Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Daniel Flickinger, a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative political commentary on his personal social media. In June 2020, he posted a controversial message about George Floyd's death. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (the King law firm), sent this post to Flickinger's supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, expressing concern. Wainwright and other WPM partners, who were not familiar with social media, reviewed Flickinger's posts and asked him to resign, which he did.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed his claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference claim and remanded the case. The King defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no substantial evidence that their actions caused Flickinger's damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the King defendants, concluding that the WPM partners' decision to terminate Flickinger was based on their independent review of his social media posts.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment for the King law firm, finding that King's actions were not within the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for King, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether King's actions were a substantial factor in Flickinger's termination and whether King was justified in sending the post. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also upheld the denial of Flickinger's motion to compel King's cellular-telephone records and his motion to continue the summary-judgment hearing. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

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In February 2017, Lily T. Ojano-Bracco, Mountain West IRA, Inc., Angelina M. Sharman, and James R. Sharman sued Bradley C. Lewis, Birmingham Income Property, LLC (BIP), MAC, LLC, and Bryan Conwill, alleging fraud by BIP, which Lewis and Conwill owned. A process server delivered a summons and complaint to Lewis's stepson, Xavier Young, at Lewis's marital home. Despite evidence linking Lewis to this address, he did not respond to the complaint or subsequent court documents. In May 2021, the trial court entered a default judgment against Lewis, BIP, and Conwill. Lewis did not respond until April 2023, when he was personally served with a contempt order.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied Lewis's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the default judgment, which he based on claims of improper service. Lewis appealed, arguing he was unaware of the case and not properly served.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the Letson Farms address was Lewis's "usual place of abode" as he listed it on tax returns, a bankruptcy filing, and with the Alabama Secretary of State. Additionally, Young, who accepted the summons, resided at the Letson Farms address, as evidenced by his own official documents and previous acceptance of service on Lewis's behalf.The court held that service of process was valid under Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P., as it was performed at Lewis's usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing there. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's denial of Lewis's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. View "Lewis v. Ojano-Bracco" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Teresa Williams and Barney's Childcare and Learning Center, Inc., doing business as Pooh Bear Academy, filed a complaint against various officials and employees of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (ADHR) and the Elmore County Department of Human Resources (EDHR). The complaint included tort claims related to the suspension and revocation of the day-care provider's operating license and the denial of its license renewal application.The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint on April 25, 2024. Williams and the day-care provider filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment on May 23, 2024. The court set a hearing for July 1, 2024, but it did not occur. A hearing was eventually held on September 5, 2024, where both parties' counsel stated on record that they had agreed to extend the time for the court to rule on the postjudgment motion beyond the 90-day limit. However, the court did not enter an order denying the postjudgment motion until September 12, 2024.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was untimely. The court noted that under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the trial court had 90 days to rule on the postjudgment motion, which expired on August 21, 2024. Since the parties' consent to extend the time was not placed on the record before the 90-day period expired, the postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on August 21, 2024. Consequently, Williams and the day-care provider had until October 2, 2024, to file their notice of appeal, but they did not do so until October 17, 2024. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Williams v. Dodd" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (collectively "RSA"), which received a land-use certificate from the Baldwin County zoning administrator to construct a five-story structure at The Grand Hotel. The Point Clear Property Owners Association, Inc. (PCPOA), representing around 400 members in the district, appealed the issuance of the certificate to the Baldwin County Board of Adjustment. The Board agreed with PCPOA and rescinded the certificate.RSA appealed the Board's decision to the Baldwin Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board's ruling. RSA then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that PCPOA was not "aggrieved" by the issuance of the certificate and thus lacked standing to appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals held that RSA had waived this argument by not raising it before the Board and cited the precedent set in City of Mobile v. Lee. The court also noted in a footnote that PCPOA did qualify as a "person aggrieved."The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that whether PCPOA was "aggrieved" was a waivable issue of capacity, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, RSA's failure to raise the issue before the Board constituted a waiver. The court did not address whether PCPOA was actually "aggrieved," as it affirmed the lower court's decision based on the waiver. View "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Department" on Justia Law

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Yadira Ordonez, individually and as mother and next friend of her minor daughter, S.C.O., sued Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. (CFMI) in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries S.C.O. sustained from hot soup purchased at Capitol International Market. CFMI moved for summary judgment, claiming it did not operate the market. Ordonez opposed the motion and requested more time for discovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CFMI, and Ordonez appealed.The trial court entered summary judgment for CFMI, finding that CFMI did not operate the grocery store or the deli where the incident occurred. Ordonez argued that more discovery was needed, particularly the deposition of CFMI's owner, John Yim, to test the veracity of his statements. The trial court denied Ordonez's motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery and granted summary judgment to CFMI.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Ordonez's motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f) to take Yim's deposition. The court noted that the health department records and other evidence raised questions about CFMI's assertions that it had no employees and did not operate the grocery store or deli. The court concluded that Yim's deposition was critical to Ordonez's opposition to the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ordonez v. Capitol Farmers Market, Inc." on Justia Law

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Briana Marquise Matthews, a former prison guard, was charged with two counts of custodial sexual misconduct for having sexual encounters with an inmate. She pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 10 years, with 18 months to be served in custody and the remainder on probation. Upon starting her probation, Matthews was informed she had to comply with the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA) requirements.Matthews filed a petition in the St. Clair Circuit Court seeking relief from the ASORCNA requirements, arguing that these were not part of her plea agreement. The State responded that her petition was incorrectly filed in the criminal action and should be a new civil action. Matthews withdrew her petition and filed a new one as a civil action, seeking relief from the ASORCNA requirements and restrictions. The circuit court temporarily relieved her from these requirements pending further orders but ultimately denied her petition, stating that her convictions were not among those listed in § 15-20A-24(a) for which relief could be sought.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It dismissed the appeal from the criminal action, stating that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition in the criminal case, making the order void. However, the court affirmed the judgment in the civil action, agreeing that Matthews's convictions for custodial sexual misconduct were not eligible for relief under § 15-20A-24(a). The court also noted that Matthews was not entitled to seek relief while still serving her probationary term. View "Matthews v. State of Alabama" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In December 2021, Officer Shelton Davis of the Montgomery Police Department, while pursuing a fleeing suspect, collided with Madilyn Shuford's vehicle at an intersection in Montgomery. Officer Davis was responding to a woman's plea for help, who claimed a man was trying to kill her. The suspect, Eugene Osborne Jr., fled in a vehicle, prompting Officer Davis to pursue him with activated lights and sirens. During the pursuit, Officer Davis slowed down at a red light but collided with Shuford's vehicle when she pulled into the intersection.Shuford sued the City of Montgomery and Officer Davis, alleging negligence and wanton conduct, and claimed the City was vicariously liable. The City and Officer Davis moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, and Ex parte Cranman. They provided evidence, including Officer Davis's affidavit and body camera footage, showing he was performing his duties with activated lights and sirens. Shuford opposed, arguing Officer Davis did not use proper signals and took unreasonable risks.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the summary judgment motion without explanation. The City and Officer Davis petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the denial and grant summary judgment based on immunity.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that Officer Davis was entitled to immunity as he was performing his law enforcement duties and exercising judgment. The court found no substantial evidence from Shuford to refute this. Consequently, the City was also entitled to immunity. The trial court was directed to enter summary judgment in favor of the City and Officer Davis. View "Shuford v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs filed lawsuits against two online-game companies, alleging that the companies' casino-themed social gaming applications constituted illegal gambling. The plaintiffs sought to recover money lost by Alabama residents who played these games, on behalf of the players' families, under an Alabama statute that allows such recovery. The plaintiffs did not play the games themselves and did not name any specific Alabama residents who had played the games.The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreements included in the terms of service for the games, which players agreed to when they downloaded the games. The defendants also moved to dismiss the cases, arguing that the plaintiffs could not pursue mass claims on behalf of all Alabama residents who played the games and that the games were not gambling. The Franklin Circuit Court denied both the motions to compel arbitration and the motions to dismiss.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs, in asserting claims under the Alabama statute, were standing in the legal shoes of the players who had agreed to arbitrate their claims. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims must be arbitrated. The court reversed the trial court's orders denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded the cases for the trial court to grant the motions. View "Zynga, Inc. v. Mills" on Justia Law

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Hembree Insurance Trust ("Hembree") leased a 135,847-square-foot industrial building in Scottsboro to Maples Industries, Inc. ("Maples") for five years starting January 1, 2020. The lease required Maples to maintain the property and share roof repair costs with Hembree. Hembree initiated a lawsuit against Maples in March 2024, alleging that Maples failed to repair or replace the roof as required by the lease.The Jackson Circuit Court treated Maples's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and ruled in favor of Maples. The court found the lease "null and void" because Hembree did not own the property, which had been transferred to Woods Cove Industrial Property, LLC ("Woods Cove") in 2014. Hembree argued that it was the sole member of Woods Cove and had the authority to lease the property, but the trial court disagreed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It found that Hembree, as the sole and controlling member of Woods Cove, had the authority to lease the property. The court noted that a tenant in possession generally cannot dispute the landlord's title and that Maples had accepted and benefited from the lease. The court concluded that Maples was estopped from challenging the lease based on Hembree being the named lessor. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hembree Insurance Trust v. Maples Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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In August 2023, the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden ("Gadsden Water") filed a lawsuit in the Etowah Circuit Court against several corporate defendants, including DuPont De Nemours, Inc., and Daikin America, Inc., alleging contamination of its raw-water intake from the Coosa River with perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). Gadsden Water claimed that the defendants' actions led to substantial economic and consequential damages, including costs for future filtration systems, monitoring contamination levels, and remediation of contaminated property.Previously, in September 2016, Gadsden Water had filed a similar lawsuit ("Gadsden I") against other parties for PFAS contamination, which was settled before trial. The settlement funds were intended to cover the costs of a new water-treatment facility and its long-term operation. The Etowah Circuit Court denied motions to dismiss the current case, leading the defendants to file petitions for writs of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petitions. For DuPont and Daikin, the Court found that Gadsden Water's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, as the claims accrued no later than September 2016, when Gadsden Water first became aware of the PFAS contamination. The Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, directing the Etowah Circuit Court to dismiss the claims against DuPont and Daikin.For INV Performance Surfaces, LLC, the Court determined that the Etowah Circuit Court lacked specific personal jurisdiction. INV's limited contacts with Alabama, including owning equipment in one or two Alabama carpet mills in 2006, were insufficient to establish jurisdiction. The Court granted INV's petition for writ of mandamus, directing the Etowah Circuit Court to dismiss the claims against INV. View "Ex parte DuPont De Nemours, Inc." on Justia Law