Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The dispute arose from a contract signed on May 12, 2021, under which Kindra Cooper agreed to purchase a house from Highland Rim Investments, LLC. Delays in closing led the parties to enter into three extensions, but the sale never concluded. Cooper then sued for specific performance, declaratory judgment, and damages, later amending her complaint to add additional defendants and claims, including various forms of misrepresentation and a request to pierce Highland Rim’s corporate veil. During litigation, certain claims were dismissed, and after a jury trial, the jury awarded Cooper compensatory and punitive damages against Highland Rim and Monique Dollone, but found for other defendants on the misrepresentation claims.The Madison Circuit Court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded Cooper attorney fees, granted her motion to pierce the corporate veil as to one defendant, and later appointed a receiver over Highland Rim to preserve its fiscal health until the judgment was satisfied. The defendants moved for post-judgment relief, which was denied, and then appealed both the judgment and the receivership order.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the appeals. It found that the trial court erred by requiring the parties to strike the jury from a list of only 21 prospective jurors, rather than the 24 required by Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 47(b). This procedural error mandated reversal. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court’s judgment in favor of Cooper and its order appointing a receiver over Highland Rim must be reversed. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Highland Rim Investments, LLC v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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A woman sought to challenge the probate of a will and asserted claims seeking recognition as an heir, either as a biological child or by equitable adoption, following the death of a decedent who resided in Tallapoosa County. After letters of administration had initially been issued to her by the Montgomery Probate Court, subsequent proceedings transferred jurisdiction to the Tallapoosa Probate Court, which admitted a document as the decedent’s will and appointed other individuals as personal representatives. The woman then filed a pro se complaint in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, contesting the will and requesting various relief, including a DNA test to establish her relationship to the decedent.The Tallapoosa Circuit Court held a hearing, denied her request to compel DNA testing of the proponents, allowed her to submit her own certified DNA evidence, and later dismissed the action on the ground that she had failed to provide proof of relationship as required. She appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to jurisdictional reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that, due to statutory changes enacted by Act No. 2022-427, original jurisdiction for will contests relating to wills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023, lies with the probate court, not the circuit court, except in cases where a proceeding has been properly removed to the circuit court. Finding that no removal had occurred, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court made no determination as to the woman’s ability to bring a will contest in the probate court. View "Glenn v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

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The dispute arose after Will Pecue contracted with Gulf Coast Dock Masters/H5K Company, LLC, represented by Ryan Hess, to replace two piers near Pecue's residence. One pier, the "harbor pier," was completed and paid for in full, while the other, the "social pier," was left unfinished after Pecue terminated the contract. Pecue became dissatisfied upon discovering that nontreated lumber was used on the social pier, contrary to contract specifications. Although some boards were replaced, Pecue claimed Hess refused to fix all affected areas and ultimately sent a notice of default. Pecue also asserted that H5K was not a legitimate business entity, which he argued prevented him from obtaining contractual remedies.The Baldwin Circuit Court held a bench trial, during which Pecue pursued only a fraud claim against Hess and H5K, seeking substantial damages. Pecue testified about the alleged misrepresentation of H5K's existence and Hess's refusal to remedy the workmanship issues. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Pecue for $100,000 against Hess and "Ryan Hess D/B/A Gulf Coast Dock Masters." Hess filed a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for fraud, but the motion was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case, applying both the ore tenus and de novo standards of review as appropriate. The court found that the evidence did not support Pecue's claim of fraud. Specifically, there was no misrepresentation of material fact regarding H5K’s existence, and any alleged misrepresentation did not proximately cause Pecue’s damages. Further, there was no evidence of promissory fraud. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Hess on Pecue’s fraud claim. View "Hess v. Pecue" on Justia Law

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On the evening of October 2, 2024, an employee was jogging in the parking lot of a Walmart distribution center when he was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by another Walmart employee who was performing his job duties. Both individuals were employed by Walmart at the time of the incident. The injured employee subsequently filed suit against Walmart and the co-employee, seeking damages under various tort theories, including negligence, wantonness, and co-employee liability.The case was first heard in the Pike Circuit Court. Walmart responded to the complaint by raising the defense that the employee’s claims were barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act, as the injured employee had already accepted workers’ compensation and medical benefits for the incident, while represented by counsel, and had not reserved any right to pursue other remedies. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Walmart and the co-employee, finding the acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits estopped the employee from pursuing additional remedies and that there was no evidence of willful conduct by the co-employee.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the employee’s acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits constituted an election of remedies that precluded him from seeking damages through a civil tort action against Walmart. The Court also held that, under Alabama law, co-employees are immune from civil liability except in cases of willful conduct, and the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of willful conduct by the co-employee. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of both Walmart and the co-employee. View "Duke v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

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The appellant arrived at the emergency room of a medical center with severe lower back pain, right flank pain, and numbness and weakness in her left leg. Initial evaluations suggested symptoms consistent with sciatica, but further testing revealed profound anemia and a herniated disk, which did not warrant surgery. Imaging also showed a nonoccluding thrombus in her aorta. She was discharged after several days, with recommendations for follow-up. About two weeks later, she returned to the hospital with ischemic symptoms in her left leg, which led to an above-the-knee amputation due to advanced ischemia.The matter was initially heard in the Houston Circuit Court, where the appellant sued the medical center and a physician for negligence, alleging that improper evaluation and failure to initiate anticoagulant therapy resulted in limb loss. The physician was dismissed as a defendant, leaving the case against the medical center. After discovery, the medical center moved for summary judgment, arguing the appellant lacked substantial evidence of causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that causation could not be established.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standard that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court found that the appellant failed to present expert testimony establishing a proximate causal connection between the alleged breach and her injury. The medical expert's causation testimony was deemed speculative, as it relied on hypothetical actions by a vascular surgeon outside the expert’s specialty. The medical center’s expert, a vascular surgeon, testified that no different treatment would have been provided. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Armour v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center" on Justia Law

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Tara Grall and her former husband, William Grall, were the sole shareholders of G-Team, P.C., an Alabama professional corporation that had ceased business operations. Amid their divorce proceedings, William initiated a derivative action against Tara, seeking to enforce the corporation's right to sell its real property to pay off mortgage debt. Tara argued that the property could not be sold due to an existing Small Business Administration lien. The trial court ordered the sale of the property and scheduled a hearing to determine the distribution of proceeds and finalize the winding up of G-Team. Tara, representing herself, filed multiple motions, including requests to stay hearings, appear remotely, and recuse the judge, but these were denied.Tara appealed several interlocutory orders to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, describing her appeal as interlocutory and requesting a stay, which was denied. Despite her pending appeal, the trial court conducted a final hearing and entered a purported final judgment on May 1, 2025, winding up G-Team. Tara then appealed that judgment as well. The Court of Civil Appeals transferred both appeals to the Supreme Court of Alabama, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined it lacked jurisdiction over both appeals. It held that the first appeal was not from a final judgment nor from an appealable interlocutory order under Rule 4(a)(1), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, and therefore must be dismissed. The second appeal was from a judgment entered while the first appeal was pending, at which point the trial court was divested of jurisdiction; this made the subsequent judgment void and the second appeal also subject to dismissal. Both appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. View "Grall v. Grall" on Justia Law

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A woman called 911 to request a welfare check on her elderly neighbors’ home after noticing an unfamiliar vehicle and a young Black male there while the neighbors were out of town. When Officer Smith of the Childersburg Police Department arrived, he found a man watering flowers and asked if he lived at the house. The man, who identified himself as Pastor Jennings and said he lived across the street, explained he was watching the house for the neighbors. When asked for identification, Jennings became agitated and refused to provide any. Other officers arrived, and after Jennings repeatedly refused to further identify himself, he was arrested and charged with obstructing a governmental function.After the charge was dismissed, Jennings sued the officers and the City of Childersburg in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging unlawful and retaliatory arrest under federal law and false arrest under state law. The district court granted summary judgment and dismissal in favor of the officers and the City, finding that Jennings violated Alabama’s stop-and-identify statute, Ala. Code § 15-5-30, by refusing to give his complete name. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, relying on a prior interpretation of the statute that prohibited officers from demanding physical identification. On remand, the district court found the law’s interpretation uncertain and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that Ala. Code § 15-5-30 does not prohibit law enforcement officers, during a valid Terry stop, from requesting physical identification if a suspect gives an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral response regarding their name and address. The court clarified that suspects must provide sufficient identifying information and that failure to do so can constitute a violation of Alabama law. View "Jennings v. Smith" on Justia Law

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A married couple who had served as foster parents were indicted for capital murder in connection with the death of an infant, E.E., who had been placed in their care by the Marshall County Department of Human Resources due to his medical needs and his parents’ inability to care for him. The child, who required a feeding tube and frequent hospitalization, died while in their custody. In July 2024, a Blount County grand jury indicted both individuals for capital murder, and they were denied bail by the Blount Circuit Court after evidentiary hearings.The petitioners each moved for bail, arguing that the State had the burden to present evidence sufficient to show they were not entitled to bail. The State countered that, in capital cases, the indictment itself creates a presumption of guilt for purposes of bail, and the burden shifts to the defendants to overcome this presumption. The Blount Circuit Court agreed with the State, denied bail, and found that the evidence did not overcome the presumption arising from the indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently denied habeas petitions challenging the denial of bail.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed the longstanding “presumption rule,” which holds that, in capital cases, an indictment creates a presumption of guilt for purposes of bail, and the defendant must overcome this presumption by presenting sufficient evidence. The Court declined to overturn this rule, citing stare decisis and legislative acquiescence, especially in light of recent constitutional and statutory amendments. The Court held that the trial court did not err in denying bail because the petitioners had not overcome the presumption of guilt, and it denied both petitions for writs of habeas corpus. View "State of Alabama v. Grimes" on Justia Law

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Brian Smith, through several companies he formed, was engaged in purchasing and developing property around Lake Martin. In March 2025, Smith and his companies initiated arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association, asserting claims such as fraud and breach of contract against various individuals and entities involved in the land transactions. These respondents, who were involved in the transactions as real estate agents, agencies, a closing agency, and a consultant, had not signed the contracts containing the arbitration provisions at issue.In response, the individuals and entities named in the arbitration, now plaintiffs, filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court. They sought a judgment declaring there was no valid and enforceable agreement requiring them to arbitrate disputes with Smith and his companies and requested a stay of the arbitration. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on provisions in the relevant land-sale contracts, arguing that even as nonsignatories, the plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration clauses due to equitable estoppel or because they were third-party beneficiaries. The defendants further contended that the question of arbitrability—whether the claims against the plaintiffs should be arbitrated—was itself a matter for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide. The circuit court disagreed, stayed the arbitration, and decided it would determine whether a valid arbitration agreement existed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the matter and held that, under its precedent, when an arbitration provision contains a delegation clause or incorporates the AAA rules, the question of whether claims against nonsignatories are subject to arbitration must be decided by the arbitrator. The Court concluded the circuit court erred in staying the arbitration and in failing to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for entry of an order compelling arbitration. The petition for writ of mandamus was dismissed as moot. View "Ex parte Smith" on Justia Law

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After both parents contracted COVID-19 in 2020, they asked their daughter to move from Tennessee to Alabama to care for them. In exchange for her agreement to relocate and provide care, the parents promised to convey an interest in their Orange Beach condominium to the daughter. The parents, acting in their individual capacities, executed a deed purporting to transfer an interest in the property to themselves and their daughter as joint tenants. The daughter was not aware that the condominium was, in fact, owned by a revocable trust for which the parents served as trustees.The parents later sought to annul the deed in the Baldwin Circuit Court, arguing that the deed was ineffective because the property was owned by the trust and they had not executed the deed as trustees. They also contended that the conveyance was voidable under Alabama law because a material part of the consideration was the daughter’s promise to support them. The daughter sought reformation of the deed to reflect the parents' trustee status and counterclaimed for fraud and breach of warranty. The Baldwin Circuit Court annulled the deed and dismissed the daughter’s counterclaims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the controlling statute, § 8-9-12, Ala. Code 1975, permitted annulment of a real property conveyance when a material part of the consideration was an agreement to provide support, regardless of whether the grantor acted as an individual or trustee. The Court further held that annulment of the deed extinguished any warranties arising from the conveyance and rendered the fraud counterclaim untenable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment, upholding annulment of the deed and dismissal of the counterclaims. View "Schumpert v. Wallace" on Justia Law