedar Crest Operating Company, LLC appealed a circuit court judgment denying its motion to compel arbitration of the medical-malpractice claim asserted against it by Linda Bolding, as attorney in fact and next friend of her father, Norton Means. In early 2012, Means was hospitalized after experiencing stroke and/or heart-attack symptoms. He was admitted to Cedar Crest, a nursing-home facility operated by SSC Montgomery, to receive rehabilitation and nursing services while he recovered. At the time Means was admitted to Cedar Crest, he was accompanied by his daughter, Michelle Pleasant, who completed the necessary paperwork on his behalf. Among the paperwork completed and signed by Pleasant was a dispute-resolution agreement (the "DRA") providing that the "parties" waived their right to a judge or jury trial in the event a dispute arose between them and instead agreed to resolve any such dispute by way of a dispute-resolution program consisting of mediation and binding arbitration. Several months later, Means was hospitalized again. In the second hospitalization, another of his daughters, Linda Bolding, whom Means had previously granted a durable power of attorney, sued SSC Montgomery, alleging that Cedar Crest staff had negligently cared for Means, causing him to suffer dehydration, malnourishment, and an untreated infection that combined to result in his second hospitalization. SSC Montgomery filed both its answer denying Bolding's allegations and a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the DRA. Bolding subsequently filed a response, arguing that it would be improper to enforce the DRA because Pleasant had no legal authority to act on Means's behalf at the time Pleasant executed the DRA. Following a September hearing, the trial court entered an order denying SSC Montgomery's motion to compel arbitration. SSC Montgomery then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court concluded that Pleasant's signature on the arbitration agreement was ineffective to bind Means, and by extension his legal representative Bolding, because the evidence indicates he was mentally incompetent at the time Pleasant executed the agreement. View "SSC Montgomery Cedar Crest Operating Company, LLC v. Bolding" on Justia Law

Appellants R & G, LLC, George D. Copelan, Sr., Gilman Hackel, and Robert Yarbrough appealed a $1.3 million circuit court judgment entered against them and in favor of RCH IV-WB, LLC ("RCH"). In July 2005, Wolf Bay Partners, L.L.C., executed a promissory note with Wachovia Bank in the original principal amount of $2.5 million. That note was secured by a mortgage on two parcels of property in Baldwin County and guaranteed by each of the appellants, as well as by Defendants GDG Properties, LLC, David W. Mobley, and George D. Gordon. By written agreement of the parties, the amount of the indebtedness was subsequently increased to $2.9 million. Wachovia Bank thereafter assigned its interest in the note and mortgage to RCH Mortgage Fund IV, LLC. Wolf Bay Partners subsequently defaulted on its payment obligations under the terms of the promissory note, and RCH Mortgage Fund IV accordingly commenced foreclosure proceedings on the property secured by the mortgage. In early 2009, RCH, a newly created affiliate of RCH Mortgage Fund IV, purchased the property at a foreclosure sale for $2 million and RCH Mortgage Fund IV thereafter assigned RCH all of its rights under the loan. In June 2009, RCH sued the defendants, seeking to recover $1.1 million allegedly still due on the promissory note, plus interest after the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were applied to the debt. A bench trial was held, at which the defendants challenged the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the foreclosed-upon mortgage had been properly assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV by Wachovia Bank. The defendants also argued that it was improper for RCH Mortgage Fund IV to sell the foreclosed property as a single unit instead of as two separate parcels and that RCH Mortgage Fund IV accepted an allegedly unconscionably low purchase price at the foreclosure sale. The trial court ultimately excluded the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the mortgage had been assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV and set aside the foreclosure and sale because, for all that appeared, the wrong party had conducted the foreclosure and sale. The trial court made no ruling on the defendants' other arguments because it found that RCH Mortgage Fund IV was the wrong party to conduct the foreclosure and sale. RCH appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court, which held that RCH's evidence of mortgage assignment should have been considered by the trial court. On remand, RCH in light of the Supreme Court's reversal, all that was left for the trial court but to enter a final judgment in RCH's favor. RCH's brief was served on all defendants; however none filed a response. The trial court entered judgment in favor of RCH. Defendants Hackel and Yabrough moved the trial court to alter, amend or vacate its judgment in favor of RCH. Unsuccessful, they appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court's new judgment in favor of RCH, and affirmed. View "R & G, LLC v. RCH IV-WB, LLC " on Justia Law

Derrick Ervin appealed a summary judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham seeking the return of $178,858. The money was taken pursuant to a search of a vehicle impounded by police in connection with suspected drug activity. During the search, officers found a black bag containing thirty-two bundles of cash, and a shoe box in the back seat containing six more bundles in U.S. currency. Officers also found assorted documents bearing Ervin's name inside the passenger compartment. Ervin did not contest those facts in federal district court. In this action, however, Ervin contended that the cash was initially seized by the Birmingham Police Department (BPD), not by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and that the cash was subsequently transferred by "unknown Birmingham police officers ... to the DEA to commence forfeiture or condemnation proceedings" in the federal court. The federal district court entered a final judgment forfeiting the $178,858 to the United States. Ervin did not appeal that judgment and did not seek any postjudgment relief from it in the federal court itself. Pursuant to "equitable sharing" of the seizure, the City received the majority of the cash for its role in the operation, and the DEA kept a small percentage. Ervin alleged that, because such forfeiture proceedings had never been instituted, he was entitled to the return of the subject property. "Even if all these contentions were correct, they amount only to an attack on the authority of the federal district court to exercise jurisdiction over the res in an in rem action, not an attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court over a forfeiture action brought under federal law. As such, they come too late and are being advanced in the wrong court." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the forfeiture. View "Ervin v. City of Birmingham " on Justia Law

Tommy Wiley appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Bohannon Services, Inc. As a Bohannon employee, Wiley suffered a shoulder injury as a result of a work-related accident. Wiley filed a complaint requesting that the trial court set the issue of his right to receive total-disability benefits for an immediate hearing, order Bohannon to pay a 15% penalty and award any other benefits to which Wiley may be entitled. At a hearing, counsel for both parties informed the trial court that a settlement had been reached, and the terms of the settlement agreement were read into the record. Both parties were to separately file a proposed settlement agreement and obtain approval from the trial court. According to Bohannon, Wiley had failed to file a proposed settlement agreement as required by the trial court and had refused to sign the proposed settlement agreement submitted to the trial court by Bohannon. Wiley filed a response to Bohannon's motion in which he averred that he did not agree with certain provisions of the proposed settlement agreement that was submitted to the trial court by Bohannon, and he requested that the trial court set the matter for a hearing. The trial court entered an order purporting to grant Wiley's postjudgment motion to set aside the settlement agreement, provided that Wiley reimburse Bohannon for any settlement proceeds that Wiley had received and all costs and attorney fees that Bohannon had incurred during the course of this action. Subsequently, Wiley filed a motion requesting relief from the court's prior order and for leave to amend his original complaint. After a hearing, the trial court found that Wiley had failed to comply with the requirements of the set-aside order and therefore denied Wiley's requests for relief and enforced the previously entered settlement agreement. Wiley filed a motion styled as a "motion for new trial or in the alternative motion for relief from judgment or order and motion to alter, vacate or amend pursuant to Rule[s] 59 and 60," but that too was denied. Wiley then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Wiley did not timely file a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wiley v. Bohannon Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

J.D.A. ("the husband") appealed a circuit court judgment that, among other things, divorced him from A.B.A. ("the wife"); divided the marital assets; awarded the wife periodic alimony; required the husband to pay child support for the parties' two minor children and postminority educational support for all three of the parties' children; and awarded the wife an attorney fee. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it ordered the husband to pay the postminority educational expenses of the two minor children; required the husband to pay the expenses associated with the daughters' automobiles; awarded the wife $10,000 per month in periodic alimony; and awarded the wife an attorney fee. Because the division of marital assets is considered in conjunction with an award of periodic alimony, the Court also reversed the trial court's property-division awards so that the circuit court could reconsider the alimony and marital-property awards together. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "J.D.A. v. A.B.A. " on Justia Law

Harold Keith Hunt, the surviving son of Harold Guy Hunt, who died testate in 2009, appealed a November 2011 circuit court order among other things, refused to issue him a deed to the real property devised to him in his father's will until all debts, claims, and costs of administration of the estate had been paid. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment. View "Hunt v. Estate of Harold Guy Hunt" on Justia Law