Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Alabama has reversed a lower court's decision in a case involving claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and violation of the Alabama Right of Publicity Act. The lawsuit was filed by Jennifer South, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Jules Pierre Gillette, against Regional Prime Television and Tommy Dwayne Hubbard. The case arose from an episode of a show titled 'Ghostly Encounters' that was filmed in a former school building where South and Gillette had lived. The episode included allegations that Gillette had a drinking problem, was paranoid, abused little boys, physically abused South, and locked her in a closet in their home. The Supreme Court found that South did not present substantial evidence to support her defamation claim and that the estate failed to prove that the use of Gillette's indicia of identity in the episode was "for the purposes of trade". The court rendered a judgment in favor of Hubbard and Regional Prime on the estate's right-of-publicity claim and South's defamation claim, and remanded the case for a new trial as to South's invasion-of-privacy and tort-of-outrage claims. View "Regional Prime Television v. South" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Alabama Legislature passed -- and Governor Kay Ivey signed -- House Bill 380 ("H.B. 380"), which became Act No. 2019-393, Ala. Acts 2019. As enacted, H.B. 380 amended various Code provisions, including § 15-22-21(a), Ala. Code 1975, creating the position of director of the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles ("the Bureau"), and § 15-22-20(b), Ala. Code 1975, addressing the nomination and appointment processes for the members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board"). After H.B. 380 was enacted, Governor Ivey appointed Leigh Gwathney as chair of the Board pursuant to the new procedures set forth in § 15-22-20(b). In November 2020, the three-member Board convened and held a parole-consideration hearing for Angela Turner, an inmate who was serving a life sentence for murder. Following a review of Turner's file, the Board unanimously denied Turner's parole request. Around that same time, Governor Ivey appointed Cam Ward as the new director of the Bureau. In response to the Board's denial of parole, Turner filed suit against Governor Ivey, Ward, Gwathney, and the other members of the Parole Board, in which she sought a judgment declaring that Governor Ivey's appointment of Ward and Gwathney to their respective positions pursuant to the changes created by H.B. 380 violated the Alabama Constitution of 1901. She also, on behalf of the State of Alabama, petitioned for writs of quo warranto pursuant to § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975, alleging that Ward and Gwathney unlawfully held their respective positions. Finally, she alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all the defendants on the basis that she had been denied due process during her parole-consideration hearing. The circuit court dismissed Turner's claims with prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Turner and the State of Alabama ex rel. Angela Turner v. Ivey, et al." on Justia Law

Irvin Shell, as administrator of the estate of Annie Ruth Peterson, deceased ("the estate"), appealed separate summary judgments entered in favor of Montgomery-municipal jail employees Terri Butcher and Shayla Payne, respectively, on the basis of State-agent immunity. Annie Peterson was arrested for driving under the influence "of any substance" and transported to the municipal jail. Peterson was not actually under the influence of an intoxicating substance at the time of her arrest; rather, she was suffering from a hemorrhagic stroke. She remained in jail overnight; when jail officers went to retrieve Peterson from her cell, she was weak, “drowsy” and appeared ill. This information was relayed to a jail nurse; the nurse in turn contacted a doctor, who instructed jail staff to transport Peterson to the emergency room. After the bonding process was complete, Peterson was released to a family member who transported Peterson to a local hospital where she was diagnosed with having suffered a stroke; she died three days later on April 16, 2013. The estate sued Butcher and Payne in their individual capacities, alleging that they had been negligent and wanton in failing to obtain medical care for Peterson in a timely manner. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the estate did not demonstrate the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Butcher and Payne based on State-agent immunity. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments were affirmed. View "Shell v. Butcher" on Justia Law

The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board"), and Board members Lester Turk, Donald McLeod, Joseph Pettway, Jr., and Shelia Dortch (collectively, "the Board members"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss the claims against them based on immunity and to enter an order granting that motion. In 2017, Kimberly Perryman, as guardian and next friend of her minor son, R.M., sued the Board, and J.E. Hobbs Elementary School principal Roshanda Jackson, and teacher Timothy Irvin Smiley. Perryman alleged in 2016, Smiley, "in a fit of rage and unprovoked, did lift the Plaintiff R.M. and slam him down upon a table, with such force as to break said table." Perryman further alleged in her rendition of the facts that "Smiley was in the habit of continuously and repeatedly using harsh, physical and otherwise inappropriate tactics on the students in his class" and that "Smiley's behavior was known or should have been known to the Principal Defendant and the School Board Defendant[]." Perryman asserted claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Smiley; claims of negligence and negligent/wanton hiring, training, retention, and supervision against Jackson; and a claim of negligence against the Board. Specifically, the negligence claim against the Board stated: "The ... Wilcox County Board of Education negligently breached [its] dut[y] to R.M. by failing to supervise, discipline or remove if necessary, the Defendant teacher [Timothy Smiley], thereby placing the Plaintiff R.M. in harm's way." The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Board and the Board members in their official capacities were entitled to immunity from the state-law claims asserted against them; the Board members in their individual capacities were entitled to State-agent immunity from any state-law claims asserted against them; and that the Board members in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity from the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim asserted against them. Therefore, the circuit court should have dismissed Perryman's claims with respect to those parties, and to that extent the petition for mandamus relief was granted. However, the Board and the Board members in their official capacities were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the section 1983 claim, and the petition was denied with respect to that claim. View "Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education" on Justia Law

This case involved Barbara Johnson's claim against the City of Mobile in which she alleged retaliation based on several complaints and lawsuits she filed against the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"). Johnson, an African-American woman over 40 years of age, began working for the City in 1996. Johnson previously filed several complaints and lawsuits against the City pertaining to her employment with the City. In 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012, Johnson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") complaints against the City alleging various forms of discrimination. Johnson also unsuccessfully sued the City in 2007, 2008, and 2010. Johnson filed the underlying action in 2013, alleging that, in violation of Title VII and the ADA, the City retaliated against Johnson because she had filed discrimination charges against the City with the EEOC. Johnson's deposition testimony indicated that in 2008 or 2009 Johnson had surgery to correct a problem with her toe. As a result of her surgery, Johnson was "taken off of work" for what "could have been a month." Johnson's time off work to recover from her injury was preapproved by the City, and she was paid for her time off. Once Johnson returned to work, she had to wear a boot to protect her toe, and her doctor "wanted [her] on light duty." Johnson's supervisor, Terrell Washington, informed Johnson that there was no light duty available at that time so Johnson remained at home on paid leave. Once Johnson returned to work, Johnson was ordered by her physician to wear a certain kind of shoe that did not comply with the City's dress code: the City required Johnson to wear black shoes, but her physician-prescribed shoes were white. Johnson subsequently received an unsatisfactory-annual performance rating from Washington for the period ending June 8, 2010. Thereafter, Johnson used the MCPB's appellate process for review of her unsatisfactory-performance rating. Ultimately, the MCPB affirmed Johnson's rating. Johnson received a "Letter of Determination" concerning the complaint she filed against the City from the EEOC. The Department of Justice did not elect to sue on Johnson's behalf, but advised that she was free to file suit on her own. The underlying matter in this appeal is the suit Johnson filed with regard to her EEOC complaint. The matter ended with judgment entered in favor of the City. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits and its denial of Johnson's post-judgment motions. The Court also affirmed the trial court's decision to award the City attorney fees. However, the Court reversed the judgment insofar as it set the amount of the fees, and remanded the case for recalculation of fees with reasons supporting the recalculation. View "Johnson v. City of Mobile" on Justia Law

Respondents Reed Collar and Bonnie Collar, as the parents of Gilbert Collar, sued the University of South Alabama in connection with Gilbert's death. In October 2012, Gilbert was a student at the University. At some point while he and a few other students were talking, Gilbert was given a substance that was believed to have included illegal drugs. Gilbert had a sudden and immediate reaction to the substance: the reaction caused him either to become extremely hot or to believe that he was very hot. Gilbert lost the ability to fully understand his actions and to reason. As a result, Gilbert took off his clothes and began running into and out of traffic on the campus of the University. At some point during his reaction, Gilbert went to the University's police station and began hitting the windows. Gilbert started to walk away from the building but came back and started hitting the door of the station. An officer came out of the station through the door with his weapon drawn. After the officer called to Gilbert, Gilbert started to advance toward the police station and "immediately began acting in an erratic manner." When Gilbert was a few feet from the officer ("and for unexplainable reasons"), the officer shot Gilbert. The trial court entered an order denying the Chief of University Police's motion to dismiss. The Chief filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to reverse the trial court. The Supreme Court found that the Chief had a clear legal right to the dismissal of counts one and three of the complaint against him. Therefore, the Court granted his petition. View "Collar v. University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

Elaine Dees sued Guyoungtech USA, Inc., alleging retaliatory discharge. A jury awarded Dees $1 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The trial court denied Guyoungtech's post-trial motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") or, alternatively, for a new trial but remitted the awards to $300,000 in compensatory damages and $900,000 in punitive damages, which Dees accepted. Guyoungtech appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Guyoungtech is entitled to a new trial, it did not address the denial of its motion for a JML. View "Guyoungtech USA, Inc. v. Dees " on Justia Law

Volcano Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Club Volcano, appealed the denial of its Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to set aside the judgment entered against it in a wrongful-death action filed by Peggy Bender Rush, as administratrix of the estate of her husband Derric Rush and as his widow, and by Dashton Rush, the Rushes' minor son, by an through his mother and next friend, Peggy Bender Rush. The complaint alleged that police officer James Kendrick met a friend of his at Club Volcano after Kendrick's shift had ended. The complaint alleged Kendrick consumed a substantial amount of alcohol while sitting in a parked vehicle in the parking lot of the club, after which he entered the club with his friend. Kendrick allegedly "remained for several hours" in the club, that while there he "became visibly intoxicated," and that, "despite his "visibly intoxicated condition, [he] was served additional alcohol and allowed to leave in an intoxicated condition." In his intoxicated condition, Kendrick allegedly drove his vehicle in a manner that caused the death of Derric Rush. In order to serve Volcano and its owner with her complaint, Rush employed a process server, who after three attempts, was unable to serve Volcano a copy of the complaint. There was a question at trial over whether Volcano's owner was actively attempting to avoid service. Rush resorted to service by publication. Volcano alleged service by publication was insufficient in this case. The Supreme Court concluded Rush had the burden of demonstrating that Volcano's owner avoided service, which the Court concluded she did not do. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant Volcano's motion to set aside the default judgment. View "Volcano Enterprises, Inc. v. Rush" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions pertaining to Alabama law to the Alabama Supreme Court. The certified questions in this matter required the Court to determine the scope of certain provisions of the Act No. 2010-761, Ala. Acts 2010. The Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative: (1) the "or otherwise" language in the Act is limited to the use of State mechanisms to make payments to organizations that use at least some portion of those payments for political activity; (2) the term "political activity" is not limited to electioneering activities, i.e., activities undertaken in support of candidates for elected offices. View "Alabama Superintendent of Education et al. v. Alabama Education Association" on Justia Law

The City of Bessemer and Bessemer City Councillors Jimmy Stephens, Dorothy Davidson, Sarah W. Belcher, and Albert Soles sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former City Councillor Louise Alexander and the law firm of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C. ("WAD"). The City councillors also sought to have a racial-discrimination claim dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2006 and 2007 Alexander received three donations from a Tuscaloosa real-estate developer, which were properly used for charitable projects in her district. In this same period (according to the complaint), Davidson and Belcher, received similar donations from the same individual for charitable projects in their respective districts. According to the complaint, beginning in the early spring of 2007, plaintiff Alexander opposed several projects the donor had proposed to the City and, the donor "vowed to retaliate." The complaint alleged that because of the donor's complaint to the Attorney General, a five-count indictment against Alexander was filed in August 2008 alleging violations of the Alabama Ethics Law. The complaint asserted that similar charges were not brought against Davidson and Belcher. WAD represented Alexander during her criminal proceedings. Alexander was ultimately acquitted. Alexander and WAD alleged that the City had a "policy and practice" of paying legal fees for city officials charged with crimes relating to their official duties if and when they were found not guilty. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief as it related to the bad-faith claim against the City. The Court denied the petition with regard to plaintiffs' claim against the City councillors regarding the racial discrimination claim: the councilors did not demonstrate entitlement to legislative immunity, and whether they were entitled to qualified immunity was a question requiring further consideration of facts outside of the pleadings. View "Alexander v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law