Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shirley R. Hulsey and her husband purchased a residence in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, which was adjacent to a vacant lot owned by Yellow Hammer Capital Management, LLC. In 2017, Build Art, LLC was retained by Yellow Hammer to construct a residence on the adjacent lot, which was at a higher elevation and sloped toward Hulsey’s property. After construction began, Hulsey observed water and debris flooding her property, which she attributed to changes in the grading and runoff from the construction. She alleged that the construction caused damage to her home’s foundation and sought damages and injunctive relief against Build Art, Yellow Hammer, and unnamed defendants, claiming trespass, nuisance, negligence, wantonness, emotional distress, and violation of her common-law rights concerning surface water flow.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Build Art on all claims against it, while the claims against Yellow Hammer and other defendants remained pending. Hulsey moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The court subsequently certified the summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing Hulsey to file an appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the trial court’s order was a final judgment suitable for appeal. The Supreme Court determined that the claims against Build Art and Yellow Hammer were so closely intertwined, arising from the same operative facts, that certifying the summary judgment as final was improper. The Supreme Court held that such certification posed risks of inconsistent results and wasted judicial resources. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the order was not a final judgment capable of supporting appellate review. View "Hulsey v. Build Art, LLC" on Justia Law

A mother and father, previously divorced, shared joint custody of their minor son. While visiting his father’s home, the child wandered into a neighbor’s property, accessed a swimming pool, and drowned. Following the child’s death, the mother—on behalf of her son—filed a wrongful death suit against both the father and the neighbor. The father cross-claimed against the neighbor for wrongful death as well. The neighbor settled with both parents, and the settlement funds were interpleaded with the Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, which then dismissed all claims against the neighbor.After the neighbor’s dismissal, the mother received half of the settlement funds. The father’s portion was held by the court pending resolution of a related criminal case, in which the father later pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide. The mother then requested that the court award her the remainder of the funds, arguing that Alabama law and public policy prohibited the father from benefitting financially from his son’s death. The father argued that because his conviction did not involve a felonious and intentional killing, he was not barred from recovery. The trial court agreed with the father and ordered the remaining funds to be disbursed to him, while reserving all other issues for trial or further hearing.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the order appealed from was not a final judgment. The trial court had expressly reserved remaining claims—specifically, the wrongful death claim against the father—so not all issues between all parties had been conclusively resolved. The Supreme Court of Alabama therefore dismissed the appeal. View "B.S.H. v. Humphryes" on Justia Law

In this matter, a member of the University of Alabama’s men’s basketball team, Kai Spears, brought suit against The New York Times Company after it published articles erroneously identifying him as the unidentified passenger in a car at the scene of a high-profile shooting. The Times based its reporting on information from two confidential sources. Spears, who was not in the car, alleges that The Times failed to use reasonable care in publishing false and damaging statements about him. During litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Spears sought discovery to uncover the identities of the sources and related information. The Times resisted, invoking Alabama’s “shield statute,” which protects journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama concerning the scope of the state’s shield statute. The first question asked whether the statute protects the identity of a source when information is published online. However, as Spears conceded that the print publication of the article triggered the statute’s application, the Supreme Court of Alabama declined to answer this question, finding it irrelevant to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the second certified question, which asked whether the shield statute protects any and all information that could reasonably lead to the identification of a protected source. The Court held that Alabama’s shield statute does not extend so broadly. Instead, it protects only information that would inevitably reveal the identity of a confidential source. Thus, information that could merely “reasonably lead” to the identification of a source is not covered. The Court declined to expand the statute’s protections beyond its plain language and expressly limited the privilege to “source-identifying” information whose disclosure would make identifying the source unavoidable. View "The New York Times Company v. Spears" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a contract signed on May 12, 2021, under which Kindra Cooper agreed to purchase a house from Highland Rim Investments, LLC. Delays in closing led the parties to enter into three extensions, but the sale never concluded. Cooper then sued for specific performance, declaratory judgment, and damages, later amending her complaint to add additional defendants and claims, including various forms of misrepresentation and a request to pierce Highland Rim’s corporate veil. During litigation, certain claims were dismissed, and after a jury trial, the jury awarded Cooper compensatory and punitive damages against Highland Rim and Monique Dollone, but found for other defendants on the misrepresentation claims.The Madison Circuit Court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded Cooper attorney fees, granted her motion to pierce the corporate veil as to one defendant, and later appointed a receiver over Highland Rim to preserve its fiscal health until the judgment was satisfied. The defendants moved for post-judgment relief, which was denied, and then appealed both the judgment and the receivership order.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the appeals. It found that the trial court erred by requiring the parties to strike the jury from a list of only 21 prospective jurors, rather than the 24 required by Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 47(b). This procedural error mandated reversal. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court’s judgment in favor of Cooper and its order appointing a receiver over Highland Rim must be reversed. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Highland Rim Investments, LLC v. Cooper" on Justia Law

A woman sought to challenge the probate of a will and asserted claims seeking recognition as an heir, either as a biological child or by equitable adoption, following the death of a decedent who resided in Tallapoosa County. After letters of administration had initially been issued to her by the Montgomery Probate Court, subsequent proceedings transferred jurisdiction to the Tallapoosa Probate Court, which admitted a document as the decedent’s will and appointed other individuals as personal representatives. The woman then filed a pro se complaint in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, contesting the will and requesting various relief, including a DNA test to establish her relationship to the decedent.The Tallapoosa Circuit Court held a hearing, denied her request to compel DNA testing of the proponents, allowed her to submit her own certified DNA evidence, and later dismissed the action on the ground that she had failed to provide proof of relationship as required. She appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to jurisdictional reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that, due to statutory changes enacted by Act No. 2022-427, original jurisdiction for will contests relating to wills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023, lies with the probate court, not the circuit court, except in cases where a proceeding has been properly removed to the circuit court. Finding that no removal had occurred, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court made no determination as to the woman’s ability to bring a will contest in the probate court. View "Glenn v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after Will Pecue contracted with Gulf Coast Dock Masters/H5K Company, LLC, represented by Ryan Hess, to replace two piers near Pecue's residence. One pier, the "harbor pier," was completed and paid for in full, while the other, the "social pier," was left unfinished after Pecue terminated the contract. Pecue became dissatisfied upon discovering that nontreated lumber was used on the social pier, contrary to contract specifications. Although some boards were replaced, Pecue claimed Hess refused to fix all affected areas and ultimately sent a notice of default. Pecue also asserted that H5K was not a legitimate business entity, which he argued prevented him from obtaining contractual remedies.The Baldwin Circuit Court held a bench trial, during which Pecue pursued only a fraud claim against Hess and H5K, seeking substantial damages. Pecue testified about the alleged misrepresentation of H5K's existence and Hess's refusal to remedy the workmanship issues. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Pecue for $100,000 against Hess and "Ryan Hess D/B/A Gulf Coast Dock Masters." Hess filed a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for fraud, but the motion was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case, applying both the ore tenus and de novo standards of review as appropriate. The court found that the evidence did not support Pecue's claim of fraud. Specifically, there was no misrepresentation of material fact regarding H5K’s existence, and any alleged misrepresentation did not proximately cause Pecue’s damages. Further, there was no evidence of promissory fraud. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Hess on Pecue’s fraud claim. View "Hess v. Pecue" on Justia Law

On the evening of October 2, 2024, an employee was jogging in the parking lot of a Walmart distribution center when he was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by another Walmart employee who was performing his job duties. Both individuals were employed by Walmart at the time of the incident. The injured employee subsequently filed suit against Walmart and the co-employee, seeking damages under various tort theories, including negligence, wantonness, and co-employee liability.The case was first heard in the Pike Circuit Court. Walmart responded to the complaint by raising the defense that the employee’s claims were barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act, as the injured employee had already accepted workers’ compensation and medical benefits for the incident, while represented by counsel, and had not reserved any right to pursue other remedies. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Walmart and the co-employee, finding the acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits estopped the employee from pursuing additional remedies and that there was no evidence of willful conduct by the co-employee.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the employee’s acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits constituted an election of remedies that precluded him from seeking damages through a civil tort action against Walmart. The Court also held that, under Alabama law, co-employees are immune from civil liability except in cases of willful conduct, and the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of willful conduct by the co-employee. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of both Walmart and the co-employee. View "Duke v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

The appellant arrived at the emergency room of a medical center with severe lower back pain, right flank pain, and numbness and weakness in her left leg. Initial evaluations suggested symptoms consistent with sciatica, but further testing revealed profound anemia and a herniated disk, which did not warrant surgery. Imaging also showed a nonoccluding thrombus in her aorta. She was discharged after several days, with recommendations for follow-up. About two weeks later, she returned to the hospital with ischemic symptoms in her left leg, which led to an above-the-knee amputation due to advanced ischemia.The matter was initially heard in the Houston Circuit Court, where the appellant sued the medical center and a physician for negligence, alleging that improper evaluation and failure to initiate anticoagulant therapy resulted in limb loss. The physician was dismissed as a defendant, leaving the case against the medical center. After discovery, the medical center moved for summary judgment, arguing the appellant lacked substantial evidence of causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that causation could not be established.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standard that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court found that the appellant failed to present expert testimony establishing a proximate causal connection between the alleged breach and her injury. The medical expert's causation testimony was deemed speculative, as it relied on hypothetical actions by a vascular surgeon outside the expert’s specialty. The medical center’s expert, a vascular surgeon, testified that no different treatment would have been provided. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Armour v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center" on Justia Law

Tara Grall and her former husband, William Grall, were the sole shareholders of G-Team, P.C., an Alabama professional corporation that had ceased business operations. Amid their divorce proceedings, William initiated a derivative action against Tara, seeking to enforce the corporation's right to sell its real property to pay off mortgage debt. Tara argued that the property could not be sold due to an existing Small Business Administration lien. The trial court ordered the sale of the property and scheduled a hearing to determine the distribution of proceeds and finalize the winding up of G-Team. Tara, representing herself, filed multiple motions, including requests to stay hearings, appear remotely, and recuse the judge, but these were denied.Tara appealed several interlocutory orders to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, describing her appeal as interlocutory and requesting a stay, which was denied. Despite her pending appeal, the trial court conducted a final hearing and entered a purported final judgment on May 1, 2025, winding up G-Team. Tara then appealed that judgment as well. The Court of Civil Appeals transferred both appeals to the Supreme Court of Alabama, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined it lacked jurisdiction over both appeals. It held that the first appeal was not from a final judgment nor from an appealable interlocutory order under Rule 4(a)(1), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, and therefore must be dismissed. The second appeal was from a judgment entered while the first appeal was pending, at which point the trial court was divested of jurisdiction; this made the subsequent judgment void and the second appeal also subject to dismissal. Both appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. View "Grall v. Grall" on Justia Law

A woman called 911 to request a welfare check on her elderly neighbors’ home after noticing an unfamiliar vehicle and a young Black male there while the neighbors were out of town. When Officer Smith of the Childersburg Police Department arrived, he found a man watering flowers and asked if he lived at the house. The man, who identified himself as Pastor Jennings and said he lived across the street, explained he was watching the house for the neighbors. When asked for identification, Jennings became agitated and refused to provide any. Other officers arrived, and after Jennings repeatedly refused to further identify himself, he was arrested and charged with obstructing a governmental function.After the charge was dismissed, Jennings sued the officers and the City of Childersburg in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging unlawful and retaliatory arrest under federal law and false arrest under state law. The district court granted summary judgment and dismissal in favor of the officers and the City, finding that Jennings violated Alabama’s stop-and-identify statute, Ala. Code § 15-5-30, by refusing to give his complete name. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, relying on a prior interpretation of the statute that prohibited officers from demanding physical identification. On remand, the district court found the law’s interpretation uncertain and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that Ala. Code § 15-5-30 does not prohibit law enforcement officers, during a valid Terry stop, from requesting physical identification if a suspect gives an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral response regarding their name and address. The court clarified that suspects must provide sufficient identifying information and that failure to do so can constitute a violation of Alabama law. View "Jennings v. Smith" on Justia Law