Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Pohl v. Duda Energy, LLC
Several individuals purchased sodium nitrite online from a company headquartered in Alabama. Sodium nitrite, while commonly used for meat curing, can cause death if ingested in high quantities. The purchasers, who resided in Florida, Tennessee, and Minnesota, used the chemical to end their own lives. Representatives of the deceased presented evidence that the company had previously been notified of other suicides tied to its product and had adopted, but failed to follow, an internal policy to screen sodium nitrite sales. Despite this, the company sold the product to the decedents without additional precautions.In the Madison Circuit Court, the plaintiffs brought various claims under the laws of the states where the deaths occurred, including negligence, wantonness, wrongful death, loss of consortium, and outrage. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant in an unexplained order. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the company had a duty to prevent foreseeable misuse of its product and that their claims should survive summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. Applying the relevant state laws, it found that under Florida law, there was no duty for the company to prevent suicide absent specific knowledge of the individual’s suicidal intent or a statutory requirement. Under Tennessee law, suicide was a superseding cause, precluding liability unless the defendant had a special relationship or specific knowledge, which was absent here. Under Minnesota law, the court found no duty to screen buyers for lawful products beyond a duty to warn of foreseeable misuse. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any legal error or basis for liability under the relevant laws. View "Pohl v. Duda Energy, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Personal Injury, Products Liability
The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC
A construction company submitted a bid to build a military project for a state commission, but its bid was rejected because it included only one original bid form instead of the preferred two, despite otherwise complying with requirements. The company claimed to be the lowest responsible bidder and alleged the commission failed to consider its bid due to a minor irregularity. After exhausting administrative remedies, the company sued the commission, seeking to enjoin further work and recover bid-preparation costs, arguing the rejection was improper.The Montgomery Circuit Court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, finding the complaint stated a claim. On remand, the company sought a preliminary injunction to stop further payments on the project, citing ongoing disbursement of funds. The commission moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting sovereign immunity under the Alabama Constitution, which it argued deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction against the commission and its officers, but stayed the injunction pending appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the commission is an arm of the state entitled to absolute sovereign immunity, meaning the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction against it. The court emphasized that such immunity is not waived and applies regardless of the nature of the plaintiff or the relief sought, including claims relating to competitive bidding laws or taxpayer status. The court concluded that the preliminary injunction was void and dismissed the appeal, instructing the trial court to vacate the injunction and dismiss the commission from the case. The court took no position on whether claims could proceed against the commission's officer in his official capacity. View "The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC" on Justia Law
In re: Burns v. Meta Platforms, Inc.
Several individuals who used a widely known social media platform brought claims against the company that operates the platform, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Their allegations centered on the company’s practice of allowing third-party developers to access users’ private data, allegedly contrary to the platform’s representations regarding privacy controls. The plaintiffs, all residents of Alabama, asserted multiple tort claims, including fraud and breach of privacy, and contended that their personal data was affected while using the application within Alabama.Previously, a nationwide class action with similar factual allegations was litigated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs in this case opted out of that class action before filing their own suit in the St. Clair Circuit Court in Alabama. After the company moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the circuit court denied the motion, finding specific personal jurisdiction existed over the company. The plaintiffs supported their opposition with affidavits detailing their use of the platform in Alabama and referenced the company’s data center operations in the state.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to dismiss through a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court lacked both general and specific personal jurisdiction over the company. The Court explained that the company’s business activities in Alabama, including the existence of Alabama-based users and a data center, did not establish that the company was “at home” in Alabama for general jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, the Court found the plaintiffs failed to allege conduct by the company purposefully directed at Alabama as a forum, rather than at users generally. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition and ordered dismissal of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Burns v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure
In re: Jeremy Pruitt v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
The case centers on Jeremy Pruitt, a former head football coach at the University of Tennessee, who was investigated by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) for rule violations involving improper benefits to players and recruits. After the university fired Pruitt for cause and self-reported violations to the NCAA, the association conducted an investigation, during which Pruitt moved to Alabama. The NCAA’s Committee on Infractions held a hearing out of state, found Pruitt had committed severe violations, and issued a six-year show-cause order restricting his employment at NCAA institutions nationwide. Pruitt appealed to the NCAA’s Infractions Appeals Committee, which upheld the penalties.Subsequently, Pruitt brought a lawsuit in the DeKalb Circuit Court in Alabama against the NCAA, asserting various tort claims related to the investigation and enforcement actions. The NCAA moved to dismiss, arguing the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction. The trial court agreed there was no general jurisdiction but found specific personal jurisdiction existed because the NCAA’s activities, including enforcement of its orders affecting Alabama institutions and residents like Pruitt, amounted to “doing business” in Alabama. It denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss, and later granted Pruitt’s request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the show-cause order, though that injunction was later dissolved.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on the NCAA’s petition for a writ of mandamus. It held that the NCAA’s enforcement actions, while affecting Pruitt in Alabama, were not suit-related conduct purposefully directed at Alabama, but rather arose from events and processes in other states. The court concluded that the NCAA’s general regulatory activities over its member institutions in Alabama were insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, it granted the NCAA’s petition and directed the trial court to dismiss Pruitt’s action for lack of specific personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Jeremy Pruitt v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure
Carpenter v. Jacobs
The plaintiff alleged that since 2018, stormwater runoff from a drainage easement in a residential subdivision caused damage to his property. He first sued the homeowners’ association and the four owners of lots nearest his property, resulting in a jury verdict against the association and pro tanto settlements with three lot owners. After continued drainage issues and difficulties collecting the judgment, the plaintiff brought a new suit in 2024 against the homeowners’ association, a newly formed association, all 21 lot owners, and the boards of both associations. The central claim against the lot owners was their alleged undivided interest in the common property, including the drainage easement.In the Mobile Circuit Court, most non-board-member lot owners moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing they did not own the drainage easement and had no involvement in causing the drainage problem. Two lot owners, Wallace and Smith, additionally asserted that prior settlement agreements barred further claims against them. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss the non-board-member lot owners and enforced Wallace’s and Smith’s releases. Claims against the homeowners’ association and the six board members remained pending. The court certified its dismissal orders as final under Rule 54(b), allowing the plaintiff to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the circuit court’s Rule 54(b) certification was proper. Applying a de novo standard to the question of finality and reviewing for excess of discretion, the Court concluded the certification was improper. The Court found the dismissed claims and those still pending were too closely intertwined, and the possibility that the remaining claims could moot the need for appellate review weighed against certification. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment and did not reach the merits. View "Carpenter v. Jacobs" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law
Pharming Capital, LLC v. Turner
A rental company, Pharming Capital, became involved in a dispute after a portable cabin was delivered to land in Geneva County, Alabama, under a rent-to-own contract with a third party, Leland Hedlund. Although the contract documents inconsistently listed addresses in both Florida and Alabama, the cabin was ultimately placed on property owned by James R. Turner. Turner had agreed to sell this property to James Gough in 2021, but the final deed conveying ownership to Gough and his wife was not recorded until July 22, 2024, after the events in question. When repossession of the cabin was attempted due to nonpayment, access was prevented by a locked gate. Pharming Capital, relying on property searches and public records, believed Turner was the record owner and sued him for possession of the building.The Coffee Circuit Court (trial court) first granted summary judgment in favor of Pharming Capital regarding some of Turner's counterclaims, but allowed negligence/wantonness and punitive damages claims to proceed to trial. After a jury trial, Turner was awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Pharming Capital moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, which were denied. Pharming Capital then appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing a copy of the complaint filed by Pharming Capital to be taken into the jury room, contrary to Rule 51 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits pleadings from being sent to the jury room. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Court did not reach or resolve other arguments raised on appeal, as the error regarding the complaint was dispositive. View "Pharming Capital, LLC v. Turner" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law
Marsh v. U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC
A woman, acting as personal representative of her late husband's estate, brought a medical negligence action after her husband died following treatment at the University of South Alabama Hospital. She alleged that various doctors and U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC (HCM) failed to provide adequate care, leading to his death. HCM employed the hospital staff involved and was created by the University of South Alabama (USA) to manage its healthcare system. The plaintiff claimed HCM was vicariously liable for the doctors’ alleged negligence.HCM moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the Mobile Circuit Court, arguing it was entitled to State immunity based on its relationship to USA, a State institution. HCM presented affidavits and documentation showing USA was its sole member and manager, and that HCM’s finances were intertwined with USA. The plaintiff opposed, arguing HCM was a separately created LLC under Alabama law, formed to shield USA from certain liabilities, and operated as an independent entity. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HCM, finding it was entitled to immunity, and later certified the judgment as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It examined whether HCM, as an LLC created by a State agency, qualified as a State agency for purposes of immunity under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution. Applying the factors from Armory Commission of Alabama v. Staudt, the court determined HCM’s powers and functions were typical of private entities, not unique to government, and its relationship with USA did not override its separate legal status as an LLC. The court held HCM was not entitled to State immunity and reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Marsh v. U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law
Nexsen, PC v. Cadence Bank
Cadence Bank hired a law firm in October 2020 to provide legal services related to an $8 million loan to a holding company, with the loan closing in November 2020. The collateral for the loan included assets of a subsidiary insurer, which operated in Louisiana. Following severe hurricane damage in August 2021, the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner (LIC) moved to place the insurer into receivership, contesting the validity and priority of Cadence’s security interest in the insurer’s assets due to a lack of required regulatory approval for the loan. By March 2022, Cadence was aware of the LIC’s position disputing the validity of its security interest.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the law firm’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in Cadence's legal-malpractice lawsuit, which alleged the firm should have advised Cadence to seek regulatory approval for the loan and later added a claim of fraudulent suppression regarding the attorneys’ expertise. The trial court certified questions regarding whether Cadence’s claims were time-barred under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA), and whether any tolling or ameliorative provision would save the claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that, under the plain language of the ALSLA, the statute of limitations for a legal-malpractice claim begins to run when the act or omission giving rise to the claim occurs—the “occurrence” rule—rather than when the client suffers actual damage. The Court found that the relevant act or omission occurred no later than the November 2020 loan closing, and Cadence’s knowledge of the facts within the two-year limitations period barred application of any six-month ameliorative period. The Court also found Cadence’s fraud-based claim insufficiently pleaded to invoke tolling under § 6-2-3. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed it to enter judgment for the defendant law firm. View "Nexsen, PC v. Cadence Bank" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Professional Malpractice & Ethics
Walmart, Inc. v. Estell
A 20-year-old college student, while on spring break in Alabama, purchased alcohol from a Walmart store using a fake Georgia driver’s license that falsely indicated he was of legal age. A Walmart cashier checked the ID for a few seconds before approving the sale. The following day, after consuming several alcoholic beverages purchased from Walmart, the student drove under the influence and struck and killed an 80-year-old man, James Reed, who was riding a mobility scooter. Reed’s wife, Bonnie Estell, witnessed the accident. The student later admitted that his intoxication, caused by the alcohol bought at Walmart, played a role in the fatal incident.Reed’s widow, appointed by an Indiana court as special administrator of his estate for the purpose of pursuing wrongful death damages, brought a lawsuit against Walmart in the Baldwin Circuit Court. She asserted claims under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act, seeking damages for Reed’s death. Claims against the student driver were settled and dismissed, leaving Walmart as the sole defendant. The trial court denied Walmart’s motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, allowing the Dram Shop Act claim to proceed to a jury. The jury awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages against Walmart.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the Baldwin Circuit Court’s denial of Walmart’s postjudgment motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that the Dram Shop Act allows for a claim for death, expressly overruling prior precedent to the contrary. The Court further found that Estell’s appointment as special administrator was sufficient to assert such a claim, and that a jury question existed as to whether Walmart violated the law in selling alcohol to a minor. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Walmart, Inc. v. Estell" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Personal Injury, Products Liability
LG Electronics Alabama, Inc. v. Velaro, Inc.
The dispute centers on a commercial contract between two companies, one providing live-chat and visitor-monitoring software services and the other purchasing licenses for these services. The contract, first executed in 2008 and amended multiple times, included automatic annual renewal, a termination-for-convenience clause, and a late-payment-charge clause. In 2022, the parties agreed to a two-year term without modifying the termination or late-payment provisions. About seven months into the new term, the buyer exercised its right to terminate for convenience. The seller then invoiced the buyer for the entire remaining balance of the two-year term, asserting that full payment was due despite the early termination. The buyer disputed this, arguing it owed only for services rendered up to the termination date.The case was tried without a jury in the Madison Circuit Court. The trial court found the termination-for-convenience clause ambiguous regarding payment obligations upon early termination. Relying on witness testimony and email correspondence to resolve this ambiguity, the court concluded the buyer owed the full remaining contract balance and imposed a late-payment charge, also awarding the seller its costs and attorneys’ fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the contract’s termination and late-payment provisions were ambiguous. The court held that the termination-for-convenience clause was unambiguous: the buyer was obligated to pay only for services received up to the termination date, not the full contract term. The court further found the late-payment-charge clause inapplicable because the invoice in question was disputed and not for a quarterly period as required by the contract. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment, including the award of attorneys’ fees and expenses, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "LG Electronics Alabama, Inc. v. Velaro, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts